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ABSTRACT
In this study the techniques of collective "biography and roll-
«
call analysis have been used to determine and analyze the response of 
185 Representatives from ten ex-Confederate states (excluding Tennessee) 
to a broad range of economic issues selected from the Fortieth through 
the Forty-Fourth Congresses (1868-1877) • Particularly at question is 
the assumption that Southern Republican Representatives disregarded the 
interests of their constituencies and voted with Northeastern party 
colleagues on economic measures. Secondarily, an effort has been made 
to investigate the relationships that may have existed between voting 
behavior on economic issues and personal and constituent characteristics 
of each Representative.
Economic measures considered include those relating to internal 
taxation, the tariff, federal aid to internal improvements, contraction 
and expansion of the currency, the remonetization of silver, public 
credit, and the overriding issue of specie resumption. A special effort 
has been made to collect surviving "biographical data on each Southern 
Representative for the purposes of constructing biographical profiles 
of the section's delegations and for analytical use. Other bodies of 
quantifiable data compiled include social and economic profiles of 
each Southern congressional district and complete county-level election 
returns for the House of Representatives from 1868 to IB76. The latter
ix
were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political 
Research at the University of Michigan, Aon Arbor. Non-quantifiable 
sources such as newspapers, manuscript collections, and government 
documents have been surveyed to help determine Southern attitudes on 
economic questions. All quantifiable biographical information, 
election return data, and census statistics on each congressional 
district have been coded in machine-readable form for correlation with 
House roll-call records obtained from the ICER. The Consortium's 
OSIRIS II package of computer programs designed for analysis of social 
science data were used to manipulate and analyze the quantifiable data 
and to construct Guttman scales on certain economic issues.
When judged by their response on recorded roll-call votes in the 
five Reconstruction Houses, the Southern Republicans, often under 
difficult circumstances, served the economic interests of their section 
in a creditable manner. They were particularly responsive to their 
section's need for federal aid for internal improvements, for reduction 
of internal taxes, and for the expansion of currency and banking 
facilities. The associations between voting behavior on specific 
economic issues and personal and constituent characteristics were for 
the most part insignificant as economic questions usually split the 
House along either regional or, more rarely, party lines. Southern 
Representatives commonly voted as a bipartisan unit on economic 
questions of major importance to their section. The most evident 
coalition on economic questions was that between the South and Midwest 
against the Northeast, but on some questions, such as that of federal 
subsidies for Internal improvements, Southerners often found more
support In the Northeast than in the Midwest. Xt is quite clear, 
however, that the issues of race and political reconstruction were more 
important to conservative Southerners than were economic questions.
The responsible voting record of Southern Republicans on economic 
issues mattered little to conservatives and the Republicans were 
slowly but surely eliminated from Southern politics by the process of 
redemption on the one hand and by declining Northern support for 
reconstruction on the other.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY
Toward the end of the First Session of the Forty-Third Congress,
the conservative Democratic editor of the New Orleans Picayune noted
with pleasure that the two most important measures of the session,
the postponing of specie payments and the empowering of a commission
to regulate railroad rates, had been passed by the votes of the South
and the Vest against the East. Most importantly, the affirmative
votes of Southern Republican congressmen had made the sectional
victory possible:
But for the almost solid vote of the Southern carpetbaggers 
both would have failed to become laws. Thus the two great 
principles for which the states-rights men of the South 
battled for half a century— a hard cash currency and the 
right of each State to regulate its own domestic affairs—  
find their supporters only in the East, which built up the 
carpet-bag Governments, and new find their instruments 
returning to plague the inventors.!
The reaction of Southern Republicans to the specie resumption 
and railroad rate issues was not the first nor would it be the last 
time they would break with their Northeastern party colleagues and 
vote for what the South perceived to be its economic interests. And 
yet such evidence belies the most pervasive historical interpretation
~*The (New Orleans) Daily Picayune. April 2, 1874.
of the role ployed hy economic factors in the reconstruction process. 
That interpretation, which may he termed the Beard-Beale thesis, 
holds that Northeastern business interests ("capitalists") dominated 
the Republican party and that Republicans, readily supported the 
economic and political interests of that group in Congress. The 
Beard-Beale thesis explains the harsh military reconstruction measures 
as the result of a Republican desire to fasten the Republican parly- 
on the South. The transformed region would then return Republicans 
to Congress to offer further support for the economic as well as the 
political program of the Republican party. Evidence indicates that 
this facet of the Beard-Beale thesis is deserving of re-examination.
A primary consideration of the present study is to examine the
p
validity of the thesis as it applies to Reconstruction in the South.
^The Beard-Beale thesis, named after the independent work of 
Charles and Mary Beard and Seward K. Beale, is examined more fully 
below. For specialized historiographical assessment of the economic 
element in Reconstruction historiography see: T. Harry Williams, "An
Analysis of Some Reconstruction Attitudes" Journal of Southern 
History. XII (November, 1946), 469-73, in which the author first 
isolated and labeled the economic interpretation the "Beale thesis"; 
Robert P. Sharkey, Money. Class, and Party: An Economic Interpre­
tation of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1959; paperback edition, 1966}, Chapter VII, and Sharkey*s 
"Preface to the Paperback Edition," 3-14; Irwin Unger, The Greenback 
Era: A Social and Political History of American Finance. 1565-1679" 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 3-11; B. P. Gallaway,
"Economic Determinism in Reconstruction Historiography," Southwestern 
Social Science Quarterly. XLVT (Decenber, 1965), 244-54; Walter T. K. 
Nugent, The Money Question During Reconstruction (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 1957), 107-21; and Larry Kincaid, "Victims of 
Circumstance: An Interpretation of Changing Attitudes Toward
Republican Policy Makers and Reconstruction," Journal of American 
History. LVTI (June, 1970), 48-66.
For essays that set the economic interpretation in the general 
context of Reconstruction historiography, see in particular: Howard 
K. Beale, "On Rewriting Reconstruction History," American Historical 
Review, XLV (July, 1940), 807-27; Bernard A. Weisberger, "The Dark 
and Bloody Ground of Reconstruction Historiography," Journal of 
Southern History, XXV (November, 1959), 427-47; Vernon L. Wharton,
3The economic interpretation of Reconstruction had its origins 
in Charles and Mary Beard's highly influential Rise of American 
Civilization (1927). With their emphasis on the role of economic 
factors in American history, the Beards depicted nineteenth century 
history as essentially a struggle Between agrarian and capitalist 
forces for control of the federal government. The struggle's water­
shed was the Civil War— "the social cataclysm in which the capitalists, 
laborers, and farmers of the North and West drove from power in the 
national government the planting aristocracy of the South."3 in 
effect, the war' was the "Second American Revolution" in which the 
forces of capitalism finally triumphed over those of agrarianism.
With the planting South out of the Union, the Beards concluded that 
Northeastern capitalists, through their faithful Republican agents 
in Congress, not only secured political power, hut also reaped long- 
sought and highly profitable economic gains; in fact, "all that two 
generations of Federalists and Whigs tried to get was won within four 
short years and more besides."1* For the capitalists, the spoils 
included a high protective tariff, huge federal subsidies for Northern 
internal improvements, profitable interest rates on war bond issues, a 
national banking system, and a sound currency. Throughout the
"Reconstruction" in Writing Southern History; Essays in Historiography 
in Honor of Fletcher M. Green, ed. Arthur S. Link and Rembert W. Patrick 
1[Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965)> 295-315; and 
Gerald N. Grob, "Reconstruction: An American Morality Play," in American 
History: Retrospect and Prospect, ed. George Atban Billias and Gerald 
N. Grob (New York: Macmillan, 1971)* 191-231.
^Charles and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization,
(2 vols., New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), XI, 51!.
4bid., 105.
"Second American Revolution," the Republicans, "the party of indus­
trial progress and sound money," functioned as the loyal executors of 
capitalistic interests
Howard K. Beale, in his The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew
Johnson and Reconstruction (1930), corroborated and extended the 
Beard's economic interpretation into the Reconstruction period. 
According to Beale, the Radical Republicans feared that under the 
terms of Johnsonian Reconstruction a readmitted and solidly Democratic 
South would unite with Western agrarian interests in Congress and 
dismantle the new economic order created by the Republicans and their
^Ibid., 105-110, 111. In their cataloging of the economic gains 
of the capitalists during the war, the Beards almost totally ignored 
the farmer and labor components of the Republican coalition. Only 
brief mention is made of the Homestead Act and the general war 
prosperity as beneficial to farmers. The Beards later imply that 
the war actually hurt labor as wages failed to keep pace with prices; 
ibid., 114-15, 212-13. Other historians have concluded that Mid­
western agrarians were persuaded to support the economic program of 
the Northeastern branch of the party through such inducements as 
generous federal subsidies for internal Improvements including rail­
roads, the Homestead Act, pensions, and by "such emotional, and 
psychological appeals as habitual use of the bloody shirt"; see 
Helen J. and T. Harry Will isms, "Wisconsin Republicans and Recon­
struction, 1865-1870," Wisconsin Magazine of History. XXIII (September, 
1939) » 17-39; and Williams, "An Analysis of Some Reconstruction 
Attitudes," 473.
g
Howard K. Beale, The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson 
and Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930). In 
his ''Forward to the 1958 Edition" of The Critical Year (New York: 
Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1958), Beale noted that he had arrived 
at his interpretation of economic issues during Reconstruction prior 
to the publication of the Beards' Rise of American Civilization. In 
his later article, "On Rewriting Reconstruction History," 813, Beale 
indicated his acceptance of the Beard's pronouncement that the Civil 
War was a revolution.
capitalist backers. In Beale's vords:
If Southern economic interests had. coincided with those of 
the rising industrial groups of the North, there would have 
been no Radical reconstruction. The real danger from "a 
return to rebels to power” was not overthrow of the Onion, 
but an ousting of the new industrial forces from control 
in Washington through a renewed union of Southern planters 
and Western farmers.7
In the critical congressional campaign of 1866, one of Pres­
ident Andrew Johnson's fatal political errors was his failure to 
exploit potential divisions in the Republican party— particularly the 
Midwestern wing's natural dislike of the Northeasterners' position on 
economic questions. As a result the Radical Republicans glossed over 
the divisive economic issues with a bloody-shirt campaign which 
rallied the North to defeat the Johnsonian forces and their recon­
struction policy. With Johnson's effectiveness stymied and a con­
gressional majority for their reconstruction program, the Radicals 
drove a series of harsh military reconstruction measures through
Q
Congress. As another member of the Beard-Beale school expressed it, 
"the Radicals in Congress had determined to force negro suffrage on 
the South in order to maintain the Republican party in power. "9 The 
Radicals professed no interest in the Democratic-minded "small
^Beale, The Critical Year, 225.
^Ibid., 297-99* 397-99, U06. For more recent statements of 
similar conclusions, see George Ruble Woolf oik, The Cotton Regency;
The Northern Merchants and Reconstruction (New York: Bookman
Associates, 1953)> 191-93; and William B. Besseltine (ed.), The 
Tragic Conflict: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: George
Braziller, 1962), 26-29.
^William B. Hesseltine, "Economic Factors in the Abandonment of 
Reconstruction," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (September, 
1935), 19^ -
farmers, laborers and poor whites" of the South. Instead, they feared 
that "these groups would stop the acquisitive activities of the South­
ern and Northern businessmen and, as representatives of agricultural 
communities, might oppose legislation for the benefit of industri­
alists."10
The key technique employed by Radicals to achieve their 
objective, according to another historian, was disfranchisement of 
Southern whites. In addition to punishment of rebel leaders, dis­
franchisement "comprehended in its purpose the formation of a 
Republican party in the South in order to keep rebel Democrats from 
uniting with cheap money advocates of the Northwest, and from their 
endangering the victory of the eastern capitalists." With the ex­
leaders of the South excluded from Congress, the Radicals could then 
proceed "to establish the sanctity of the tariff, national debt, 
and monetary system, [so] that when the southerners returned to 
Washington, it was too late to change the new industrial order which 
had became firmly intrenched in the interim. "11 To the Beard-Beale 
school, the political purpose of congressional reconstruction was to 
make the South Republican, thereby thwarting a Southern and Western
10Hesseltine (ed.), The Tragic Conflict. 29. See also: 
Hesseltine, Confederate leaders in the New South (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1950), 13^-37.
•^William a. Russ, Jr., "Registration and Disfranchisement 
Under Radical Reconstruction," Mississippi Valley Historical Review. 
XXI (September, 193*0* 179-80* For a rebuttal to Russ' argument on 
the extent and effectiveness of disfranchisement, see Forrest G. Wood, 
"On Revising Reconstruction History: Negro Suffrage, White
Disfranchisement, and Common Sense," Journal of Negro History. II 
(April, 1966), 98-113.
agrarian alliance on economic issues and guaranteeing further support 
for the Radicals' political and economic program.
As a logical corollary to the Beard-Beale thesis, historians 
have tended to accept the undocumented conclusion that Southern 
Democrats worked diligently in Reconstruction Congresses for their 
section* s economic interests while Southern Republicans voted with 
their Northern party colleagues to preserve and consolidate wartime 
gains of Northern capitalists. On the tariff question, for example, 
Rembert Patrick recently asserted that Southern Republican congress­
men "followed the leadership of protectionists in the House and 
Senate, disregarding the benefits of a low tariff for their raw 
material-producing region." In return the congressmen "demanded 
approval of the Southern Republican state governments."^ In C. Vann 
Woodward's seminal work on the Compromise of 1877 (which he refers 
to as the "Theimidor" of the "Second American Revolution"), he notes, 
without documentation, that during Reconstruction "the votes of both 
Carpetbagger and Negro in Congress had proved a prep to the new 
economic order":
So long as Republican rule lasted in the South the region had 
proved a bulwark to the new economic order, for however radical 
the party bad been in realizing its more idealistic aims of 
equality and freedom within the South, the congressmen it sent 
to Washington had voted solidly with Northern Republicans in 
support of the more pragmatic aims of economic privilege.^3
i2Rembert Patrick, The Reconstruction of the Nation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), 177.
^C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of
1877 and the End of Reconstruction (Boston: little, Brown and
Company, 1951JT"13,
Those ’bore pragmatic aims" of the Republican party were "centered 
in the protection of a sectional economy and numerous privileged 
interests, and were reflected in new statutes regarding taxes, money, 
tariffs, banks, land, railroads, subsidies, all placed upon the law­
books while the South was out of the Union. "ll+ Woodward* s emphasis 
on the role of economic factors in the Compromise of 1877 dovetails 
neatly with the Beard-Beale thesis; the Compromise serves as the final 
dramatic episode in the "Second American Revolution."
Revisionist historians began to question certain aspects of the 
Beard-Beale thesis in the late 1950* s. In the first of a series of 
revisionist studies utilizing an interest-groip approach, Irwin 
Unger investigated the attitudes of Northern businessmen toward specie 
resumption and concluded that it was "clearly not valid to speak of 
a single business attitude toward the money question after the Civil 
War. "3-5 In another article published in 1959, Stanley Coben found 
sharp divisions in both the Northeastern business community and the 
Republican party on the tariff and currency questions. Instead of 
being protectionists and contractionists as Beard and Beale had con­
cluded, large segments of the Northeastern business community 
favored lower tariffs and opposed currency contraction. "Since 
neither business leaders nor Radicals were united in support of any 
specific set of economic aims," Coben concluded that Radical Recon-
^Ibid. t 12.
^Irwin Unger, "Businessmen and. Specie Resumption," Political 
Science Quarterly, LXXIV (March, 1959), *t6-70. For a fuller account 
see Unger, "Men, Money and Politics: The Specie Resumption Issue,
1865-1^ 879" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1958).
struction "cannot be explained as an organized attempt by the business 
interests of the Northeast either to preserve and promote their own 
economic advantage or to obtain protection for economic exploitation 
of the South. "16
The publication of Robert Sharkey's Money* Class, and Party 
(l959) marked the first full-scale assault on the validity of the 
Beard-Beale thesis. In an astute analysis of the complex interests 
of Northern economic groups, Sharkey dismissed the agrarian-capitalist 
dualism of the Beards as simplistic and destroyed their "conceptual 
monolith" of the interests of "capitalists." Sharkey did not quarrel 
with the Beards' emphasis on the importance of economic factors, 
but rather with their failure "to disentangle the interests of the 
various triumphant economic groups and to show that they were 
frequently contradictory."^ In particular, Sharkey found that the 
"capitalists" were split between industrial and the financial capital­
ists; the former profited from wartime inflation and favored high 
protective tariffs and easy money while the latter group suffered 
from inflation ana leaned toward free trade and sound money.^
Sharkey also seriously undermined the basic premise of the 
Beard-Beale thesis by demonstrating that the Republicans were far
•^Stanley Coben, "Northeastern Business and Radical Recon­
struction: A Re-examination," Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
XLVT (June, 1959), 67-68. *
^Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, 11-12, 292-93, 300.
^Ibid., 293, 299-300. See also: Peter Kolchin, "The Business
Press and Reconstruction, 1865-1868," Journal of Southern History, 
XXXIII (May, 1967), 183-96.
from united behind a specific economic program. The party harbored 
free traders and protectionists, currency expansionists and 
contractionlsts, greeribackers and bullionists, and resumptionlsts 
and anti-resumptionists in a bewildering array of combinations. Nor 
could have the Radicals conspired to keep the South out of the 
Union because of a fear that the South would unite with the West to 
inflate the currency as Beale had claimed. In the first place, 
Sharkey found that the prosperous Western farmers showed little 
concern over financial questions until after I869, and secondly, the 
most extreme radicals were often the Republicans who leaned toward 
the soft-money inflationist philosophy. ^
Other revisionists have continued the onslaught on the Beard- 
Beale thesis. Irwin Unger*s prize-winning study of American finance 
from 1865 to 1879 makes clear the complex patterns of opinion on 
postwar financial questions among the various interest groups of 
the North. In his search for the underlying determinants for 
Northern financial opinion, Unger shifts the emphasis from economic 
factors to non-quantifiable ethical and ideological considerations.
In doing so he takes issue with the economic determinism of the 
Beards and Sharkey and questions their concept of the Civil Welt as 
the great watershed of American history.
^Sharkey, Money. Class, and Party, 302-301*.
P O
Unger, The Greenback Era, 3-9, passium. See also: Unger, 
"Money and Morality: The Northern Calvinist Church and the Recon­
struction Financial Issue," Journal of Presbyterian History, XL 
(March, 1962), 38-55; and James K, Kindahl, "Economic Factors in 
Specie Resumption: The United States, l865-79»,, Journal of Political
Economy, IXIX (February, 1961), 30-1*8.
While the revisionists have overturned the "basic tenets of
the Beard-Beale thesis, the corollary to that thesis— the notion that 
readmitted Southern Republicans ignored constituent interests on 
economic measures to vote with the Northeast on such questions— has 
escaped historical analysis* Historians such as Hesseltine, Patrick, 
and Woodward have assumed that Southern Republicans responded to 
economic issues in accordance with the Beard-Beale thesis, and the 
revisionists, lacking a specific study to attack, have overlooked the 
problem. On the national level, historians have concentrated on the 
period from the close of the war to the Implementation of congres­
sional reconstruction while on the state and local level a plethora of 
studies have examined every facet of reconstruction in the South* But 
the Southern congressional delegations, the link between the states 
and the federal government, have received little scholarly attention,
particularly in the period from readmission to the end of Recon-
21struction.
^In work on related subjects, a few historians have touched 
on the response of the South to economic Issues. Unfortunately, 
Sharkey's analysis concludes in 1869— on the eve of full readmlsslon 
of the South to Congress. Unger carries his study to specie 
resumption in 1879, but his focus is on financial questions and the 
impact of moral and ideological factors on the formation of financial 
opinion in the North. Allen Weinstein*s Prelude to Populism; Origins 
of the Silver Issue* 1867-1878 (New Haven; Yale University Press, 
1970}" briefly comments on the Southern reaction to the silver 
demonetization-remonetlzation controversy, but his discussion of the 
silver question is concentrated on the years from 1876 to 1878.
The current interest in roll-call analysis has prompted several 
studies centering in part on congressional response to economic 
issues. Glenn M. Linden's "Congressmen, 'Radicalism,' and Economic 
Issues, li^l-l^S" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Washington, 1963), and his two articles, "'Radicals' and Economic 
Policies; The Senate, 1861-1873." Journal of Southern History. XXXII 
(May, 1966), 189-99; and "Radicals and Economic Policies: The House
of Representatives, 1861-1873," Civil War History. XIII (March, 1967),
The Southern congressional delegations are deserving of atten­
tion, not only to test the validity of the Beard-Beale thesis, but 
also to examine their, composition and the manner in which they repre 
seated their region on the national level. Because of chaotic 
political conditions in their home states resulting in a relatively 
high turnover rate and endless contested elections, it is readily 
admitted that Southern congressmen had little opportunity to attain 
the seniority necessary for congressional leadership. Still, 
Southerners from the tex ex-Confederate states alone composed over 
20 percent of the House of Representatives during the 1870*s. If, 
on any given economic question, they were able to achieve sectional 
unity and combine with like-minded colleagues from other sections, 
they constituted a powerful voting bloc in Congress.
In the present study the techniques of collective biography
5I-65, are all concerned with defining a group of Northern Radicals 
on political issues and then testing their cohesiveness as a unit on 
economic issues. Consequently, little attention is given to the 
Southern Representatives although in his most recent article, 
"'Radical' Political and Economic Politics: The Senate, 1873-1877," 
Civil War History, XIV (September, 1968), 21(0-49, Linden suggests 
that Senatorial voting behavior is better explained by geographical 
region than it is by party and that in the Senate, at least, the 
South and the West controlled economic votes; ibid., 246-47. More 
provocative and sophisticated in methodology are John L. McCarthy, 
"Reconstruction Legislation and Voting Alignments in the House of 
Representatives, 1863-1869" (unpublished Eh.D., dissertation, Yale 
University, 1970); and John K. Fobmr, "The Repletion of Republican 
Congressional Support for Enforcement of Reconstruction Measures: A
Roll Call Analysis, 1871-1877" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Alabama, 1968). McCarthy's focus is on political 
reconstruction but his study is quite imaginative in the quantitative 
techniques employed. As his title indicates, Folmar is also concerned 
with the political questions during the later Reconstruction period, 
but he does construct general economic scalograms for comparison 
with scalograms on political questions.
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and roll-call analysis have been used to determine and analyze the 
response of 18? congressmen from ten ex-Coafederate states to a 
broad range of economic measures selected from the Fortieth through 
the Forty-Fourth Congresses (1868-1877)•22 The obvious first step 
in the process is the simple detenni nation of how each Southern member 
of the House of Representatives (regardless of political affiliation) 
voted on economic measures and to compare his response with that of 
Representatives from other sections. Secondly, it is important to 
attempt to ascertain and explain the motivation and rationale for 
the voting behavior of Southern congressmen. In this area, an 
effort is made to investigate the associations that may have existed 
between voting behavior on economic issues and the personal and 
constituent characteristics of each subject. Finally, the Southern 
response to economic measures is set in context to determine the 
implications and importance of that response to Reconstruction history 
and historiography.
A broad range of quantifiable and non-quantifiable data have 
been collected for the purposes of this study. Consideration is
22Initially, information was gathered for Southern Senators but 
this study is limited to Southern members of the House of Repre­
sentatives for several reasons. The House members were subject to 
frequent popular elections, their constituency, which was definable 
in specific terms, could be subjected to social and economic analysis, 
and, in theory at least, the congressmen were responsible to that 
constituency. The ten states considered are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, 
and Virginia. The eleventh ex-Confederate state, Tennessee, approved 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, and was readmitted to representation 
by a joint resolution of Congress in July 1866. The state was thereby 
spared the special rigors of congressional, reconstruction and is for 
tnat reason excluded from consideration.
given to a comprehensive list of economic measures including issues 
of taxation, the tariff, and federal aid to internal improvements 
with particular attention to questions of finance such as contraction 
and expansion of the currency, the demonetization and remonetization 
of silver, public credit, and the overriding issue of specie resump­
tion. In addition to biographical information on the congressmen, 
other bodies of quantifiable data collected include social and 
economic profiles of each Southern congressional district and com­
plete county-level election returns for the House of Representatives.23 
ETon-quantifiable sources such as newspapers, manuscript collections, 
and government documents have been surveyed to help determine Southern 
attitudes on economic questions.
The nature of the topic and the volume of data necessitates 
extensive use of the computer. All quantifiable biographical infor­
mation, election return data, and census statistics on each congres­
sional district have been coded in machine-readable form for corre­
lation with House roll-call records. The OSIRIS II package of 
computer programs designed for analysis of social science data has 
been used to manipulate and analyze the quantifiable data. In 
addition to the usual data management programs, the OSIRIS II package 
includes programs for calculating bivariate and multivariate
23jhe county-level election returns (the ten states, I868-IB76)
and a complete set of House roll-call records (all states, tOth to
Iflfth Congresses), were obtained in machine-readable form from the
Historical Archive of the Iirter-University Consortium for Political
Research at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Social and eco­
nomic statistics on each congressional district were compiled from
Francis A. Walker (comp.), The Hinth Census of the United States (3
volumes, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1#72J.
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frequencies, ordinal and categorical correlations, partial and multiple
oh.
correlations, and Guttman scaling.
A special effort has been made to collect surviving biographical 
data on each congressman under consideration for the purpose of con­
structing biographical profiles of the delegations and for analytical 
use. The quantifiable data collected for each congressman includes 
birth state, age (at the beginning of each term served), ethnicity, 
level of education, Civil War military service, occupation (at the 
time of service in Congress), former slaveholding status, value of 
real and personal estate (1870), length of residency (in the state 
served), state served, congressional district, party affiliation 
prior to 1B60, secession stand, vote for president in i860, Southern 
party faction (at the time of service), congressional party, prior 
political experience, margin of victory (each election), contested 
election status, and number of terms served. The statistics com­
piled for each congressional district included racial composition
2l*The OSIRIS II package, available for use at the Louisiana 
State University Computer Center, was designed by the Inter- 
University Consortium for Political Research (ICFR). Among the 
better introductory guides to the computer and quantitative methods 
are Edward Shorter, The Historian and the Computer: A Practical
Guide (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971); Kenneth Janda,
Data Processing: Applications to Political Research (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1965); V. 0. Key, Jr., A Primer of 
Statistics for Political Scientists (New York: Thomas~Y. Crowell,
195*05 Lee F, Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, 
Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1966)j Richard Jensen and Charles A. Dollar, The Historian1 s 
Guide to Statistics; Quantitative Analysis and Historical Research 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971)'; and Roderick Houd,
An Introduction to Quantitative Methods for Historians (Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 19737* For an excellent survey of quanti­
tative work and the application of quantitative methods see: Robert P.
Swierenga, "Computers and American History: The Impact of the 'New'
Generation," Journal of American History. IX (March, 197*0, 1045-70.
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(expressed as percent white), per capita wealth, percent agricultural, 
and land value per acre.**'*
The raw data have been coded in accordance with schemes utiliz­
ing either dichotomous (two-valued) or geomet ric-progression codes.^ 
After punching the data on IBM cards (one card for each congressman 
in each congress), the accumulated files of data for each congress and 
for all congresses were subjected to programs to calculate univariate 
frequencies (frequency distribution for each code and case and related 
statistics), bivariate analysis (to create cross-tabulations which 
classify selected variables in terms of every other variable), and in 
certain select cases, multivariate analysis (to. test the association 
between a selected dependent variable and two or more independent 
variables) She advantages of using the computer to cross-tabulate
^Other elements of data collected for each congressman included, 
for example, religious affiliation and father's occupation* In both 
cases, however, the data was deemed too incomplete for use in analysis.
26For example, 1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican was the dichotomous 
code employed for congressional party. For variables having more than 
two values, geometric codes were devised to categorize or rank the 
values; for example, the code devised for margin of victory was 
0 = Unknown, 1 = 1-2$, 2 = 3-5S&, 3 - 6-10$, t = 11-20=6, 5 = over 20J&,
6 - unopposed or token opposition. Wherever possible, the standardized 
codes (e.g., for ethnicity) created by the ICFR were utilized. The 
codebook for biographical and congressional district data is repro­
duced in Appendix I,
27TO help preserve the original range and richness of the data, 
multidigit codes were used for certain statistical procedures. For 
example, multidigit codes for age, birth state, occupation, length of 
residency, and congressional parly were used to calculate univariate 
frequencies and percentages and descriptive statistics for each vari­
able. To facilitate the use of programs for bivariate and multi­
variate analysis the multidigit codes were collapsed to single digit 
codes. Thus, for example, the two digit code for age (giving the exact 
age in years at beginning of each tera) used in calculating univariate 
frequencies was reduced to a single digit age group code with nine
17
variables in a collective biography are evident. The program designed 
to calculate and display bivariate frequencies, for example, generated 
hundreds of cross-tabulations, calculated various statistics to measure 
the strength of each relationship, and created ancillary percentage 
tables for each cross-tabulation.2® The results of the collective 
biography are presented in Chapter II and as introductions to the 
roll-caul analysis of each congress.
Initially several different methods of analyzing and displaying 
the roll-call data were examined and tested. Given the problem under 
investigation, the most useful appeared to be a simple tabular pre­
sentation showing the regional and party divisions occurring on 
selected roll ca lls.The relationships between a Representative's 
performance on roll-call votes and his personal or constituent 
characteristics have been examined by simple correlation techniques 
devised to measure the strength of association between two or more 
variables. Provided the proper correlation coefficients and correct 
tests for significance are applied (the selection of both depends 
on the type of variables being compared), correlations may yield 
useful information on the relationship between individual character-
values. For bivariate and multivariate analysis the code values were 
limited to the range of 0 through 9*
2®For a model of the application of quantitative techniques to 
collective biography, see Richard Jensen, "Quantitative Collective 
Biography: An Application to Metropolitan Elites," in Quanti­
fication in American History: Theory and .Research, ed. Robert P.
SwierengaTNew York: Atheneum, 1970), 3&9-U05.
2^See the note to Table 3-1: A and B.
istics and voting "behavior. 30 The results of the correlation analysis 
were at best disappointing— primarily because the Southerners tended 
to vote either as a sectional bloc or as a party unit. In either case, 
member or constituent characteristics offer little insight into voting 
behavior. The results of the correlation analysis are presented only 
when they are deemed significant.
Another statistical test employed whenever possible in this 
study is Guttman scaling. Scale analysis hinges on the assumption 
that "each legislator has a more or less fixed attitude on each 
issue and that he votes yea for measures which he approves and nay on 
measures that are too strong for him to accept." The use of 
scaling necessitates the existence of a closely-related group of 
issues which can be ranked on an ordinal scale from easiest-to-accept 
(the lowest scale position) to hardest-to-accept (the highest scale 
position). If the assumption is acceptable and a scale of roll calls 
can be properly defined, then each legislator may be assigned a scale 
position, based on his voting record on a particular set of issues. 
That scale position indicates how far the legislator was willing to 
go in support of the issue defined by the scale set.32 The resulting
3°Por methods and limitations of correlation, correlation 
coefficients, and tests of significance for correlations, see Key,
A Primer of Statistics. ch. IV; and Jensen and Dollar, Historian* s 
Guide to Statistics, ch. III.
31Jensen and Dollar, Historian*s Guide to Statistics, 116.
methods employed in scale construction are explained in 
Chapter IV, Table 4-3: B. For the purposes of this study, scales 
constructed on specific issues were found to be more useful than
scale positions have been cross-tabulated with biographical and con­
stituent characteristics to offer a final, measure of the effect of 
such variables on voting behavior. 33
In the following chapters the results of the application of 
these quantitative techniques to the data are displayed and supple­
mented with non-quantifiable data to determine the response of 
Southern congressmen to economic measures. The initial concern, 
however, is to examine the Representatives as individuals. Chapter II 
is devoted to a biographical and statistical profile of the men and 
their constituencies.
general content scales containing a variety of economic issues. For 
the latter type, constructed by session for the Forty-Second through 
the Forty-Fourth Congresses, see Folmar, "Congressional Support for 
Enforcement of Reconstruction Measures."
33fhe pioneer study in the refinement and application of 
Guttman scaling is Duncan McRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional 
Voting: A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in 
the Eighty-First Congress' '^Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 195$). See also: Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox, 
Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, ch. VI; Jensen and Dollar Historian1 s 
Guide to Statistics, llS-21; and Thomas B. Alexander and Richard E. 
Beringer, The Anatomy of the Confederate Congress: A Study of the
Influences of Member Characteristics on Legislative Voting Behavior, 
1&61-186~(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972)7 5-7.
The latter study is an excellent example of the application of 
quantitative methods to a practicular historical problem.
CHAPTER II
THE CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES:
A PROFILE
Traditionally, legislative voting behavior has been studied 
along party lines with the implication that political affiliation 
is the chief determinant of voting behavior. The advent of such 
quantitative methods as legislative roll-call, analysis has done 
little to alter the emphasis on political party,- in fact, the new 
methods have tended to justify the traditional focus. A recent 
survey of the quantitative literature on legislative voting behavior 
bluntly concludes that '^ political party affiliation is the decisive 
factor in legislative voting."-1- On certain well-defined issues, par­
ticularly those on which a party has a declared position, it has been 
demonstrated that political affiliation is the determining factor.
Several studies, for example, have found a high degree of correlation 
between political affiliation and the emotionally-charged issues of 
reconstruction policy and the "Southern Question.
^Robert P. Swierenga, "Computers and American History: The
Impact of the ’New' Generation," Journal of American History. EX 
(March, 197*0, 1053.
^See, for example: John L. McCarthy, "Reconstruction
Legislation and Voting Alignments in the House of Representatives, 
1863-1j869" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Yale University, 1970); 
and John K. Folmar, "The Depletion of Republican Congressional Support 
for the Enforcement of Reconstruction Measures: A Roll-Call Analysis, 
1871-1877" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama, 1968).
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Explaining legislative voting patterns solely In terms of polit­
ical party, however, has obvious limitations. Most Importantly, it 
assumes the existence of a party discipline and an ideological stance 
seldom characteristic of the American party system. Exclusive focus 
on party also neglects the individual legislator and ignores a host 
of other potential influences, including factors in the legislator*s 
personal background, the social and economic characteristics of his 
constituency, and his regional identification.
It is not to be denied that political affiliation and member­
ship in some political faction were meaningful, particularly to 
Southerners, during the era of Reconstruction. The period has 
spawned a host of troublesome political stereotypes. Such political 
epithets such as "carpetbagger," "scalawag," "bourbon," and "klansman" 
immediately conjure up decided images of the individuals so designated.
t
Even the less opprobrious political party labels assume sectional
overtones and suggest a definite stance oh reconstruction issues. As
a perceptive Georgia Republican explained,
In the Southern states, few men, if any, have taken their 
side in the present politics from any opinions concerning 
currency, taxation, expenditures, civil service, foreign 
policy or Indian policy. Such matters are secondary here.
Men are Republican or Democrat accordingly as they are or 
are not attached to the last three amendments of the con­
stitution. 3
3Amos T. Akerman to George W. Friedley, August 22, 1876, in 
Amos T. Akerman Letterbooks, University of Virginia library} quoted 
from Keith Ian Polakoff, The Politics of Inertia: The Election of
1876 and the End of Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1973), 177-78. 'Akerman, a native Georgia Republican, 
served as Attorney General for a short time in the first Grant Admin­
istration; see Robert Sobel (ed.), Biographical Directory of the United 
States Executive Branch. 177^-1921 (Westport, CT; Greenwood Publishing 
Company, 1971),7.
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If issues of political reconstruction determined the political 
affiliations of Southerners, one might question the relationship 
between party and opinion on such "secondary" matters as economic 
issues. If opinion on economic issues did transcend party lines, 
other factors must be sought to explain voting behavior on such 
measures. The party label submerges a wide range of individual and 
constituent characteristics which may have been associated with a 
legislator's response to economic issues. The present chapter is 
devoted to a collective appraisal of the Southern congressmen and 
their constituencies. On the one hand, an investigation of the 
background of the Representatives facilitates reconsideration of the 
familiar stereotypes; on the other, it suggests potential determinants 
of voting behavior other than party for use in voting analysis in 
subsequent chapters.
Most of the 185 congressmen under consideration left little 
substantial evidence regarding their personal, economic, and political 
backgrounds. By virtue of their positions of leadership, the major 
figures, such as Alexander K. Stephens of Georgia and I>. Q. C. Lamar 
of Mississippi, have merited full-scale biographies. The surviving 
details of background and record of public service for the vast 
majority, however, are all too briefly summed up in the Biographical 
Directory of the American Congress.** For Democratic congressmen native
**The edition used for this study is Lawrence F. Kennedy (comp.), 
Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 177^-1971 (Washington: 
United States Printing Office, 1971J hereinafter cited as Biographical 
Directory. Only 26 of the IB5 Southern congressmen merited inclusion 
in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds.), Dictionary of American Bio­
graphy (22 voIs. and Index, New York: Charles Schribner's Sons,
to the South, particularly those who participated in antebellum 
politics or were in the Confederate service, the range of surviving 
biographical data is much greater than it is for Republicans. Within 
the Republican party, background information is more abundant for the 
natives (scalawags) than it is for the outsiders (carpetbaggers) and 
for the fourteen blacks who served in Congress during the period. 5
The attitude of contemporary biographers toward Republicans in
general and blacks in particular was clearly expressed by the compiler
of a biographical directory of Georgia public officials:
The reader will preceive that no biographical sketches of 
the Colored Members [of the state legislature] appear.
Aside from the manifest absurdity it would have been to 
have written the lives of men who were but yesterday our 
slaves, and whose past careers, probably, embraced such 
menial occupations as boot-blacking, shaving, table-waiting
1928-1958), hereinafter cited as D.A.B. A greater number are in­
cluded in such contemporary compilations as James Grant Wilson 
and John Fiske (eds.), Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography 
(7 vols., New York: D. Appleton and Company, I5&8-1900), and the 
multi-volume National Cyclopaedia of American Biography (New York:
James T. White and Company, 1892— 77 tut rarely does the coverage 
of relevant background information exceed that in the Biographical 
Directory. Much the same can be said of Who Was Who in America:
The Historical Volume, 1607-1896 (Chicago: Marquis--Who's Who, 19**0). 
More useful are the contemporary editions of Benjamin P. Poore (comp.), 
Congressional Directory . . . .  (Washington: Government Printing
Office, I868-IB76), for each session of each Congress; and the volumes 
in William Horatio Barnes, History of Congress. . . . (New York:
W. H. Barnes and Company, issued every two years, 1870-1876), which 
contains biographical sketches of each Senator and Representative in 
each Congress.
^There is a tendency in recent revisionist studies dealing with 
Reconstruction to avoid the use of the terms carpetbagger and scalawag 
because of their often inaccurate connotations. The terms most often 
substituted are outside white Republican and native white Republican. 
For the sake of brevity and convenience, "carpetbagger" and "scalawag" 
are used in this study to designate the white factions in the Repub­
lican party* The terms are used with no implied assumption about the 
character of those so designated.
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and the like, there was, perhaps another motive prompting 
the Editor to exclude than from "biographical notice. It may 
have "been that he felt a secret exaltation over the fact 
that, though Congress could compel him to associate with 
negroes in a deliberative [body], sit beside them in rail­
road cars, etc., neither Congress, Military Government, a 
triple Reconstruction, nor even anorher [sic] Amendment to 
that national patch-work, the United States Constitution, , 
could compel him to publish their biographies in this book.
Despite such attitudes, several important sources do offer bio­
graphical data on Southern congressmen. In addition to the national 
biographical directories and scattered autobiographies and memoirs, 
useful sources include state and regional directories, state and 
local histories, specialized monographs, and contemporary newspaper.. 
For Representatives formerly prominent in Confederate leadership or 
worth more than $20,000, the Amnesty Papers, which contain their 
personal applications for pardon to President Andrew Johnson, proved 
to be especially revealing.? The manuscript population and agri­
cultural schedules of the Ninth Census (1870) are a more valuable
^A. St. Clair-Abrams (ed.), Manual and Biographical Register 
of the State of Georgia for 1871-2 (Atlanta: Plantation Publishing 
Company’s Press,' 1 8 7 2 vi. “
^Amnesty Papers, Office of the Adjutant General, Record Group 9k} 
National Archives, hereinafter cited as Amnesty Papers. The petitions 
for amnesty were filed by ex-Confederates who were excepted from 
President Andrew Johnson's General Proclamation of Amnesty on May 29, 
186?. Of the fourteen excepted classes, most were disqualified by 
reason of service in the Confederate army at above the rank of 
Colonel or by the famous thirteenth clause excepting voluntary 
participants whose taxable property was worth over $20,000. For the 
proclamation, see James D. Richardson (ccmp.), A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 178*1-1857 (lO vols., Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1897), VI, 310-12. For a general dis­
cussion of the proclamation and its implementation, see Jonathan T. 
Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty Under Lincoln and Johnson: The Restora­
tion of the Confederates to Their Rights and Privileges. 1861-1895*. 
(Chapel Kill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953)» 35, 211-13, 
135-52, 221-27.
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source. For most congressmen the voluminous schedules contain vital 
data as to members and. size of family and. household, age, occupation, 
state of birth, and the valuation of real and personal estate.® De­
spite the range of the source material, certain background details 
(such as former political affiliations) remain unknown for several 
individuals. In particular, many Southern Republicans remain obscure, 
transient figures who left little evidence of their presence other 
than a residue of hatred among Southern whites— an animosity which 
created the Republican stereotypes that historians are still trying 
to dismantle.
The ten Southern states under consideration sent a total of 
185 men to the House of Representatives from June 1868, when the first 
states were readmitted to the Fortieth Congress, to the conclusion of 
the Forty-Fourth Congress in March 1877. The political composition of 
the Southern delegations by Congress and state is outlined in 
Table 2-1. The delegations reflect the progress of reconstruction and 
the viability of the Republican party at the state level over the time 
period. Proportionally, Texas, Virginia, and Georgia, all among the 
last to be readmitted and the first to be redeemed, sent the fewest 
Republicans to Congress. In each of the three states, Republican 
strength depended on the support of native unionists; eight of the 
eleven Georgia Republicans, two of the three Texas Republicans, and
^Microfilm copies of the manuscript papulation and agriculture 
schedules of the Ninth Census (1S70) for the ten states were used at 
the following libraries: for Alabama, on deposit at the University of
Alabama; for Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Virginia, on deposit at the University of North Carolina; 
and for Louisiana and Mississippi, on deposit at Louisiana State 
University.
TABLE 2-1
POLITICAL PARTY BY CONGRESS AND STATE*
Congress and Party
State
4Cth 
Dem Rep
41st 
Dem Rep
42nd 
Dem Rep
43rd 
Dem Rep
44th 
Dem Rep
Total 
Dem Rep
Alabama ■ • 6 2 4 3 3 3 5 6 2 11 15
Arkansas • • it 1 2 1 3 1 4 4 • 9 5 9
Florida a • 1 • • 1 1 1 • • 2 1 2 2 3
Georgia 2 4 4 3 5 3 7 3 9 • • 19 11
Louisiana 1 4 • • 5 * 4 6 1 6 4 3 6 12
Mississippi • • • * • • 5 • • 5 1 5 4 2 4 9
North Carolina • • r 2 7 5 2 5 3 7 1 12 12
South Carolina • • k « • 5 • 4 4 • • 6 • • 6 • 4 15
Texas • • • a 1 3 4 1 6 * • 6 « • 11 3
Virginia • 4 ♦ m J. _4 JL J l J l -2. J3 JL IB _ 8
Total 3 30 15 39 24 31 29 39 49 17 86 97
totals include all individuals seated by the Bouse of Representatives including partial-term, 
replacements for members who died during their term and those who were expelled, or lost their seat 
by contest. The Biographical Directory is the source of political affiliation unless other sources 
clearly indicate that the Directory is incorrect.
four of the eight Virginia Republicans were natives. At the other 
extreme, South Carolina, with, a large and active black constituency, 
sent solidly Republican delegations to Congress throughout the period. 
The political balance in the North Carolina delegations is a reflection 
of what was, for a time, the best-balanced party system in the South 
during Reconstruction. As in Georgia, North Carolina Republicanism 
drew its strength from an established contingent of native unionists. 
Eight of North Carolina's twelve Republican congressmen were natives 
of the state.
The Republican party remained relatively strong in the other 
Southern states until after the elections to the Forty-Third Congress 
in 1872. In some Southern states, the Republican success in the 1672 
elections was attributable to the fact that Horace Greeley, the 
Liberal Republican candidate, sought and won the endorsement of the 
Democratic national convention. As a result, no viable Regular 
Democratic candidate entered the presidential race, and Southern 
Democrats and Conservatives faced the alternatives of either supporting 
and campaigning on the liberal Republican ticket or staying home on 
election day.9 The Republican gains in 1872 were, however, temporaxy. 
In the long run, the national Republican schism in 1672 hurt the 
Republican party in the South by widening the already existing split 
between the carpetbagger and scalawag factions. The Southern Repub­
licans (primarily native) who joined Democrats to support the liberal 
Republican ticket found that the experience eased their way back into
9&arle Dudley Ross, The liberal Republican Movement (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1919), passim.
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the Democratic party.
With the exception of South Carolina) where the Republican party 
remained well entrenched, the most dramatic change in the fortunes of 
the Republican party occurred between the congressional elections in 
1872 and those in 187^. The Democratic gains in 187^ were in part a 
reflection of renewed Democratic organization and the redemption 
process as Alabama and Arkansas joined the ranks of the redeemed 
states. But the Republicans) faced with the scandals of the Grant 
administration and economic depression touched off by the Panic 
of 1873) fared badly nation-wide in the congressional elections of 
187 .^ The overwhelming Republican majority in the Forty-Third 
Congress became an almost equally decisive Democratic majority in 
the Forty-Fourth Congress. For the period as a whole, the Republi­
cans slowly lost ground in the South, but for the five:Congresses 
under consideration the ratio between Republicans (97) and Democrats 
(88) facilitates comparison of the parties in terms of personal, 
economic, and political background.10
To their Southern contemporaries, one of the first-noticed and 
most important variations between Republican and Democratic congress­
man lay in their regional origins and their length of residency in 
the South. A breakdown by party according to region of birth reveals
10The determination of total base numbers for each party to be 
used in analysis is complicated by the instance of William Wilshire of 
Arkansas who was elected as a Republican to the Forty-Third Congress 
as a Conservative to the Forty-Fourth Congress. To avoid confusion, 
Wilshire is considered a Republican in all calculations involving the 
total membership in each party. He is considered a Democrat in the 
analysis of the Forty-Fourth Congress.
2 9
anticipated patterns (see Table 2-2). While 88 percent of the Demo­
crats were horn in the slave states, almost 50 percent of the Repub­
licans were natives of the free states. One-third of the Republicans 
were bom in New England or the Middle Atlantic states. Sixteen 
Republicans listed their birth place as either New York or Massacnu- 
setts while Pennsylvania and Maine each contributed five Republicans.
Of the 113 congressmen bom in the South, eighty came from the older 
Atlantic seaboard states of Georgia (31), North Carolina (25), and 
Virginia (24). The individual Representative's length of residency 
in the state he served in Congress clarifies the relationship be­
tween nativity and party (see Table 2-3). By i860, eighty-four of 
the eighty-eight Democrats resided in the states they eventually 
represented during Reconstruction. By contrast nearly half the 
Republicans arrived in their adopted Southern states after the Civil 
War began. Well over one-third of the Republicans were either 
mustered out of the army in the South or arrived there after April 1865.
The individual's place of residency as of April l86l is used 
as the basis for delineating the carpetbagger and scalawag factions 
within the Republican party. White Republican congressmen are 
accordingly split into factions of forty carpetbaggers and forty-three 
scalawags.13' The distinction between outsiders and natives in the
^Richard N. Current has estimated that at least 45 carpetbaggers 
represented the South in Congress during Reconst met ion. Current's 
figures included two carpetbaggers from Tennessee and three carpet­
baggers, Horatio Bisbee, Jr. (EL), John E. Leonard (LA), and Joseph 
Jorgenson (VA), who served in the Forty-Fifth Congress and are not con­
sidered in this study. Current also counted three individuals who were 
not carpetbaggers; Thomas Haughey (AL) was a scalawag, James Mann (LA) 
was a Democrat, and Alexander M. McDonald (AR), while a carpetbagger,
TABLE 2-2 
REGION OF BIRTH BY PARTY
DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN TOTAL 
REGION (n=88) (n*=97) (n^ l85)
New England 2 20 22
Middle Atlantic 6 13 19
Midwest 1 7  8
South 67 (76$) 1<6 ( W )  113 (61#)
Border 10 If llf
Foreign 2 7 9
TABLE 2-3
LENGTH OF RESIDENCY (IN STATE SERVED) BY PARTY
2RI0D RESIDENCY DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN TOTAL
ESTABLISHED (n=88) (»=97) ( n=l85)
Native 5b 32 86
Prior to 1850 18 14 32
1850-1860 12 5 17
I86l-l861f 1 10 u
1865 or After 3 36 39
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party is important as the two factions varied in background and in 
their response to the issues of Reconstruction. More often than not, 
they also represented antagonistic factions at the state level.
The distribution of outsiders and natives by party and state 
is outlined in Table 2-4. Nearly 75 percent of the congressmen were 
antebellum residents of the states they represented during Recon­
served in the Senate rather than in the House. Current's figures do 
not include three Representatives, Charles Fierce (AL), William J.
Hynes (AR), and John T. Deweese (NC), who definitely were carpetbag­
gers. Fart of the problem in this instance stems from the fact that 
Fierce and Deweese are erroneously referred to as Democrats in the 
Biographical Directory. See Current, "Carpetbaggers Reconsidered," 
in A Festschrift for Frederick B. Artz, ed. David H. Pinkney and 
Theodore Ropp (Durham: Duke University Press, 196k), 146, l47n; and 
Current, Three Carpetbag Governors (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1967)7 4.
^%*lace of residency in l£6l is now commonly recognized as a 
reference point for defining the carpetbag and scalawag factions.
Richard Current, for example, defines carpetbaggers as "white North­
erners who went south after the bwrfntving of the Civil War and, sooner 
or later, became active in politics as Republicans,11 but he notes that 
in some cases it is impossible to be absolutely precise in classifying 
a congressman as either a carpetbagger or a scalawag; see Current, 
"Carpetbaggers Reconsidered," 144. Some scalawags, for example, were 
being educated in the North when the war broke out and either joined 
the Union amy or declined to return to their native states until the 
hostilities were concluded. In such cases the individuals are consid­
ered to be natives, only temporarily away from their Southern residences. 
The origins and character of the scalawags are considered in Allen W. 
Trelease, "Who Were the Scalawags?" Journal of Southern History, XXIX 
(November, 1963), 445-68; Otto H. Olsen, '^ Reconsidering the Scalawags," 
Civil War History, XII (December, 1968), 304-20; and Sarah Woolfolk 
Wiggins, "Whafe is a Scalawag?" Alabama Review, XXV (January, 1972),
56-61. The men considered scalawags in this study were antebellum 
residents of states they served during Reconstruction with two 
exceptions. Christopher C. Bowen moved from Georgia to South Carolina 
in 1862 and John L. Morphis moved from Tennessee to Mississippi in 
IB63. As both men were residents of the slave states prior to the 
war and both served the Confederacy, they are classified as scalawags.
For Bowen's varied career, see Biographical Directory, 617-18; and 
Francis Butler Simkins and Robert H. Woody, South Carolina During 
Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1932), llET; f*or Moiphis, see Biographical Directory, 1438-39*
TABLE 2-4 
SOUTHEM PARTY FACTION BY STATE
DEMOCRATS ' REEUBItCCANS
Natives Outsiders
Whites 
Natives Outsiders
Blacks 
Natives Outsiders
State (n^ 8U) «»*}
(Scalawags)
(n=43)
(Carpetbaggers ) 
(n^O) (n=10) (n=4)
AX. 11 •  • 6 6 3 •  «
AR 5 •  * it 5 • • m •
FL 2 • • •  • 2 • * l
GA 19 • » 8 2 1 « •
LA 5 1 3 8 1 •  •
MS 4 •  * 3 5 * • 1
NC 12 •  • 8 3 1 •  •
SC * + •  * 5 4 4 2
TX 10 1 % 1 •  « •  *
VA 16 2 4 4 •  * ♦ •
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struction. Natives dominated the delegations of Georgia, North 
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and. Alabama. Each state sent at least 
one non-native to Congress, hut "outsiders" were proportionally most 
numerous in the delegations of Florida and Louisiana. Blacks were 
even more unevenly distributed; South Carolina and Alabama contri­
buted nine of the fourteen black c o n g r e s s m e n . ^
Age was one of the most evident differences between Southern 
Democratic and Republican congressmen. The median age for all members 
of the House of Representatives at the beginning of their first texm 
was slightly over forty-four years.^ As Table 2-5 indicates, the 
median age of Southern Democrats upon entering Congress in most
^3por the purpose of analysis, the blacks and the Democrats 
are each considered as a group without regard to whether they were 
natives or outsiders. For the blacks, race is far more important than 
length of residency and contemporaries classified blacks in a category 
of their own. Similarly, the four Democratic outsiders do not merit 
treatment separate from native Democrats. Their acceptance of the 
Democratic party overshadows their length of residency in the South.
See Current, "Carpetbaggers Reconsidered," 143-44. Southern conser­
vatives preferred to refer to Democrats who arrived in the South after 
the war as "settlers"— rather than carpetbaggers. The conservative 
Richmond Whig, for example, emphasized that Gilbert C. Walker, a yan- 
kee who moved to Norfolk in 1B64, was a "settler— not a carpetbagger.11 
When Walker successfully ran for Governor in 1869 as the candidate of 
the "true Republicans" (a conservative coalition Which opposed the 
regular Republicans), the Whig declared that "we will beat them with a 
Northern man who is not a carpetbagger." See Richmond Whig. January 22, 
1J869, May 4, IB69. Walker had been a Douglas Democrat before the war 
and was later elected to Forty-Fourth Congress as a conservative 
Democrat. See Biographical Directory. 1869; and Jack P. Maddex, Jr., 
The Virginia Conservatives. 1867-1^79: A Study in Reconstruction 
Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970),
74-75.
ll+Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 297. Rice's time series on median age by 
Congress indicates that the percent of first termers in the House 
ranged from 46 percent in the Fortieth Congress to 58 percent in the 
Forty-Fourth Congress. The median age for all Representatives (in­
cluding first termers) for the five Congresses is slightly under 46.
TABLE 2-5
MEDIAN AND AVERAGE AGE BY FARCY AND STATE*
DEMOCRATS REPUBLICANS COMBINED
State Median Average Median Average Median Average
AL 44.0 42.7 40.0 41.7 41.5 42.2
AH 44.0 43.2 37.0 40.0 42.0 41.3
EL 55.0 55.0 28.0 29.0 32.0 39^
GA 45.0 45.0 34.0 38.2 42.5 42.5
LA 44.0 44.2 32.5 34.2 3^.5 37-5
MS 48.5 48.3 33.0 36.1 36.0 39-8
NC 45.0 45.9 44.5 44.0 45.0 45.0
SC • • • • 38.0 38.8 38.0 38.8
TX 44.0 42.7 45.0 47.6 44.0 43.3
VA 47.0 47.7 35.5 39.0 !j6.5 45.0
Total 45.0 45.3 37.0 39.1 42.0 42.0
aAge figures are based on the age of each Representative at the 
beginning of his first term in the House. The Biographical Directory 
is the source of birthdate in all but a few cases in which other 
sources clearly indicate that the Directory is incorrect.
states was very close to the national figure* For all Southern 
Democrats the median age was forty-five. By contrast, the Republi­
cans were much younger with a median age of thirty-seven. Sixty per­
cent of the Republicans were under the age of forty at the beginning 
of their service while only 21 percent of the Democrats were in the 
same age group. The bulk of the Danocrats (73 percent) were in their 
forties or fifties as compared to only 37 percent of the Republicans. 
The carpetbaggers and blacks provided the youth in the Republican 
party. Almost 75 percent of the carpetbaggers and 86 percent of the 
blacks were under forty years of age, and over 50 percent of each 
faction were under the age of thirty-five. The age distribution for 
the scalawags is remarkably similar to that of the Democrats; over 
half the scalawags were forty-five or older.
Beyond the general disparity in age between Democrats and 
Republicans it is difficult to enumerate significant age patterns. 
Florida, the youngest and least populated state, represents the 
extremes. Florida's three Republican congressmen (all carpetbaggers) 
were among the youngest (median age 28), but the two Florida Democrats, 
both long time residents, were much older (median age 55), Republi­
can Representatives from Louisiana (median age 32.5), Mississippi 
(median age 33), and Georgia (median age 3*0 were also remarkably 
young. The combined party figures indicate that the older and more 
settled states like Virginia and North Carolina tended to send older 
men to Congress, This was partially due to the fact that they came 
under Democratic control early in the period— as did Texas and 
Georgia. Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, mi
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redeemed later, sent younger delegations. The lower median age 
figures also reflect the preponderance of carpetbaggers and blacks In 
these delegations. In terns of age, as In other respects, the North 
Carolina delegations were the most balanced with twelve Republicans 
(median age 44.5) and twelve Democrats (median age 4-5). The older 
median age of North Carolina Republicans Indicates the influence of 
native unionists in the party. ^
On an individual level, the Republicans represent the extremes 
in age. The South sent two twenty-five year old Republicans to the 
House during the period. The youngest, John Auber Snith, a Virginian, 
was six months over the minimum age of twenty-five when seated by the 
Forty-Third Congress. The same House admitted twenty-five year old 
John Roy lynch, an ex-slave from Mississippi. The only Southern 
congressman b om in the eighteenth century, Nathaniel Boyden of
^In terms of age, the Republican Representatives were much 
younger on the average than Southern leaders in the antebellum state 
legislatures, the secession conventions, and the Confederate Congress. 
Median age values for Democratic congressmen are quite similar to 
those of earlier Southern politicians. See the summary statistics on 
age in Ralph A. Wooster, The People in Power: Courthouse and State-
house in the Lower South»~i550-1p60 "(Khoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1969)> 29; Wooster, The Secession Conventions of the South 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 16, 30-31, 53, 69, 85, 
105, 125, 142, 158, 195-96, and Richard E. Be ringer, "A Profile of the 
Members of the Confederate Congress," Journal of Southern History,
XXXIII (November, 1967), 518-41. With some variation, Be ringer’s 
findings were published in Thomas B. Alexander and Richard E. Be ringer, 
The Anatomy of the Confederate Congress; A Study of the Influences of 
Member Characteristics on Legislative Voting Behavior, I86l-l665 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), ch. 1. The members 
of these earlier Southern representative bodies are obviously not 
strictly comparable to the Southern congressmen. These studies are, 
however, similar collective biographies and their findings regarding 
membership characteristics are used to note variations between 
previous Southern political leadership and Reconstruction leadership 
as presented by Southern congressmen.
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north Carolina, m s  also a Republican. Boy den, a long time Unionist 
Whig iriio had served in the Thirtieth Congress (18*47-18*4-9), was 
seventy-one when elected to the Fortieth Congress in 1 8 6 8 . The 
first of the congressmen to die was James Mann, a "carpetbag" Demo­
crat from Louisiana, who succumbed to "acute brain fever" on August 
26, 1868, thirty-nine days after the Louisiana delegation was 
admitted to the Fortieth Congress. The only other two Southerners 
not to live into the 1870* s fell to assassins. A disgruntled Demo­
crat shot and killed carpetbagger James Hinds in October 1868 in a 
prelude to the Brooks-Baxter War in Arkansas. The second victim, 
scalawag Thomas Haughey, was assassinated by a supporter of his 
carpetbagger opponent while making a political speech in Courtland, 
Alabama, in August 1869* The last surviving Southern congressmen 
were Frederick G. Bromberg of Alabama, who died in 1930 at the age of 
ninety-three, and John Roy lynch of Mississippi who died at the age of 
ninety-two.^
^^Biographical Directory. 1716 (Smith), 1318 (lynch), 623 
(Boyden); John R, lynch, The Facts of Reconstruction, ed. William C. 
Harris (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrili Company,' 1970), xiv-xxvi;
lynch, Reminiscences of an Active Life: The Airbobiogranhy of John Roy
Lynch, ed. John Hope Franklin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1970), Introduction; Nathaniel Boyden to Andrew Johnson, August 9>
1865, Amnesty Papers, North Carolina.
^Biographical Directory. 1333 (Mann), 1122 (Hinds), 1087 
(Haughey), o*4l (Bromberg), 1318 (lynch); Speech of W. Jasper Blackburn 
(memorial to James Mann), Cone* Globe. *40 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 5, 
Appendix, 2*40; The Daily Picayune (New Orleans), August 27, August 28, 
1868 (Mann); Martha Ann Ellehburg, "Reconstruction in Arkansas" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1967)* 39-1*Oj 53-5^; 
Daily Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), October 2*4, October 31, 1868; 
Thomas Haughey to Benjamin P. Poore, December 28, 1868, in Haughey MSS, 
1868, University of Alabama Library, Tuscaloosa; Sarah Van Vorhis Wool- 
folk, "The Role of the Scalawag in Alabama Reconstruction" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1965)> H9> 287.
The Democratic congressmen outranked Republicans in terms of
Tfl
level of formal education. The available evidence indicates that 
nine Republicans and two Democrats had no formal schooling, hut five 
of the Republicans were blacks who had little educational opportunity 
until after the war, A sharper contrast between members of the two 
parties exists at the college or university level of education.
Over two-thirds of the Democrats had attended a college or university 
and 55 percent had taken at least one degree. By comparison, only 
k6 percent of the Republicans gave evidence of having attended college 
and only 28 percent had received a college degree. The sources of 
college training were also sharply sectional. Of those who took 
degrees, only nine of the forty-eight Democrats attended college out­
side the slave states, and only nine (all scalawags) of the twenty- 
seven Republicans attended Southern institutions. The most popular 
institution was the University of North Carolina with ten graduates 
among the congressmen, followed by the University of Virginia with 
eight, and the University of Georgia (Franklin College), Bnory College, 
and Harvard College with five each. Only two of the Southerners took 
degrees abroad.
^Education is one of the most difficult background character­
istics to measure. Obviously, some congressmen who were self-educated 
or who received only an elementary education were as “well-educated" 
as others who had one or more college degrees. The problem of meas­
uring educational levels is further complicated by the fact that 
a majority of the congressmen were trained as lawyers (see below).
Many read law and were admitted to the bar after only rudimentary 
formal education. Others turned to law after college or law school 
training. In the absence of a more satisfactory means of measurement 
the congressmen have been ranked according to the highest level of 
formal (institutional) education.
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On an individual level, Randall Gibson of Louisiana was among 
the better educated Democrats. The son of a wealthy Terrebonne Parish 
sugar planter, Gibson received his initial education from private 
tutors in Louisiana and at his mother's home in Kentucky. He attended 
a Yale preparatory school, was graduated ac the head of the Yale 
class of 1853, took a law degree from the University of Louisiana 
(now Tulane) in 1855, and spent the next three years traveling in 
Europe before settling down to sugar planting.-*-9 The Republicans 
had no one comparable to Gibson in educational experience, and only 
three Republicans had more than one degree. Of the three, the 
experience of Charles Buckley of Alabama best reveals the restless 
movement characteristic of many carpetbaggers. Buckley began his 
public schooling in his birthplace at UnadlUa, New York, and com­
pleted it in Freeport, Illinois, where his parents have moved to buy 
a farm. In i860 he was graduated from Beloit College'in Wisconsin, 
returned to his native state, and took another degree from Union 
Theological Seminary (New York City) in 1863* He entered the army as 
a chaplain in the U. S. Colored Volunteer Infantry and served with 
the Louisiana Colored Infantry before Joining the Freedman's Bureau 
in Alabama.20 For sheer variety though, few could match the educational 
experience of Beverly Brown Douglas of Virginia. After being graduated 
from a private academy in King William County, Douglas attended William
-^^ Donald Eugene Dixon, "Randall Lee Gibson of Louisiana,
1832-1892" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University,
1971), 6-22.
20Joel Campbell Dubose (ed.), Notable Men of Alabama. Personal 
and Geneological with Portraits (2 vols., Atlanta: Southern Historical
Association! 190*0. I. 25-2B7l3iographical Directory, 662.
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and Mary, Yale, and the University of Edinburgh in Scotland before 
returning home to study law under the renowned Beverly Tucker. He 
took a law degree from William and Mary in 1843.21
The educational experience of Gibson, Bucitley, and Douglas was 
exceptional, but as a group, the educational level of the Southerners 
was far above that of their constituents and probably compared 
favorably with Representatives from other sections. Even the men 
who possessed only an elementary or secondary education often had 
read law privately and had been admitted to the bar before the wax.
In terms of education, admission to the bar served as the great 
equalizer; an individual's ability at the practice of law over­
shadowed his formal educational attainments.
A survey of the vocations pursued by the 185 Southerners in­
dicates that the majority were engaged in the practice of law or 
agriculture or both. A full 58 percent listed their occupation as 
lawyers while 20 percent were primarily fanners or planters. The
latter figure is surprisingly low given the overwhelmingly rural nature
22of the South. It is almost certain that more congressmen were
4
^Lynn Gardiner Tyler (ed.), Encyclopedia of Virginia Biography 
(5 vols., New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1915)7 III) 
114-15; Biographical Directory, 875.
22The studies of Southerners in other representative bodies 
indicate a much higher concentration in agricultural pursuits. Berin- 
ger found that 58 percent of the membership of the Confederate Congress 
were engaged in agriculture; see Beringer, "Members of the Confederate 
Congress," 526-27. Wooster's study of seven Southern legislatures 
in I&50 and i860 indicates that in most states the percentage of 
membership engaged in agriculture ranged from 50 to 65 percent. In 
most states, the planters and faxmers outnumbered lawyers in the 
secession conventions. See Wooster, People in Power, 35i and Wooster, 
Secession Conventions. 17-18, 31, 53, 70, 85, 106, 126, 143, 158, 196.
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engaged in agriculture than is indicated in Table 2-6. The problem of
classification is illustrated by Archibald T. MacIntyre of Georgia.
MacIntyre is listed in the census of i860 and 3870 and other sources
as a lawyer. In i860, however, he owned eighty-four slaves and in
I870 he lived in a rural area and owned 6,400 acres of land valued
at $50,000. MacIntyre was therefore classified as a planter.
Similarly, all- sources list Dudley M. Du Bose of Georgia as a lawyer
and the 1870 census found him living in the town of Washington, but
the census also lists his real estate holdings at $50j000. Du Bose* s
primary occupation is listed as a lawyer with agricultural interests,
even though his real estate holdings indicate he could have been a
qIl
farmer with a secondary interest in the practice of law.
Over half of the congressmen had two or more occupations. Same 
like Gilbert C. Walker of Virginia were involved in so many pursuits 
that they defy classification. Walker, a Democratic "settler," 
practiced law and was the organizer and president of a Norfolk bank.
He had interests in the iron industry and railroads and owned real 
estate valued at $18,000 which suggests agricultural interests.The
23joseph Karl Menn, "The Large Slaveholders of the Deep South, 
i860" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1964),
857-58; Manuscript Census, 1870, Population and Agricultural 
Schedules, Georgia, Thomas County; MacIntyre to Andrew Johnson,
July 25, 3865* Amnesty Papers, Georgia.
2Vanuscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules, Georgia, Wilkes 
County; Biographical Directory. 883.
25d.A.B. , XIX, 344-45; Biographical Directory. 1869; Manuscript 
Census, I870, Population Schedules, Virginia, Norfolk County; Maddex, 
The Virginia Conservatives, 74-75> 91; Catherine Silverman, "'Of Wealth, 
Virtue, and Intelligence': The Redeemers and Their Triumph in Virginia
and North Carolina," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University 
of New York, 1971), 30-31.
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TABLE 2-6 
OCCUPATION BY PARTY6,
LEGAL 
Lawyer 
Lawyer/Judge 
Lawyer/Farmer 
Lawyer/Merchant 
Lawyer/Editor 
Lawyer/Railroads 
Lawyer/Banker 
Lawyer/Mining 
Lawyer/Educator
Total Legal
AGRICULTURAL
PROFESSIONAL
(e.g., Doctor, Educator, 
Engineer)
BUSINESS
(e.g., Merchant, Grocer, 
Lumber Business)
MANUAL TRADES
(e.g., Carpenter, Brick­
layer, Pilot)
OFFICEHOLDER15
DEMOCRATS
(n^ 88)
37 (42?0 
1 <
15 (17#)
1 ( If
4 '
2 
2 
1
m
. iw
2 ( 830 
65 (7456) 
16 (18#)
4 ( 5#)
3 ( 3#)
REHJBUCANS
(n=97)
27 (28#)
336)3
4 
2 
4 
3
43 (44#) 
21 (21#)
TOTAL
(n=l85)
64 (35#) 
4 ( 2#) 
19 (10#) 
3 ( 2#)
3#
1 ( 1#
2 ( 1#
108 (58#) 
37 (20#)
14 (14#) IB (10#)
9 ( 9 # )  12 ( 7#)
8 ( 8 # )  8 ( 4 # )
2 (2#) 2 (1#)
Occupations were cross-checked through a variety of sources 
including the Biographical Directory, the population schedules of the 
manuscript census, and the Congressional Globe. Individuals were 
classified according to their primary vocation (outside politics) at 
the time of their service in the House of Representatives.
^No occupation other than politician or public official was found 
for the two congressmen classified as officeholders. Both held federal 
positions (appointive) at the time of their election to the House.
tendency toward dual occupations necessitated a classification system 
to account for the various occupational combinations. In Table 2-6  
the Southerners are classified in six primacy occupational classes.
The full range of occupational combinations -within the primary legal 
category are reproduced to indicate the variety of combinations.^6
Occupational breakdown according to political affiliation 
indicates several variations between the parties. Less than 10 percent 
of the Democrats pursued vocations outside law and agriculture. The 
Republicans displayed more diversity with a full third of the party 
involved in pursuits other than law and agriculture. No significant 
variation in occupation exists within the Republican party with the 
exception than seven of the eight individuals in the manual trades 
class were blacks. The occupational profile for the scalawags might 
have been expected to be very similar to native Democrats, but a 
breakdown by party faction indicates that the profiles for scalawags 
and carpetbaggers are almost identical. The same variations in 
occupation that existed between Republicans and Democrats also pre­
vailed between scalawags and Democrats.
Lawyers, rather than planters, farmers, and businessmen, 
dominated the congressional delegations from the South. Including 
those who had prepared for law but were not actively practicing,
68 percent of the congressmen (8h percent of the Democrats, 5^ percent 
of the Republicans) were qualified to practice law. By contrast, only
26For the complete occupational classification system. See 
Appendix I.
Uh
31 percent (35 percent of the Democrats, 25 percent of the Republicans) 
were engaged primarily or tangentially in agriculture. While these 
percentages must be considered minimal figures, it is notable that 
less than ten percent of all the Southerners had economic interests 
exclusively in agriculture. Professional and business interests 
rivaled those of agriculture. Thirty-five percent of the congress­
men (23 percent of the Democrats, k2 percent of the Republicans) 
had some interest in professional or mercantile pursuits or such 
economic concerns as railroads, banking, shipping, manufacturing, 
and extractive industries. Quite clearly, agricultural interests 
no longer dominated the congressional delegations of the still rural 
South. 27
Efforts to determine the level of personal wealth for each of 
the 135 Southerners from the population schedules of the 1370 census
aQ
were only moderately successful. Of the 136 individuals found in
the Confederate Congress, Beringer found that 78 percent of 
the membership were engaged in law and 58 percent had agricultural 
interests with all other vocations totalling 20 percent (the percent­
ages do not tally to 100 percent because many had more than one 
occupation); see Beringer, "Confederate Congress," 526-27* The ratio 
between those involved in agricultural pursuits and lawyers in most 
of the Southern state legislatures in 1350 and i860 was over two to 
one; see Wooster, People in Power, 35*
28The census schedules were the only source systematically 
searched for figures on wealth. In several cases, the wealth figures 
from the 1870 census were cross-checked with figures from the 1360 
census schedules for agriculture and free and slave population and 
with the agricultural schedules of the 1880 census. The petitions 
for pardon in the .Amnesty Papers (particularly those coming under 
the Thirteenth Exception) are also a useful source for cross-checking 
wealth. These alternate sources have not been used, however, to 
project a congressman's wealth in 1370. A more accurate determination 
of individual wealth would have to take into account such sources as 
the county and state tax assessment rolls in scattered depositories 
in the South.
voluminous population schedules, twenty-two did not admit to having 
any real or personal property. Three of the rattaining individuals 
were dead by the time the census takers began their enumerations In 
June 1870 and the others were either unlisted or raaained undis­
covered.2^ The amount of real and personal estate reported by the 
individual congressmen is subject to dispute on several accounts.
Some individuals may have exaggerated the value of their estates 
to make themselves appear more prosperous than they actually were. 
Other individuals may have underestimated the value of their property 
out of personal modesty or because of a simple hesitancy to make 
known the true value of their property for tax purposes. In cases 
in which the real estate holdings are agricultural, the figures 
given in the population schedules may be cross-checked with figures 
for the improved and unimproved acreage and the estimated cash value 
of land, implements, livestock, and productions given in the agricul-
2^The problems associated with locating the congressmen in 
the population schedules are considerable. Before searching the 
schedules, it is necessary to determine as accurately as possible 
the residence of each individual as of Jhne 1870 when the census 
takers began their enumeration. In several cases, the exact 
residence could not be determined and the search had to be abandoned 
after examining the returns for all probable locations. Occasionally 
the returns are totally illegible or in such poor condition as to be 
of no value. In still other cases, the individuals may have been 
listed, but simply overlooked. The problems associated with finding 
the four individuals who susposedly resided in New Orleans, for 
example, are self-evident— given the fact that almost 200,000 people 
lived in Orleans Parish in IB70. Furthermore, there is no guarantee 
that those undiscovered congressmen were even listed in the census.
The census takers were overwhelming Republican and not a few were 
Negroes. Those individuals who were "unreconstructed" may have been 
unwilling to submit to cross-examination by a Radical census taker.
The reverse is also true. Some census takers were simply irresponsible. 
Under-enumeration Is a special problem in the 1870 census, particularly 
in South Carolina.
tural schedules. Still others simply declined to give the census 
takers any estimation of their real and personal wealth although 
other sources indicate they were property owner s. 3° Overall, the 
wealth figures are probably biased in favor of well-established 
individuals (primarily Democrats) with medium to large estates.
Despite the incomplete figures and misgivings about the reliability 
of census figures, the infoxmation in Table 2-7 gives a general 
indication of variations in wealth in relation to political affil­
iation.
Judged by the standards of the time, the Representatives were 
generally well-to-do men of property with only two admitting to an 
estate of le3s than $1,000. At the other end of the spectrum, four 
Democrats claimed a valuation exceeding $100,000. The richest of the 
four, William Smith Herndon of Texas, had accumulated real estate 
valued at $122,000 and a personal estate of $55*000 by the time he 
was thirty-two. The census taker listed Herndon simply as a lawyer, 
but his large landholdings in 1&70 indicate additional interests. He 
was a prominent railroad attorney end general solicitor and he was 
later involved in railroad construction and served as vice president 
of the Kansas and Gulf Short line Company. ^  More is known about
3°rhe census figures are defective in other ways. As Beringer 
has noted, the census figures on wealth give no indication of the 
extent to which the estates were mortgaged. But he adds that "the 
fact of a mortgage would not necessarily detract from the status the 
owner held in his community . . . .  Debt, after all, may indicate 
wealth as well as poverty"; see Beringer, "Confederate Congress," 530n.
^Biographical Directory. 1110; Walter Prescott Webb and H.
Bailey Carroll (e'cLs.), The Handbook of Texas (2 vols., Austin: Texas
State Historical Association, 1952), I, 802; Sid S. Johnson, Texans
SABLE! 2-7
PERSONAL AND REAL ESTATE 
VALUATION (1870) BY PARTY*
Estate DEMOCRAT REPUBLICAN
Valuation (n=88) (**=97)
Unknown 17 32
Undeclared 6 16
Under $1,000 1 l
$1,000 - 9,000 21 28
10,000 - 19,000 16 10
20,000 - 1+9,000 19 7
50,000 - 99,000 k 3
100,000 and Over h •  •
aSource: Federal Manuscript Census, 1870, Population
Schedules for the ten states.
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Effingham Lawrence of Louisiana who was probably worth considerably 
more than the $15^,000 he claimed in 1870. The agricultural schedules 
list his Plaquemines Parish holdings at 2,680 acres; the value of the 
average acre of land in the swampy sugar-producing parish has been 
estimated at $28 in 1370* Lawrence may have had seme useless swamp 
land, hut he also had same of the best sugar land as is evidenced by 
his production of 20,000 gallons of molassas, as well as orchard land 
yielding $6,000 of oranges for I869-IB70. In addition he had live­
stock valued at $20,000 and equipment (probably a sugar mill) worth 
$23,000. His total productions for the year were valued at $120,000.32 
Georgians ranked third and fourth in wealth* Archibald MacIntyre's 
sugar lands along the Ochlockonee River in Southern Georgia were 
worth only $50,000 but he claimed an additional $60,000 in personal 
property. Nelson Tift, who styled himself a "merchant and farmer" 
had $107*500 wrapped up in a number of ventures including land, 
lumber, flour, and com meal mills and a packing plant, as well as
Who Wore the Grayfn.n*. 1907), 68-69; John Pressley Carrier, "A 
Political History of Texas Luring the Reconstruction" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1971)* ^91.
3%anuscript Census, 1370, Population and Agricultural Schedules, 
Louisiana, Plaquemines Parish; Thomas J. Fressly and William H. Sco­
field, Farm Real Estate Values in the United States by Counties. 1350- 
1359 (Seattle: University of Washington Press', 19657* 57* Joseph Karl 
Menn, The large Slaveholders of Louisiana— 1360 (New Orleans: Pelican
Publishing Company, 196*0, 3C®7 310-11. For a description of Lawrence's 
operation in an earlier period, see J. Carlyle Sitterson, 'Magnolia 
Plantation, 1852-1362: A Decade of a Louisiana Sugar Estate," Missis­
sippi Valley Historical Review.. XXV (September, 1938), 197-210.
Lawrence served less than a day in the House of Representatives. He 
was seated on the last day of the Forty-Third Congress after success­
fully contesting Republican incumbent Jacob H. Sypher. He had the 
opportunity to vote on five roll calls; he was absent for two and voted 
for three— none of which were economic measures.
railroads,33 For those whose wealth is known, almost 70 percent of 
the Democrats were worth more than $10,000 with a healthy 1*4 percent 
worth more than $20,000, The median property valuation for Democrats 
was $17,000 (average $26,815), By contrast, the property of almost 
60 percent of the Republicans was valued at less than $10,000 with 
only 20 percent worth more than $20,000. Within the Republican 
party, the average property valuation was $7,500 (average $14,032) 
for scalawags, $10,450 (average $14,166) for carpetbaggers, and 
$6,800 (average $5,270) for blacks.
Information on the political antecedents of most congressmen 
is incomplete. Thirty-one of the thirty-seven identified as members 
of the Democratic party during the 1850* s remained in the party 
through Reconstruction. Of the remaining six, four became scalawags, 
and two became carpetbaggers. Of the thirty-four identifiable former 
Whigs, twenty-two served as Democrats and twelve as scalawags during 
Reconstruction. Only eight (all carpetbaggers) were positively 
identified as belonging to the Republican party before the war. While 
the data is far too fragmentary to engender conclusions, it is clear 
that former Whigs did not naturally gravitate into the Republican 
party. Of the fifty Representatives whose vote in the presidential 
election of i860 is known, twenty-two supported John C. Breckinridge, 
thirteen favored Stephen A. Douglas, nine voted for John Bell, and
3%anuscript Census, 1870, Population and Agricultural Schedules 
Georgia, Thomas County; MacIntyre to Andrew Johnson, July 25, 1865, 
Amnesty Papers, Georgia; Manuscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules 
Georgia, Dougherty County; Tift to Andrew Johnson, June 27, 1865, 
Amnesty Papers, Georgia.
I50
tea (all carpetbaggers) are known to have supported Abraham Lincoln. 
All the Breckinridge votes came from Democrats, while the votes for 
Douglas and Bell were proportionally split between Democrats and
scalawags. 3^
Information is more complete on the congressmen's attitudes 
toward secession and their subsequent service in the Civil War (see 
Table 2-8). If the blacks are excluded, only twenty (all Democrats) 
were identified as secessionists while 103 were unionists (43 unknown). 
It is interesting that nearly half of the Democrats took a unionist 
or cooperationist stance during the secession crisis. The Democratic 
unionists, however, tended to join the Confederacy once the war 
began. While 80 percent of the Democrats supported the Southern effort 
in civil and military capacities, over half the scalawags declined 
to serve the Confederacy.
Given the political instability of the Reconstruction period, 
the level of prior political experience remained high for both 
Democrats and Republicans. As anticipated, the native Democrats had 
the edge over their Republican counterparts in terms of total political
3^While some association exists between an individual's party 
during the 1850s, vote for president in i860, position on secession, 
and civil war service, in no case has one position been used to 
predict another. If an individual voted for Breckinridge in i860, 
for example, it does not necessarily follow that he was also a 
secessionist. In fact, for individuals whose position in both cases 
is known, three Breckinridge supporters were declared unionists in the 
subsequent crisis over secession (contingency coefficient C = .66 for 
cross-tabulation of vote for president and position on secession). 
Likewise, the association between position on secession and civil war 
service is relatively strong (contingency coefficient C = .51; mean 
square contingency coefficient phi = .46 for a reduced 2x2 table), 
but it is far from being perfect.
TABLE 2-8
POSITION ON SECESSION AND CIVIL WAR 
SERVICE BY PARTY
DEMOCRATS REPUBLICANS
Scalawag Carpetbagger 
(n=88) (n= 3^) (n=lfO)
Position on Secession
Secessionist 20
Unionist Ifl 27 40
Unknown 27 lf> ..
Civil War Service
Confederate 70® (80$) 15^ (3:
Union 2C ( 2$) 3 (7$) 35 (88$)
Nonparticipant 16 (18$) 21 (^ 9$) *f (10$)
Unknown . . I f  1
aTotal includes four individuals who had no identifiable 
military service but served the Confederacy in civil capacities.
^Total includes two individuals who had no identifiable 
military service but served the Confederacy in civil capacities.
°Mann (LA) and Connor (TX).
experience, "but the Republicans' general level of experience belies 
the commonly accepted notion that they were political novices. Only 
ten Democrats and seven Republicans had no discoverable political 
experience at the beginning of their first term in Congress.^ At 
the highest level, eight Democrats and four Republicans had served 
in the House of Representatives prior to the war, nine Democrats had 
experience in the Confederate Congress, and one, Alexander Stephens 
of Georgia, had been Vice President of the Confederate States of 
America. Fifty-six percent of the Democrats and 38 percent of the 
Republicans had served one or more terns in state legislatures— the 
principal stepping stone to congressional service. The so-called 
"Black and Tan" constitutional conventions held in each of the ten 
states in I867 and 1868 provided experience and a forum for forty- 
four of the ninety-seven Republicans. In several cases, their role 
as delegates to those conventions constituted their only substantial 
political expe r i e n c e .36 Many Representatives from both parties had 
served in the state and local judiciary systems (see Table 2-9).
The extent and variety of political experience varied widely
35phe figures for those with no political experience are undoubt­
edly too high; it may be assumed that information for some of these 
individuals was not discovered. Most had been active in state and 
local party politics and several had been unsuccessful candidates for 
political office prior to their election to Congress.
3^The forty-four Republican delegates to the Black and Tan 
Conventions included sixteen carpetbaggers, nineteen scalawags, and 
nine blacks. According to Richard Hume's voting analysis, thirty- 
eight of the forty-four were radicals, four were conservatives, and 
three were non-aligned; see Hume, "The 'Black and Tan* Constitutional 
Conventions in Ten Former Confederate States: A Study of Their
Membership" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 
1969), passim.
TABLE 2-9 
PRIOR POLITICAL EXPERIENCE BY PARTY
federal 
House of Representatives 
Appointive®
Total
CONFEDERATE 
Vice President 
Congress 
Appointive*5 
Total
STATE
Governor, It. Governor
Legislature
Judiciary
Secession Convention 
Constitutional Convention 
IB65-66  
1667-68 
Other 
Total
LOCAL0 
County or Parish 
City 
Other 
Total
POLITICAL PARTY 
National Party Conventions 
Presidential Electors
NO POLITICAL EXPERIENCE
DEMOCRAT
(n=88)
s
11 (13$)
1 
9 
5
Ik (lS#)
Ik (16%
10 (11#) 
8 c m
75 (88#)
13 (15#)
k J Si 2 ( 2#)
19 (22#)
1? S i
10 (31#)
REPUBLICAN
(n^97)
1
38 (39#) 
17 (18#) 
3 ( 3#)
10 (10#) 
Uk {k%) 
16 (16#) 
80 (82#)
28 (29# 
9 | 9#,
2#
13 (13#) 
7 ( 7#)
7 ( 7#)
TOTAL
(ns=385)
if ( It#) 12
26 (27#) 29
25 (26#) 36 (19#)
2
2
( 2#) .
(2#) 16 ( 9#)
5#
3
ok
ifit (2$  
17 ( 9#)
20 (11#) 
Ifif (2lf#j 
2if (13#) 
155 (8if#5
ifl (22#) 
13 ( 7# 
if ( 2#) 
31 (32#) 50 (27#)
2lf (13#
17 ( 9#)
aE.g., positions of U. S. District Attorney and Internal Revenue 
agent, service in the Freedmert's Bureau.
u
E.g., positions of tax assessor., judge, service in the C.S.A. 
diplomatic corps.
cThe figures for local political experience are undoubtedly too 
low due to lack of information. The sources and the men themselves 
often neglected to detail the range of their experience at the local 
level.
from individual to individual and from party to party. In terms of 
total experience, no one could match Alexander H. Stephens of 
Georgia. In a political career that hegan with election to the 
Georgia House in 1836, Stephens served a term in the state Senate, 
and seven terms as a prominent Whig in the U. S. House from 18^3 to 
1859* He was a presidential elector for Stephen A. Douglas In i860, 
a unionist in the Georgia secession convention, and was elected to 
the Provisional Congress prior to his selection as Vice President of 
the Confederacy. At the conclusion of the war, the Georgia legis­
lature promptly selected him as one of the state's U. S. Senators, 
hut he was not seated. When he finally returned to the House in 
1873 to begin the first of four terms, he was, in the words of
Republican leader James G. Blaine, "physically a shattered man . . .
merely a relic of the past in a representative assembly in which his
voice was said to have been once potential. "37 But to his younger
Southern Democratic colleagues who helped him to the Speaker's chair 
to take the oath he was a symbol of the greatness of Southern leader- 
ship.
Other more obscure Democrats were big men in their own baili-
37James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to 
Garfield (2 vols., Norwich, CT: The Henry Bill Publishing Company,
1886), II, 5 7^.
3®See, for example, Alfred Moore Waddell, Some Memories of My 
life (Raleigh: Edwards and Broughton Printing Company, 190$), 109;
Atlanta Constitution, November 30, 1873; and The Brooklyn Argus as 
quoted in Atlanta Constitution, December 11, 1873. Far Stephen's 
career, see Richard M. Johnston and William H. Browne, life of 
Alexander H. Stephens (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company,
1876); Rudolph Von Abele, Alexander H. Stephens: A Biography (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19*t6); and dTa.B. XVII, 569-75*
wicks. Otho R. Singleton, for example, a wealthy Mississippi planter- 
lawyer, served in the Mississippi House in 3J8lt6 and I8U7, in the state 
Senate freon 18U8 to 185 ,^ and as a Democratic Representative for three 
terms before withdrawing when Mississippi seceded in early 1861. His 
constituents promptly sent him to the Confederate House of Repre­
sentatives for the duration of the war. ^9 The political background 
of Charles E. Hooker, Singleton* s fellow Mississippian, is more 
representative of the general level of political experience among 
Democrats. Hooker, a lawyer of modest means, served as a district 
attorney from 1850 to 185^ and spent one term in the Mississippi House 
prior to the Civil War. After serving in the Confederate army, he 
was elected Attorney General of Mississippi and served until removed 
by military authorities in 1868.**° Most of the Democrats acquired 
their political experience in their native states, but a few, like 
Jesse J. Finley of Florida, had served in several states. A native 
of Tennessee, Finley was succesively a member of the Arkansas Senate 
in 18^ 5> mayor of Memphis, Tennessee, a member of the Florida Senate 
in 1850, and a U. S. judge and a Confederate judge for the Florida 
District from 1852-1865.^
In terras of major officeholding, no Republican had compiled a
3^Biographical Directory, 1702; Singleton to Andrew Johnson, 
n.d., Amnesty Papers, Georgia.
^^ Biographical Directory. U37; Dunbar Rowland (ed.), Missis­
sippi: Comprising Sketches of Counties, Towns, Events, Institutions, 
and Persons . . . . vols., Atlanta: Southern Historical Publishing
Company, 1907), IV, 150-5 .^
^^ Biographical Directory, 9 2^.
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record comparable to Stephens or even Singleton. She native Repub­
licans were more experienced than the carpetbaggers and blacks. Some 
scalawags, like Robert S. Heflin of Alabama, had made a career of 
public service. A native Georgian, Heflin had served as clerk of the 
Georgia Supreme Court and in the Georgia Senate and House before 
moving to Alabama in 1849- In Alabama, he was elected as a Democrat 
to the state House and state Senate, before changing his allegiance 
to the Republican party during the war.1*2 While as a rule the 
caxpetbaggers had less experience than the scalawags, many had held 
office in several different states— a reflection of the adventurous, 
restless character often associated with the carpetbagger type.**3 
David Heaton, for example, had served in the Ohio and Minnesota state 
Senates prior to accepting an appointment as agent of the Treasury 
Department at New Bern, North Carolina, in 1863. But Heaton could not 
match the travels of John Edwards, a lawyer, editor, and professional 
politician who eventually represented the third district of Arkansas 
in the Forty-Second Congress. Although Edwards was bom in Kentucky, 
his political career apparently began with his election to the 
Indiana House in 184-5. Four years later he was serving as an Alcalde 
(a major with judicial powers) in California. He returned to Indiana 
in 1852 and was selected to the state Senate in 1853- Another move
Ibid., 1099* Benjamin P. Poore (camp.), Congressional Directory 
for the Second Session of the Forty-First Congress of the United States 
of America (2d ed., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1870), 6.
^See, for example, David H. Oveiy, Jr., "The Wisconsin Carpet­
baggers: A Group Portrait," Wisconsin Magazine of History. XLIV
(Autumn, i960), 15-49.
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in 1855 took Edwards to Iowa where his new constituents promptly elected 
him to the state's constitutional convention of that year and to the 
Iowa House for the next four years. His House colleagues selected 
him Speaker in 1859 and i860. During the war, Edwards attained the 
rank of Brigadier General of Volunteers in the Union army. After being 
mustered out in January 1866, he settled in Fort Smith, Arkansas, and 
President Johnson rewarded him with an appointment as U. S. Assessor 
of Internal Revenue.1^
As a factor in voting analysis, prior political experience, in 
and of itself, appears to be of little consequence, but It merits 
consideration for reasons other than illuminating the political back­
ground of the individual. An individual with extensive political 
experience was likely to have compiled a record on public issues.
He was known to other political figures and to his constituents 
either by virtue of his public record or by the mere fact of contact 
established by perennial campaigning. Thus an individual., by virtue 
of his political experience and record, might wield more influence 
among his colleagues than other individuals who were political novices.
Men with extensive political experience, like John H. Reagan and James 
W. Throckmorton of Texas, received better committee assignments, their 
voices merited consideration, and they wielded much more influence 
during their first tern in the Forty-Fourth Congress than did, for 
example, another first termer, Charles Hash of Louisiana, whose only 
known experience even closely related to politics was his appointment
^^ Biographical Directory, IO98 (Heaton), 901-902 (Edwards).
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as a night inspector of customs in New Orleans.
A final measurable attribute possessed by each congressman was 
the margin of victory by which he achieved election to the House.
David Donald has demonstrated that a Representative ’ s margin of 
victory, which can be interpreted as a measure of security in office, 
had an Impact on his response to the formation of reconstruction 
policy. Professor Donald's study suggests a direct association between 
radicalism and security in office— the more secure his position (as 
measured by margin of victory) the more radical he was likely to be. ^5 
Conversely then, one might expect that the more insecure a congress­
man felt, the more responsive he might be to what he perceived to be 
his constituents' interests and the less likely he might be to chart 
an independent course.
Information on the margin of victory in each of the 276 congres­
sional elections is presented in Table 2-10. Any compilation of 
election statistics gathered over a period of time must be qualified 
by an awareness that the margin of victory depends on the time and 
particular circumstances of each election. Since the margin of 
victory depends on the relative strength of each political party at 
the time of election, the decisive Republican victories usually came 
during the earlier part of Reconstruction and in the heavily black 
districts. The reverse is true for Democrats. The closely contested 
elections most often occurred just prior to or during the redemption
^5pavid Donald, The Politics of Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, lofe), especially""33-52.
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TABLE 2-10 
MARGIN OP VICTORY BY PARTY
MARGIN OP 
VICTORY8,
Unknown
1-2$
3-5$
6-10$
11-20$
Over 20$
Unopposed
Total
Elections
DEMOCRAT
2
12 (10$) 
12
19
20
h9 (hi$) 
_6
120
Scalawag
1
16 (25$) 
9 
10 
12
15 (2lf$)
MP*
63
REPUBLICAN
Carpetbagger
3
8 (11$) 
7 
6 
lb
29 (to$
. 2-
72
Black
1
5 (2lf$) 
2 
2 
2
7 (33$) 
J2
21
aMargin of victory is defined as the difference between the 
percentages of total vote won by the top two candidates In each 
contest.
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process at the state level.^
For the period as a whole, only minor variations existed be­
tween the parties in terms of margin of victory. Within the Repub­
lican party, however, there are several Important variations, As 
Table 2-10 indicates, the distribution of cases for Democrats and 
carpetbaggers is about equal, particularly in the 1-2 percent and the 
over 20 percent categories. On the other hand, the scalawags and, to 
a less degree, the blacks were much more likely to be involved in 
close contests. This variation is another shred of evidence that 
suggests the peculiar position and dilemna of the scalawag. Earlier 
variations in background between the scalawag and carpetbag elements 
of the Republican party have been noted. Quite often, and not
^In most cases, the margin of victory was calculated from 
county-level election returns on machine-readable tape from the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (ICFR) at the 
University of Michigan. The ICFR election returns for the Recon­
struction period were, for the most part, compiled from the annual 
issues of The Tribune Almanac and Political Register (New York:
The Tribune Association, 1868-1B76"J*I The election returns in Almanac, 
however, are incomplete particularly for interim elections to vacancies 
created by contests, deaths, and resignations. In addition, the 
Almanac does not include revised returns for elections won by contest. 
In these cases the ICFR returns must be supplemented with returns 
in newspapers and other sources. On occasion, the Congressional 
Globe and Congressional Record include election returns for indi­
viduals seated during the term. The revised returns for elections 
won by contest are often contained in two compilations of contested 
elections: D. W. Bartlett (comp.), Digest of Election Cases. Cases
of Contested Elections in the House of Representatives From 1865 to 
TO! Inclusive, House Miscellaneous Documents',' ¥l CongT, 2 Sess.,
No. 152; and J. M. Smith (comp.). Digest of Election Cases. Cases 
of Contested Elections in the House of Representatives, Forty-Second, 
Forty-Third, and Forty-Fourth Congress, Frcm 1871-187^. Inclusive,
House Miscellaneous Documents, ^5 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 52. The 
various editions of Boore (comp.), Congressional Directory, are an 
additional source for cross-checking election returns.
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surprisingly, the scalawags were closer to the Democrats in terms of 
personal background. The scalawags were often caught in an uneasy 
position between the carpetbaggers on the one hand and the Democrats 
on the other. As will be discussed later, scalawags tended to be 
elected from closely-contested districts that were either marginally 
black or white in terns of racial composition. Districts with heavier 
black majorities favored carpetbaggers and blacks while Democrats 
tended to come from districts with white majorities.
Any study of the membership of a legislative body over a period 
of time is complicated by the various factors contributing to a high 
turnover rate and the Reconstruction period is clearly no exception. 
The turnover rate is obviously related to party strength at any 
given time and other factors contributing to contested elections.
Of the 276 elections to the House during the period, twenty-nine 
were contested--seventeen successfully. No congressmen from Alabama 
and Mississippi lost their seats by contest. Not surprisingly, 
Louisiana and South Carolina led in the number of successful contests. 
One congressman, Josiah Walls of Florida, had the distinction of 
losing his seat twice by contests, while Jacob H. Sypher of Louisiana 
won one contest and lost one during his four terms in the House.
Sypher lost his second contest to Effingham Lawrence who was seated 
on the last day of the Forty-Third Congress. The only other Repre­
sentative to serve one day was also from Louisiana and served the same 
day as Lawrence. Former Union General George A. Sheridan won his 
celebrated contest with P. B. S. Pinchbeck and was granted, as one
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editor put it, "15 hours honor and several thousand dollars backpay. *'^ 7 
Others speculated that the prospects of financial gain figured in 
many contests. In his commentary on one such election, the editor of 
The Atlanta Constitution denounced the Republican contestant, charging 
that the "Radical congress will pay him for his trouble, and that is 
all he is working for." The Constitution and other newspapers agitated 
continually for a law, eventually passed, that stopped pay for 
unsuccessful contestants.
Another factor contributing to the turnover rate was the 
creation of vacancies by death or resignation. Six congressmen died 
during their terms in office, the Bouse forced two to resign, and 
a third resigned to re-enter state politics. The staggered readmi3sion 
of the states added greatly to the number of partial-tenners in the 
Southern delegations. Seven states, including Georgia, were readmitted 
toward the end of the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress and the 
swearing in of members stretched over a two month period in mld-1868. 
Georgia, denied admission to the First Session of the Forty-First 
Congress, was not readmitted until the Third Session. Virginia, was 
readmitted in January 1870, Mississippi in February 1870, and Texas 
in March 1870— all midway in the Second Session of the Forty-First 
Congress.
^New Orleans Republican. March 5, 1875.
^Ehe Atlanta Constitution. January 7, January 12, 1873. See 
also Richmond Whig. November l5, 1870, December 21, 1871* For the 
act curtailing payments to either party for expenses incurred in 
contested elections, sec Cong. Globe, kZ Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 
Appendix, 260.
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The political distribution of the large number of congressmen 
who served partial terms Is worthy of note. Nearly hai.-p of the terms 
served by Republicans were partial terns while only 19 percent of the 
Democratic terms were incomplete. Thirty-five of the forty carpet­
baggers served at least one partial term and 35 percent of the seventy- 
two terms served by carpetbaggers were partial terms with an average 
length of eleven months. The large number of partial terms for 
Republicans suggests that perhaps the Republicans actually served 
fewer total months (in proportion to their numbers) in the House 
than did the Democrats. Such, however, was not the case. The ratio 
between total number of months served by Republicans and Democrats 
and the ratio between Republicans and Democrats in the membership 
are equal. This is due to a difference in the average number of 
terms served by Democrats (l.tf) and Republicans (1.6). A variation 
does exist between the parties in average length of term. Democratic 
terms averaged 20.8 months; Republicans averaged 17.3 months.
To some degree, the Representatives were responsible to con­
stituencies definable in social and economic, as well as geographical 
terms. Ideally, a congressman* s response to economic measures, for 
example, should reflect the varied economic interests of his constit­
uency. Thus if a given constituency is heavily agricultural, one 
would expect its elected representative to respond positively to 
measures favored by agricultural interests of his district. On the
0M'
other hand, the representative of an urban constituency with a heavier 
concentration of manufacturing and labor interests might be expected 
to respond to economic issues in a manner quite different from his
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counterpart who represents an agrarian district. Granting the assump­
tion that seme relationship exists between a congressman's vote and. 
his constituents' interests, it is important to try to define the 
social and. economic interests of that constituency.
It is practically impossible to measure accurately the extent 
and. influence of each of the varied, economic interests within each 
congressional district. She Reconstruction South is justifiably 
viewed as primarily a staple-producing region, but when it is broken 
down into congressional districts, greater variations occur in economic 
interests. Furthermore, the economic values usually associated with 
an agrarian region (e.g., soft money, free trade, free banking, an 
inflationist philosophy, federally-subsidized transportation systems) 
are functions of time and circumstance. It has been shown, for 
example, that agrarian concern with economic issues is inversely 
proportional to farm prosperity. The attendant difficulties in 
determining the Southern position on economic issues at any given 
time are numerous. Contemporary newspapers and special interest 
publications give a general indication of the economic attitudes of a 
particular area or interest group within the South. But editors and 
other spokesmen for Southern interests were naturally subjective, and 
may or may not have accurately reflected the economic interests of a 
given area.
^$Ehere is no study of the economic interest groups of the South 
comparable, for example, to those of Sharkey and linger for the ftorth. 
Some indication of the economic interests is given in E. Merton Coulter, 
The South During Reconstruction. 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 19^7), particularly chs. 3X-XII, but Coulter is 
more interested in recounting and assessing blame for the South's
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To supplement other contemporary and secondary sources, three 
statistical Indexes have been constructed to assist in measuring the 
economic interests of each congressional district* Two of the 
indexes, per capita wealth and land value per acre, serve as incondite 
indicators of the general level of the economy and economic develop­
ment within each district. A more important index measures the 
importance of agricultural interests to the economy of the district, 
and a fourth index is the ratio between white and black population 
in each district. The index of racial composition is particularly 
well correlated with political affiliation but it also relates to 
economics. Heavily black areas were most often rural and agricul­
tural. The scattered white rural districts were usually centered 
in the upland wooded country or in poorer agricultural areas outside 
the black belt, seacoast, and delta areas of the South. A few 
urban centers contained sizable black populations, but whites formed 
the majority in most urban areas.5°
economic ills on the war and radical political domination. Other 
historians have dealt with the South* s reaction to specific economic 
issues; see, for example, Arm!stead C. Gordon, "The Effects of Currency 
Legislation," in The South in the Bu1.ld3.nK of the Ration. (12 vols., 
Richmond: The Southern Historical Society, 1909)* VI, Economic History.
1865-1910. 1*15-18; Davis R. Dewey, "Banking in the South," ibid..' 1*26>- 
33; William E. Dodd, "The Economic Effects Upon the South of the United 
States Tariff Policy," ibid., 1*76-81; Paul Wallace Gates, "Federal Land 
Policy in the South, 1866-1888," Journal of Southern History, VI (August^  
19l*0), 303-30; George L. Anderson^TheSouth and the Problems of Post- 
Civil War Finance," Journal of Southern History. IX (Hay, 19**3)» 183- 
216; and Anderson, "The National Banking system, 1865-1875; A Sectional 
Institution" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 
1933)9 ch. V, passim; and Walter T. K. Nugent, Money and American 
Society, 1865-1880 (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 57-59*
50/01 four indexes are explained in fuller detail below. The 
indexes of per capita wealth, percent agricultural, and percent white 
for each congressional district were compiled from county-level statis­
tics in Francis A. Walker (ccorp.), Ninth Census of the United States
The compilation of the four indexes necessitates reconstruction 
of the Southern congressional districts at each apportionment. Under 
the apportionment of 1360, which was valid through the Forty-Second 
Congress, the South was allotted fifty Representatives in a House 
which numbered 2k3 members. The apportionment based on the I87O 
census, valid for the Forty-Third and Forty-Fourth Congresses, in­
creased Southern membership to sixty-three and total House membership
(3 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, I872), Vol I. The 
Statistics of the Population of the United States . . . , hereinafter 
cited as Walker (comp.). Statistics of the Population. 1670; and Vol. 
Ill, The Statistics of the Wealth and Industry of the United States 
. . . , 1670. The index of land value per acre was compiled from 
Pres sly and Scofield, Farm Real Estate Values.
The 1870 census is used in this study with an awareness that the 
returns have been found to be inaccurate— the central problem being 
one of under-enumeration. After studying population trends, census 
officials in 1890 estimated that the total population in IB70 was 
approximately 39,818,M #  instead of 38,558,371 as reported. Under- 
enumeration was a special problem in the South. Authorities estimate 
that the 1870 figures for the total population in the thirteen South­
ern states should be increased by about U.2 percent. Under-enumer­
ation was "marked" in South Carolina, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Texas, and "considerable" in Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina. 
For a discussion of the reliability of the 1870 census, see Robert P. 
Porter (ccmp.), Compendium of the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part I: 
Papulation (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1592), 35-43;
Simon Kuznets and Dorthy S. Thomas, Population and Economic Growth. 
1870-1950, Vol. I, Everett S. Lee, et al.. Methodological Consid­
erations and Reference Tables (Philadelphia: The American Philo­
sophical Society, 1957), tOl-402; and Carroll D. Wright and William C. 
Hart, History and Growth of the United States Census, 1790-1890 
(Washington: GovernmenF Printing Office, 1900), 52-57. For more 
general discussions regarding census use, see Barnes F. Latfarop, 
"History from the Census Returns," Southwestern Historical Quarterly,
II (April, 191*8 ), 293-312; Merle Curti, et al., The Making of an Amer­
ican Community: A Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier County
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 195977 Appendix I, 1&9-58; Sam
B. Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 
3870-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press and the M.I.T. Press, 
1962), Appendix A. 169-178; and Robert G. Barrows, "The Manuscript 
Federal Census: A Source for a 'New* Local History," Indiana
Magazine of History, LXIX (September, 1973), 181-192.
to 293.5** The state legislatures or constitutional conventions that 
assumed responsibility for implementing apportionment could revise 
congressional district lines at any time. In Louisiana, for example, 
the conservative legislature of 1865 divided the state into five 
congressional districts in accordance with the apportionment of i860. 
Three years later, the convention charged with revising the stated 
constitution according to the guidelines set down by Congress redrew 
the lines of the five congressional districts to its liking. Because 
of the timing of the redistxicting, Louisiana Representatives to the 
Fortieth Congress were elected from districts established by the 1865 
legislature, and those to the Forty-First Congress served from the 
districts established by the constitutional convention of 1868. With 
the exception of a minor adjustment in Arkansas' district lines in 
1868, Louisiana was the only state to redistrict twice within the 
same apportionment in the period under review.
The Southern congressional districts for the apportionments of 
i860 and 1870 are presented in Maps 2-1 and 2-2 respectively. The 
apportionment of 1870 increased the number of Representatives allotted 
to each Southern state but only four states decided to redistrict for
?lpor the number of Representatives allotted to each state 
at each apportionment, see Biographical Birectory. 7^.
5%or the counties included in the congressional districts 
established by the legislature of 1865» see "An Act to Divide the 
State of Louisiana into Five Congressional Districts," Acts Passed 
by the First General Assembly of the State of Louisiana . . . . (New 
Orleans: W. R. Fish, State Printer, 1865) For the act 
reapportioning the state in 1868, see Louisiana Contested Flections. 
Testimony Taken by the Sub-Committee of Elections in Louisiana.
House Miscellaneous Documents. 41 Cong.. 2 Sess., Pt. 1,
Appendix, i.
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elections to the Forty-Third Congress. The other states, with the 
exception of Alabama, elected at-large Representatives equal to their 
increase to the Fprty-Thlrd Congress and completed redlstricting in 
time for elections to the Forty-Fourth Congress. Alabama retained 
the congressional districts established under the apportionment of 
i860 and elected two at-large Representatives to both the Forty-Third 
and Forty-Fourth Congresses. Alabama did not redistrict until after 
the elections to the Forty-Fourth Congress. By then the Democrats had 
full control of the state legislature and were able to divide the 
state in a manner most beneficial to party interests.53
53ihe only congressional district maps available for the Recon­
struction Congresses were compiled by the WPA Historical Records 
Survey under the direction of Clifford Lord and are now in the Columbia 
University library, see McCarthy, "Reconstruction Legislation and 
Voting Alignments," 382. As the author was unable to consult these 
maps, the maps in this study were constructed from a number of sources. 
The sources for counties in each district at each apportionment were 
the various editions of Poore (comp.), Congressional Directory. supple­
mented and cross-checked by the notices of elections in newspapers 
which often enumerated the counties in each district. Map 2-1 and all 
subsequent maps are based on the U. S. maps showing present-day county 
lines in United States, Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, 
The National Atlas of the United States of America (Washington; Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1S7O), e.g., 164. For state maps outlining the 
counties at the time, Rand McNally and Campaigns Business Atlas (Chicago 
Rand McNally, 1878) was particularly useful as were the i860 state maps 
showing county divisions in Ralph A. Wooster, "The Secession Conventions 
of the Lower South: A Study of Their Membership" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Texas, 195*0i and the Outline Maps of the 
United States by Counties, for June 1, i860 and. JUne 1, 1870 (U. S. 
Department of Agriculture, Division of Publications). These were 
supplemented by state maps in other sources; see, for example, the map 
of North Carolina counties as of 1870 in David L. Corbitt, The Formation 
of North Carolina Counties. 1663-19^3 (Raleigh: State Department of
Archives and History, 1950), 291; and those for Mississippi in James £. 
Baxter, "Congressional Redlstricting in Mississippi From 1817-1939," 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Duke University, 1939)» 53, 91* For the 
period under review, New Orleans was the only city split by congres­
sional district lines. Tracing the division of New Orleans at art 
apportionments was facilitated by the ward maps in E. Robinson and 
R. H. Pidgeon (comps.), Atlas of the City of New Orleans. Louisiana 
(New York: E. Robinson, 1883).
The key consideration for those charged with redrawing congres­
sional district lines was the racial composition of each district.
The shape the districts took depended upon the party in power in the 
state legislature at the time of redistricting. Each party showed 
an adeptness at gerxymanaering districts in such a way as to ensure 
the racial balance in each district desired by the party. Missis­
sippi serves as a good example of the process. John Boy lynch, who 
eventually represented the state in the Forty-Third Congress, was 
Speaker of the Mississippi House of Representatives when it came time 
to reapportion the state from five to six districts in accordance with 
the apportionment of 1870. The Republican House decided that lynch, 
as Speaker, should draft a bill to redistrict the state. According 
to lynch, there were two possible plans of redistricting to be con­
sidered:
One plan was so to apportion the State as to make all the 
districts Republican; but in doing so the majority in 
at least two of the districts would be quite small. The 
other was so to apportion the State as to make five dis­
tricts safely and reliably Republican and the remaining one 
Democratic. . . .  After going over the matter carefully I 
came to the conclusion that the better and safer plan would 
be to make five safe and sure Republican districts and con­
cede one to the Democrats. Another reason for this decision 
was that in so doing, the State could be more fairly 
apportioned. 5^
An examination of the ratio between the races in each congres­
sional district before and after the lynch reapportionment indicates 
that lynch did his job well.^ In creating one solidly Democratic
5^Iynch, The Facts of Reconstruction, 67-68.
lynch took the five districts which were 5*+$, 53$» **6$, h5$, 
and 37$ white and created six districts which were 71$, hk$, 43$, ^3$,
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district, lynch knowingly provided for the election of L. Q. C. Lamar
(whan he admired) to the Forty-Third Congress. In 1875 > the state
legislature, now in Democratic hands by virtue of the so-called
’Mississippi Plan,” reapportioned the state into five safely white
districts and one black district. lynch represented that black
district, the famous "shoestring district” along the Mississippi River,
*56in the Forty-Seventh Congress.
The index of racial composition is expressed as the percent of 
the total population of a district which was white at each appor­
tionment (see Maps 2-3 and 2-k). According to the 1870 census, whites 
constituted 56 percent of the population of the ten states. Blacks 
outnumbered whites only in South Carolina, Mississippi and Louisiana, 
but in those states and others they tended to be concentrated in 
certain areas. The congressional districts were often designed to 
emphasize those concentrations. Consequently, the values for percent 
white range from a low of 30.U in the coastal second district of 
South Carolina (i860 apportionment) to a high of 97*2 in the north­
western fourth district of Arkansas (1870 apportionment). The median 
position at both apportionments was 53*7 percent white, but surprisingly 
few districts had a nearly equal balance between the races. As shown
U l a n d  39f> white. For the reaction of the conservative press to 
the lynch reapportionment, see Baxter, "Congressional Redistricting 
in Mississippi,” 81-8H.
5^Iynch, The Facts of Reconstruction. 67-68, 195. For a 
revealing insight into the workings of the "Mississippi Plan" by one 
of the victims, see the Jason Miles Diary, Vol. 21 (microfilm copy 
in Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill), entries for June-Novesnber, 1875 •
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in the lynch reapportionment in Mississippi, congressional district 
lines were often constructed in such a way as to heighten the prepon­
derance of one race for political purposes. The Mississippi example 
was repeated in other states. Maps 2-3 and 2-U indicate the some­
times drastic changes in racial composition resulting from appor­
tionment. A close comparison of the maps indicates which party was 
responsible for reapportionment in each state.^7
As might be anticipated, districts with a large white population
tended to elect Democrats and those with heavier concentrations of
blacks favored Republicans. The breakdown by party and faction
in Table 2-11 clearly indicates the relationship that existed
between party and racial composition of each district. Most blacks,
as expected, were elected from predominantly black districts. The
same type of district favored carpetbaggers, only a very few of whom
were elected by constituencies that were more than marginally white.
Seventy-seven percent of the Democrats came from districts that were
more than 50 percent white. As mentioned earlier, the scalawags
were caught in the districts which were from bo to 60 percent white
but particularly those that were only marginally white. Districts
that were either heavily black or white were not likely to select
58scalawags as their Representatives.
-^The percent white index for each congressional district was 
compiled from county-level population figures in Kennedy (comp.), 
Statistics of the Population, 1870, Table II, H-7*f.
5®Again, the significance of the relationship between the racial 
composition of a district and the political affiliation of its Repre­
sentative must be qualified by an awareness of the circumstances 
of each election. To cite but one example, the lynch reapportionment,
IABLE 2 -U
DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES BY THE RACIAL 
COMPOSITION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Cong. Dist. 
Percent White
DMOCRAT
Scalawag
REPUBLICAN
Carpetbagger Black
Under 1*0# 1* ( 3#) 5 ( 8#) 15 (21#) 3 (ll*#)
1*0 -  1*4# 7 ( 6#) 9 (ll*#) 12 (17#) 13 (62#)
1*5 - 1*9# 17 (ll*#) 7 (11#) 18 (25#) 3 (ll*#)
50 - 54# 13 (11#) 18 (29#) 11 (15#) 2 (10#)
55 - 59# 12 (10#) U  (17#) 3 ( 4#) 9 *
60-69# 20 (17#) 2 ( 3#) 7 (10#) 9 9
70 - 79# 29 (21*#) 6 (10#) 4 ( 6#) 9 9
Over 80# 18 (15#) 5 ( 8#) 2 ( 3# 9 9
Total
Elections 120 63 72 21
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She index of per capita wealth for each congressional district 
was calculated by dividing real and personal property valuation totals 
by the aggregate population. The values of per capita wealth range 
from $117 for the first district of Texas (1870 apportionment) to a 
high of $893 for the first district of Louisiana (1870 apportionment). 
The highest wealth levels occurred in districts containing urban 
areas. The first district of Louisiana, for example, Included a 
substantial portion of Orleans Parish and most of the city of New 
Orleans. Other districts with high per capita wealth levels were 
those encompassing Richmond, Norfolk, and the Shenandoah Valley in 
Virginia, and Charleston and Mobile. Arkansas, an overwhelmingly rural 
and agricultural state, also had surprisingly high per capita wealth 
levels. If the census statistics are reasonably accurate, the high 
per capita wealth levels for Arkansas districts are probably due 
to the fact that at each apportionment the Arkansas districts 
included either a share of the prosperous delta country or a portion 
of Pulaski County (Little Sock). In addition, the population of 
Arkansas was 75 percent white. The lower levels of per capita wealth 
occurred in the hill country of East Texas, the piney woods area of
which was designed to make five of the six Mississippi districts 
"safely and reliably Republican," worked as lynch planned in the 
elections to the Forty-Third Congress. In elections to the Forty- 
Fourth Congress, however, the same districts selected four Democrats 
and two Republicans. The new element in the electoral process was the 
introduction of the so-called ’Mississippi Flan"--an all-out effort to 
intimidate Republican voters by a variety of means. Thus three of the 
five districts so carefully designed to be safely Republican (black) 
elected Democrats. During the earlier part of Reconstruction, some 
heavily white districts elected Republicans, This was due in part 
to either white apathy, evidenced by a failure to register, or a 
white boycott of elections.
central Louisiana, and. the upland areas in Northern Alabama, Georgia, 
and Western North Carolina. The median levels of per capita wealth 
were $252 for the districts created under the i860 apportionment and 
$2Uh for the 1870 apportionment.-^
The index of land value per acre is a less satisfactory index 
but it does indicate the general level of the economy and. the 
productivity of land in the district. The land value figure for each 
congressional district is the average value of land and improvements 
per acre in the district’s median county. Land values range from one 
dollar per acre in the first district in Southeastern Georgia (at 
both apportionments) to a high of twenty-eight dollars per acre in 
the Louisiana districts encompassing part of Orleans Parish. The 
extremes do not represent the average; the median land value per acre 
for all districts ranged from $h.00 (i860 apportionment) to $^.50 
(1870 apportionment). An overwhelming number of the districts had 
land values ranging from three to six dollars per acre— a fact which 
detracts from the usefulness of the index for analysis.
A final and more satisfactory index, referred to as percent
59phe per capita wealth index is calculated from county-level 
statistics on real and personal estate valuation in Kennedy (comp.), 
Statistics of the Wealth and Industry, 1B70, Table II, 15-68; and 
aggregate population figures in Kennedy (comp.), Statistics of the 
Papulation, 1870. Table II, U-7h.
^°Land values are taken from county-level statistics for 1870 
in Pressly and Scofield, Farm Real Estate Values, *f2-57, 59-62. 
Alexander and Beringer use a similar land value index to measure the 
general level of the economy for the constituencies of members of 
the Confederate Congresses; see Alexander and Beringer, Anatomy of 
the Confederate Congress, 252.
agricultural, is the percent of total productions value which were 
agricultural. The percent agricultural for each district was calcu­
lated by dividing the total value of agricultural products by the 
total value of agricultural and manufacturing products. The re­
sulting percentage is a rough measurement of the degree to which the 
district's economy was agricultural as opposed to manufacturing. The 
distribution of values varies from a low of 18 percent agricultural 
for the districts including the Richmond manufacturing complex to a 
high of 96 percent in the fifth district of Louisiana (the delta land 
in the northeastern part of the state) at both apportionments. The 
index indicates that in terms of products value, the South was 
heavily agricultural. Less than 10 percent of the districts created 
at each apportionment were under 50 percent agricultural. The median 
values for percent agricultural ranged frcm 79 (i860 apportionment) 
to 81 (I87O apportionment). It is evident that most Southern 
congressmen represented districts which were primarily if not predom­
inantly agricultural in terms of value of productions.^1
^Percent agricultural is calculated from county-level data in 
Kennedy (comp.), Statistics of Wealth and Industry. 1870. Table IV 
(Productions of Agriculture), 9^-285> and Table XI: A (General
Statistics of Manufactures), ^93-58U. The productions of manufactur­
ing cover almost all productions of the Southern economy that were not 
exclusively agricultural. The manufacturing statistics include those 
for all phases of the important lumbering industry as well as the 
products value for industries ranging frcm one-man operations to the 
large associated iron industries In Virginia. The only two elements 
of the economy not included in the productions totals for figuring 
percent agricultural are those for mining and fishing. Both are 
so small in all states that they amount to less than one percent of 
total valuation of products. The mining of Southern iron, copper, 
coal, and stone deposits did not become important elements of the 
economy of certain areas until later. See ibid.. Tables XII-XV 
(Statistics of Mining), 759-90; and Table XVlT (Statistics of 
Fisheries), 792-93.
The range of values for the four indexes for each state at 
large indicate the relationships between the indexes (see Table 2-12). 
States "which had a high level of per capita wealth also had higher 
land values. Both indexes are inversely related to the percent 
agricultural index. ^  Overall, very little relationship exists 
between the percent white index and the three econctnic indexes. Any 
relationship between political affiliation and the economic indexes 
hinges on the racial composition of the district rather than on the 
levels of per capita wealth, land values, or percent agricultural. 
Thus, for example, predominantly black agricultural districts tended 
to select Republicans while heavily white agricultural districts 
selected Democrats. A cross-tabulation of party and the economic 
indexes does indicate a positive correlation between the carpetbaggers 
and urban areas. Districts with a low percent of agricultural 
interest and a high level of per capita wealth were urban and 
manufacturing centers. Carpetbaggers won 70 percent of the elections 
held in these districts. They obviously found the urban setting 
receptive even though over two-thirds of these districts were at 
least marginally white.
The individuals who represented the South in Congress during
62
The relationships between the four indexes can be tested by 
Goodman and Kruskal's gamma, a measurement of association between two 
ordered categorical variables, with values from -1 to +1. For land 
value and per capita wealth, gamma = .hi indicating a positive associ­
ation (as one increases the other does also). For land value and per­
cent agricultural, gamma = -.3 8 indicating an inverse relationship.
For per capita wealth and percent agricultural, gamma - -.29*
TABIE 2-12
RANK OP STATES BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT INDEXES
State
Percent
White State
Per Capita 
Wealth State
Percent
Agricultural 1 State
Land Value 
per Acre
SC 4l.l$ TX $194 VA 57$ IX $3
MS 46.2 AL 202 PL 66 GA 3
IA 49.8 GA 226 LA 68 PL 3
PL 51.2 FL 235 GA 72 NC 3
AL 52.3 NC 243 NC 75 SC 3
GA 54.0 . MS 253 TX 81 AL 4
VA 58.1 SC 295 SC 81 AR 4
NC 63.3 AR 323 AL 84 MS 5
TX 69.0 VA 334 AR 90 LA 8
AR 74.7 LA 445 MS 90 VA 9
H
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Reconstruction resist stereotyping in terns of background and the type 
of constituency they represented. IP attempt to describe the "typical" 
Democrat or Republican in terms of background characteristics -would 
do injustice to the congressmen as individuals. The principal differ­
ence between the carpetbaggers and other Representatives was obviously 
a matter of nativity, length of residency in the South, and Civil War 
service. The blacks, of course, were set off by the simple fact of 
race and all that race symbolized to Southerners. Otherwise, differ­
ences between the parties in terms of background and constituent 
characteristics are not especially evident. Republican Amos T. Akexmaa 
may have struck close to the truth when he observed that in the South 
"men are Republican or Democrat accordingly as they are or are not 
attached to the last three amendments to the constitution.
The exact relationship between political affiliation and economic 
issues remains unclear. Contemporary newspapers leave a definite im­
pression that political control of the South was more important than eco­
nomic considerations of the moment. Regardless of how well a Republican 
responded to the economic Interests of his constituency, he was still 
a degree undesirable because he was a symbol of alien leadership. 
Ackezman*s suggestion that economic considerations were secondary to 
the issues of political reconstruction implies that the two were not 
associated in any meaningful way. In short, economic opinion may 
have transcended party lines. On the other hand, the Beard-Beale 
thesis suggests that political affiliation was highly correlated with
^Quoted frcm Polakoff, Politics of Inertia, 177-78.
economic issues; Southern Republicans reinforced a specific set of 
economic values held dear not by the South, but by the Northeast. 
Both views can be tested by measuring the association between a 
congressman's vote on economic issues and his party and region. The 
foregoing investigation into the background of the congressmen has 
suggested several factors other than political party and party 
faction that may have been related to the congressmen's voting 
behavior on econcanic issues. In particular, such background 
characteristics as occupation, wealth, prior political affiliation, 
margin of victory, and the four congressional district indexes— all 
of which cut across party lines— are potential influences on voting 
behavior.
The following chapters attempt to determine and analyze the 
response of Southern Representatives to specific economic issues 
selected from the Reconstruction Congresses. The key consideration 
is a matter of ascertaining how well the congressmen, particularly 
the Republicans, represented Southern economic interests in the 
House of Representatives.
CHAPTER III
THE FORTIETH HOUSE
When the House of Representatives overrode President Andrew 
Johnson's veto of a bill readmitting Arkansas to representation in 
Congress on June 22, 1868, it opened the way for readmission of the 
other nine ex-Confederate states. But the process of restoring the 
Southern states to their proper relationship to the Union took over 
two years. Georgia, the final state to be readmitted, was not allowed 
to rejoin the Union until July 15, 1370, the last day of the Second 
Session of the Forty-First Congress. The last Representative to be 
admitted frcm Georgia took his seat on February 9, 1371* Thus the 
South did not attain full representation in the House until just 
before the end of the final session of the Forty-First Congress.^
iThe states and dates of their readmlssion are as follows: 
Arkansas, June 22, 1368; Florida, June 25, 1368; North Carolina, July 4, 
1868; Louisiana, July 9, 1368; South Carolina, July 9, 1368; Alabama, 
July 13, 1368; Virginia, January 26, 1370, Mississippi, February 23,
1870; Texas, March 30,. 1870. Georgia's Representatives qualified and 
took their seats July 25, 1368 in the Fortieth Congress, but the state's 
Senators, who presented their credentials during the Third Session, 
were not seated. In the interim Congress deemed that Georgia had not 
properly complied with the conditions for readmission. Georgia's 
Representatives were not admitted to the First Session of the Forty- 
First Congress. Congress passed the act readmitting Georgia on July 15, 
1870; Biographical Directory. 138-92 (Fortieth Congress), 193-97 
(Forty-First Congress), For the controversy over the representation 
of Georgia, see C. Mildred Thompson, Reconstruction in Georgia:
Economic, Social, and Political, 1365-1^72 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1915 7, 255-70.
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A month remained in the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress 
when the three Representatives from Arkansas took their seats on June 
2k, 1868. Two days later, the House overturned another Johnson veto 
of an omnibus hill relating to the readmission of six other Southern 
states. During the final month of the session, the House seated the 
duly elected delegations from Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Louisiana, Alabama, and Georgia. As most of the Southern Repre­
sentatives were not sworn in until the last few days of the Second 
Session, the seven states were not effectively represented until the 
beginning of the Third Session on December 7, 1868.^
The thirty-three Representatives from the seven states to the 
Fortieth Congress were the least "Southern1' of any of the recon­
struction delegations and, in terms of background information, they 
are the most obscure. Thirty of the thirty-three were Republicans.
They represented states which had been reconstructed quickly— states 
in which the conservative forces had not had time to organize. In a 
few cases, the conservative whites had boycotted the congressional 
elections— the first such canvasses in which the newly-enfranchised 
blacks participated. Several Republicans had little or only token 
opposition from Democratic or Conservative candidates.3
^Between the last day of the Second Session (July 27, 1868) and 
the beginning of the Third Session (December 7, 1868), the House con­
vened in three unusual, one-day sessions on September 21, October 16, and 
November 10. The sessions were not concerned with economic issues and 
are not subject to analysis herein. For the acts readmitting the seven 
states, see Congressional Globe, U0 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5, Appendix, 
509-10.
^The margin of victory for three of the Representatives is unknown. 
Twenty-two of the remaining thirty Representatives were elected by a
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The three Democrats represented, the extremes to he found, among 
Southern conservatives at the time. Of the three, Fierce Manning 
Butler Young of Georgia probably best represented, the type of leader­
ship to which the South had been accustomed in the antebellum period.
He was the son of a slaveholding planter, a secessionist Democrat, 
and a West Point cadet. He resigned from the academy two months before 
graduation to join the Confederate army and. he held the rank of major 
general at the end of the war. After having secured a pardon from 
President Johnson, Young was elected to the Fortieth Congress from the 
heavily white seventh district in northwestern Georgia.1*- Nelson Tift, 
the second Democrat, represented the moderate ground in the party.
Tift, the wealthiest of the delegation, was bom in Connecticut but 
moved to Georgia in 1835 > where he quickly acquired interests in land, 
railroads, and various manufacturing endeavors. He was a unionist in 
i860 and, although he later wrote President Johnson that he had never 
borne arms, he was a major supplier for the Confederacy. Tift was 
elected by a district that was only forty percent white.5 The third
margin of over 10 percent. Eight of those won by more than 20 percent 
of the total vote and four were unopposed. When margin of victory is 
cross-tabulated with party, a familiar pattern emerges in that the 
scalawags represented the most closely contested districts, and they 
tended to represent those districts that were either marginally black 
or white.
^.A.B., XX, 633-3^5 Iynwood M. Holland, Pierce M. B. Young; The 
Warwick"’of the South (Athens: University of Georgia Pres:;, 196 )^,
passlun; Young to Andrew Johnson, September 22, 1865* Amnesty Papers, 
Georgia.
B^iographical Directory. 1818-19; Tift to Andrew Johnson, June 
27, 1865, Amnesty Papers, Georgia; William Warren Rogers, "Nelson Tift 
Applies for Pardon, 1865," Georgia Historical Quarterly, LI (June 
1967), 230-32. That Tift could be elected as a Democrat from a district 
that was sixty percent black was probably due to the disorganization of
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Democrat served only briefly in the Fortieth Congress. James Mann, a 
resident of Maine until 1865, was a rarity in the party. He was a 
Union army veteran and had served as a U. S. Treasury Agent for 
Louisiana prior to his election by a largely white New Orleans con­
stituency. When Mann died in August 1868, a three-way contest for his 
seat ensued, and the seat stood vacant for the remainder of the
f.
congress. 0
The thirty Republicans consisted of fourteen scalawags and six­
teen carpetbaggers. With one exception, an served in the Third Session 
of the Fortieth Congress. That exception, James Hinds, an Arkansas 
carpetbagger, was assassinated in October 2368. James Elliott, his 
scalawag replacement, was seated in January 1869 for the duration of 
the Third Session. Thus for most of the session, the Republicans 
numbered fifteen carpetbaggers and fifteen scalawags.?
the Republican forces in that district. Tift was beaten by a scalawag 
in the next two elections and his second district became the last 
stronghold of Republicanism in Georgia; see Olive Hall Shadgett, The 
Republican Party in Georgia: From Reconstruction through 1900 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1964), 53.
6Biogr aphical Directory. 13335 The Daily Picayune (Hew Orleans), 
August 27, 1868; Speech of W. Jasper Blackburn (memorial to James Mann), 
Cong. Globe. 40 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 5> Appendix, 240. Had Mann been a 
Republican, Southerners would have considered him to be the worst kind 
of carpetbagger. A thorough search of the sources did not reveal any 
type of economic vocation for Mann other than his job as a Treasury 
Agent. Furthermore, he could not have been considered a "settler" as 
he never moved his family to the South. In fact, the evidence suggests 
that he left Louisiana in 1867 to move his family from Maine to Andover, 
Massachusetts. It was his choice of party that dictated his acceptance 
by Southerners. See "Papers in the Case of Simon Jones v. James Mann," 
House Misc. Doc. No. 13» 40 Cong., 3 Sess., 29-30.
^According to E. Merton Coulter, "twenty of the thirty-five 
Representatives" elected to the Fortieth Congress were carpetbaggers. 
Coulter does not indicate how he defined the carpetbaggers other than
The congressmen came from a variety of backgrounds. They ranged 
in age from twenty-seven year old Logan Boots of Arkansas to seventy- 
one year old Nathaniel Boyden of North Carolina. The median age was 
forty-three, but over half the carpetbaggers were under the age of 
thirty-five and more than half the scalawags were forty-five years of 
age or older. Sixteen were born in the slave states, fourteen in free 
states, and three were foreign-born. Seventeen had no more than an 
elementary education, but ten held college degrees* Only two were 
known slaveholders (ten unknown), and only one had a record as an 
active secessionist (seven unknown). Eighteen had served in the Union 
army, seven had served the Confederacy, six were non-participants, and 
the wartime service of two remains unknown. They held a greater 
variety of occupations than did subsequent delegations. Twelve were 
lawyers and seven were Involved in agricultural pursuits. The balance 
included four editors, three bankers, and two physicians.
In addition to having only a brief time to serve, the Southerners 
were handicapped by a relative lack of political experience. Although 
only three had no discoverable political experience, several had not 
held an elective office. Only six had served in state legislatures, 
and six had held local elective offices. Seventeen Republicans had 
gained experience in the conventions held in 1867 end 1868 to revise
that "they had come out of a shady or obscure life in the North, 
bringing all their earthly belongings in a carpetbag . . . ," nor 
does he delineate those so designated. His figures are clearly in 
error on both counts. The South elected thirty-three men to the 
Fortieth House, and only sixteen were carpetbaggers. See Coulter, The 
South During Reconstruction. 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press', 19^7)» 1**0> 126.
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the constitution of each state according to the congressional guide­
lines for readmission. Another eight had served either in the Freedmen's 
Bureau or as Southern agents of the Treasury Department. Two, Nathaniel 
Boyden (R-NC) and William Kellogg (R-AL), had served in the U. S. House 
of Representatives in the anteheUum period and their records in the 
Third Session indicates that they adapted quickly to the House. Most 
of the Southern Representatives simply had not had the opportunity to 
serve in elective political office unless they were old enough to have 
done so in the antebellum period.
In a House that totaled 2h3 members, the Southerners, who never 
numbered more than thirty-two at any given time, could not have expected 
to have much influence. As freshmen they were assigned to the lowest 
ranking position on minor committees. Most would never be any more 
than freshmen as only fourteen were re-elected to the Forty-First 
Congress. Four more would continue into the Forty-Second Congress, 
and two, Jacob Sypher (R-LA) and Pierce M. B. Young (D-GA) survived to 
serve in the Forty-Third Congress. The circumstances under which the 
Southerners labored must be considered when evaluating their 
performance in the Third Session of the Forbietn Congress.
When the Third Session convened on December 7s 1868, the problems 
of political reconstruction still dominated the Washington scene. 
Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia had not yet been restored to the Union, 
and while Georgia's Representatives had been admitted, the state's 
Senators had not been seated and Georgia's delegation would not be 
admitted to the Forty-First House. The intense feelings regarding the 
impeachment and trial of President Andrew Johnson had cooled somewhat
with the knowledge that Johnson was now a lame duck. But Johnson con­
tinued to antagonize Congress with his statements on economic issues 
and his vetoes of congressional legislation, and Congress responded 
accordingly. Fresh in the background was the hard-fought, hut hardly 
closely-contested presidential election of 1868. To congressional 
Republicans, the selection of Ulysses S. Grant signaled the beginning 
of an era of better executive-legislative relations. In the country 
at large, Grant's campaign slogan, "Let us have peace," had struck a 
responsive chord, but the shibboleth proved to have little application 
to Grant's administrations.®
The consideration and passage of the proposed Fifteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution overshadowed all other legislation during the 
Third Session, but Congress did consider a few important economic 
measures. Of the 197 recorded roll-call votes in the House of 
Representatives, approximately one-fourth related to economic issues 
of general concern. Of those issues, only one tariff bill merited 
consideration. More significant were a series of roll calls related 
to the granting of lands and other federal subsidies to aid in railroad 
construction. The most important economic issue of the session was 
probably the consideration and passage of the Public Credit Act which 
Johnson pocket vetoed at the end of the session. Finally, late in the 
session, Congress gave considerable attention to a bill providing for 
a more equitable distribution of the national bank notes. In varying 
degrees, all these issues were important to the South. The response of
M^artin E. Mantell, Johnson, Grant, and the Politics of Recon­
struction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), chs. 8 and 9.
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the section's Representatives to these specific measures offers an 
indication of how well they served Southern economic Interests.
The solitary tariff measure (H. S. 1^460) to he considered pro­
posed higher duties on a variety of imported copper products and 
copper ores. As a measure of attitudes toward tariff rates in general 
it is of little value. At the time very little copper was mined in 
the South3 and the hill was not an issue in the region. The measure 
had heen under consideration since the beginning of the Fortieth 
Congress, and it was brought to a vote and passed on the second day 
of the Third Session. On the initial passage of the hill, Southerners 
split along party lines with the Republicans favoring the bill. The 
South, in fact, was the only region in which party cohesion was perfect, 
although voting on the issue generally followed party lines in other 
regions (see Table 3-1: A).
The measure reappeared in the House on February 8, 1869; with 
several proposed Senate amendments which made the bill more protec­
tionist by adding several copper products to the list of items on which 
duties were to be raised. ^ The House, by a vote of 120-50, indicated 
its willingness to suspend the rules and consider the Senate amendments 
but the House was initially less inclined to favor the more protec­
tionist bill. On a Democratic motion to table the amendments, party 
lines wavered and a few more Republicans indicated their opposition to
O^pponents of the bill were quick to point out that the Senate 
had added copper sulphate or blue vitriol, a product widely used for 
dyeing cloth, to the protected list. As Brooks (D-NY) put it, blue 
vitriol entered "into every old lady's dye-pot in the country,1 see 
Cong. Globe, UO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 960.
TABLE 3-1: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY* ON H. R. Ilt60: 
"AN ACT REGULATING THE DUTIES ON IMPORTED 
COPPER AND COPPER ORES"
A. Initial passage of H. R.
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE * • 13 « « 6
MA 1 25 13 3
MW « • 38 9 9
SS • * lfl 2 • •
BS a • 9 6 3
PS JL _2 • « • «
Total 2 105 30 21
Grand Total 107 51
B. To table Senate amendments to H. R. l460c
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Don. Rep.
NE • • 7 * • 11
MA 15 1 3 31
MW 10 17 • • 38
SS 2 k * • 13
BS 5 h • * 9
PS » m 2
Total 32 33 5 105
Grand Total 65 110
TABLE 3-1- -Continued
Regional codes In this table and all subsequent tables are a 
modified version of the ICFR code. HE (New England) includes Connect­
icut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
MA (Middle Atlantic) includes Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania. MW (Middle West) includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 
SS (Solid South) includes the ten ex-Confederate states considered 
in this study. BS (Border States) includes Kentucky, Maryland, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia. FS (Pacific States) includes California, 
Nevada, and Oregon. Political affiliations in this table and all 
subsequent tables have been derived from the ICFR roll-call data sets 
for each House (the original source for party affiliation is the 
Biographical Directory). In a few cases, the party affiliation for 
several Southern Representatives has been corrected. Those House 
members who served under political labels other than simply Democrat 
or Republican have been recoded as members of the party with which 
they identified with the exception of three Independents serving in 
the Forty-Fourth House. The vote totals in each table include paired 
and announced votes.
^Cong. Globe, 1*0 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 15 (December 8, 1868).
cIbid., Pt. 2, 960 (February 8, I869).
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the amendments (see Table 3-li B), The move to table failed 65-110, 
and concurrence in the Senate amendments by a vote of 112-56 followed 
almost immediately.1® President Johnson vetoed the bill on the grounds 
that it was special interest legislation for a few copper mines along 
Lake Superior* He declared that it would decrease revenue and raise 
taxes while burdening consumers of copper products with higher prices. 
The House thereupon overrode the veto by what was nearly a strict party 
vote. 11
The two Southern Democrats opposed the measure at every oppor­
tunity while Southern Republicans favored the measure, although a 
few broke party ranks in the attempt to table the more protectionist 
Senate amendments.1^ On the surface at least, it would appear that as 
consumers of copper products, it would have been in the interest of 
the Southerners to vote against the bill. In addition, the South, as a 
staple-producing region, had traditionally upheld the doctrine of free 
trade. A Southern vote for the bill could have been justified to
10See ibid., 960-61, for the votes to consider, to table the 
Senate amendments, and to concur in the Senate amendments.
^Ibid., 1460-66, for Johnson's veto message, subsequent discus­
sion, and the vote overriding the veto* The text of the bill as 
finally approved by the House and Senate is given in ibid., Ft. 3, 
Appendix, 304. According to F. W. Taussig, Johnson's veto message was 
written by revenue reformer David A. Wells who considered the act 
blatantly protectionist. See Taussig, The Tariff History of the United 
States (8th ed., New York: a. P. Putman's Sons, 1931), 219-21.
^The Southern Republicans voting to table the Senate amendments 
were Clift (AL), Dockery (NC), Goss (SC), and Norris (AL). There 
appears to be no common denominator among their personal or constituent 
characteristics which would indicate why they voted as they did. Of 
the four, only Goss and Dockery (both scalawags) voted against accepting 
the Senate amendments, but on the final vote to pass the measure over 
Johnson's veto, Whittemore (SC) and Hamilton (FL) joined Goss in 
opposing the bill.
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protect fledgling copper mines in the South, hut according to statistics 
compiled in 1870, copper was mined, only in scattered pockets in the 
region, most notably in North Carolina. ^
Johnson* s widely-publicized veto message attracted little notice
in the South, but a few old-line Democratic newspapers blasted the
Republican, Congress for having passed the copper bill. The New Orleans
Times, for example, rebuked Republican Senator Zaeharlah Chandler of
Michigan for "crowding the infamous copper bill through Congress":
The copper bill is probably the highest job, next to the 
Pacific Railroad, ever passed in this country. Every consumer 
of copper in the United States is taxed three cents per pound 
extra in order to render profitable a few mines on the shore 
of Lake Superior, in which Chandler has become an immense 
stockholder.1^
The Times exaggerated the importance of the issue. But if the 
South still favored a tariff for revenue only and if a positive vote 
on the copper bill can be taken as solid evidence of a protectionist
^North Carolina copper mines were centered in Chatham County in 
the fourth congressional district. The Representative of that district, 
Republican John Deweese supported the measure on all the roll-call 
votes. North Carolina ranked fourth among the states in the production 
of copper, but in terms of value, North Carolina*s copper production in 
1870 ($96,000) was small compared to that of Michigan, the leading 
copper-mining state ($lf,312,!67). See the census statistics on mining 
productions in Francis A. Walker (camp.), The Statistics of the Wealth 
and Industry of the United States . . . .  (Washington: Government 
Printing Office /IF72), Tables XIII-XV, 760-90.
^The New Orleans Times, March 2, 1869. Unlike some other South­
ern newspapers and generally unmindful of Louisiana sugar interests and 
New Orleans manufacturing interests, the Times remained adamant in 
defense of free trade: "The pet idea of all Southern statesmen, the
main political principle upon which the Southern people of all political 
shades have ever been a unit, is that of unrestricted trade," ibid., 
March If, I869.
stance 5 then party was more important to most Southern Republicans 
than were sectional interests. The copper hill was the only tariff 
measure of any significance to he considered in the Third Session.
Its significance as an indicator of tariff attitudes is correspondingly 
limited.
More important to the South than the tariff were federal subsi­
dies for internal improvements. Measures promoting internal improve­
ments were, one of the few issues to elicit bipartisan support in the 
postbellum South. The South especially desired federally-aided pro­
jects to upgrade the region's transportation system. Proposals 
abounded for building railroads and canals as well as for levee 
construction and river and harbor clearance to rehabilitate war- 
torn areas. That element of the antebellum states-rights philosophy 
which forbade federal aid for internal, improvements was one of the most 
notable casualties of the war.
Southern newspapers preached the necessity of improving the
South's internal transportation system and of establishing external
connections with the Midwest and the Pacific states as the Northeast
already bad done. Southern attitudes toward internal improvements
were best summarized by a North Carolina editor who concluded that the
whole people, "regardless of race, color, or condition,” concurred
in the importance of internal improvements:
What then may we not say in behalf of the man who adds a mile 
of Railroad to the number already in existence in a State like 
North Carolina, which is remote from the markets of the world, 
and without the ordinary facilities of reaching them? We say
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this: that he Is the true statesman and patriot whose
achievement Is worth more than a career in Congress, or 
volumes of speeches upon party politics.3^
The sense of urgency underlying such editorials was prompted 
by an uneasy feeling that perhaps the practice of handing out huge 
federal subsidies was ending, leaving the South without its rightful 
share. In response to an editorial in the New York Journal of 
Commerce calling for the curtailment of federal subsidies to railroads, 
the editor of the Richmond Whig acknowledged that wartime subsidies 
had generated a certain amount of corruption. But the editor insisted 
that the South had "certain works of vast national importance," and 
that
we are too poor to complete them, and having never received 
any assistance from the General Government, while other works 
in other States have been built by government liberality, 
we are anxiously looking forward to that source for needed 
assistance. . . .  Is the door to be slammed in our ..faces 
after having for years been kept open for others?"*
^The Raleigh (NC) Register. November 3, I867. For a sampling of 
similar Southern attitudes on internal Improvements see: North Carolina
Standard, November IB, 1867; Daily Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), Dec­
ember 24, 1869; New Orleans Times, March 3, 1&69; New Orleans Daily 
picayune, March 29, 186#; New Orleans Republican. November 26,1^70; 
Atlanta Constitution, January 20, 1869; Augusta (GA) Constitutional, as 
quoted in Atlanta Constitution, January 6,1374; The Daily Mississippi 
Pilot (Jackson), December 30, 1874; and The Vicksburg (MS) Herald, March
3, 1875- Almost every issue of Debow's Review (After the War Series), 
from 1368 to cessation of publication in October 1370, contained 
articles in support of internal improvements, especially those projects 
in the Mississippi Valley. See, for example: Vol. VII (August, 1369), 
588-696; (October, 1869), 837-38, 845-60, and Vol. VIII (March-April, 
1870), 209-26, 294-99. Of all the newspapers surveyed only the Atlanta 
Constitution and the New Orleans Daily Picayune hesitated to endorse 
federal subsidies for internal improvements.
•^ Richmond Whig and Advertiser, January 1, 1369, hereinafter cited 
as Richmond Whig. Virginians were particularly interested in federal 
subsidies for the Cheaspeake and Ohio Railroad and the James River and 
Kanawha Canal. The Whig viewed the latter project as one which would
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The Southern crusade for internal improvements was often 
frustrating. The editor of the New Orleans Republican later wondered 
if any hope remained "that continued appropriations can be extorted 
from an unwilling Congress?"1? The frustration often turned to out­
right anger. In reference to an unfavorable Northern commentary on 
Georgia's canal scheme, an Atlanta editor bitterly concluded that such 
remarks were simply more evidence of "the customary disregard, If not 
hostility to the interests and just claims of the South.
The voting record of Southern Representatives reflected the 
region's concern with federal subsidies for internal improvements. The 
cohesion level of Southern Republicans in favor of federal subsidies 
in the Third Session was consistently higher than that for Republicans 
from other regions. This was one of the main areas in which Southern 
Republicans voted in opposition to the Northeastern wing of the party.
But the Republicans were the self-proclaimed heirs to the Whig philos­
ophy of governmental participation in the economy, and that sentiment 
remained strong even in the Northern wing of the party. Northern 
Republicans were much more receptive to the granting of federal subsidies 
during Reconstruction than were Northern Democrats. Throughout the 
period, Northern Democrats in the House, invariably led by retrenchment - 
minded William S. Holman of Indiana, consistently voted against federal
open a vital water route from the Atlantic seaboard to the West. See 
ibid., February l£, 1869; "Report of the Committee of the National 
Board of Trade on a Continuous Water line of Transportation through 
Virginia," Debow's Review. VII (December, 1869), 1030-1*8.
l^Kew Orleans Republican, April 1, I87I+.
^Atlanta Constitution, January 25, 187!*.
99
subsidies for internal improvements. This put Southern Democrats In 
the frustrating position of having to side with Republicans In any 
attempt to secure federal aid for Southern projects.-^
Of the numerous measures requesting federal grants for internal 
improvement projects in the Third Session, few were considered on the
pofloor of the House and fewer still were subjected to roll-call votes. 
Southern Representatives, regardless of party, were usually unanimous 
in their support of internal improvement projects— same of which were 
only remotely related to most Southern states. The Southern and 
Pacific states, for example, were the only regions to vote solidly in 
favor of a resolution (H. J. Res. 465) granting a right of way across 
public lands to the Memphis, £1 Faso, and Pacific Railroad from El Faso 
to the Pacific.2’** The resolution did nothing more than award the
^See Albert V. House, Jr., "Northern Congressional Democrats as 
Defenders of the South During Reconstruction," Journal of Southern 
History, VI (February, 1940), 46-71. House concluded that Northern 
Democrats did nothing to aid the South in its quest for favorable 
economic legislation during the period. The uneasy alliance between 
Southern Democrats and. Northern Republicans on economic legislation is 
the subject of much pertinent comment in C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and 
Reaction; The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1951) > especially 51-63*
2°A New York journal opposed to further subsidies counted seventy- 
one railroad bills in Congress in late December 1868, see Journal of 
Commerce, as quoted in the Ricimond Whig, January 1, 1869.
^It is understandable why a state like Arkansas might favor the 
Memphis, El Faso, and Pacific line (see Dally Arkansas Gazette, October 
28, 1868), but support for the venture was evident even in regions of 
the South remote from the line. The Richmond Whig, for example, viewed 
the route very favorably and envisioned the establishment of new 
connecting lines running back to Norfolk, Virginia, see Richmond Whig, 
March 26, 1869.  *
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right of way lands and It specifically stipulated that no other subsidy 
or lands were to be granted to the company. 22 still, the resolution 
raised same opposition in the Northeast and Midwest, as both sections 
already had or were building their own railroads to the Pacific 
(see Table 3-2).
Southern attitudes toward federal subsidies were more clearly 
indicated by the -votes on two cleverly-worded resolutions introduced 
by William S. Holman (D-IN) on January 18, 1869:
Resolved. That in the present condition of the national 
finances no further subsidies ought to be granted by Congress, 
either in bonds or money, to railroads or other corporations, 
or to promote local enterprises, but the whole resources of 
the country ought to be applied to the pressing necessities 
of the public service in such manner as will relieve the people 
from the burdens of taxation.
Resolved, That grants of the public lands to corporations 
ought to be discontinued, and the whole of such lands ought 
to be held as a sacred trust, to secure homesteads to actual 
settlers, and for no other purpose whatever. 3
Holman's resolutions put those favoring federal subsidies in an
untenable position. While the resolutions had no practical effect
other than to sample congressional attitudes, a vote for either
resolution indicated a disposition to curtail the granting of federal
subsidies— something not desired by Southern constituencies. On the
other hand, a vote against the resolutions implied a willingness to
increase the "burdens of taxation" and to give the national domain to
pp
For the text of the resolution ana the votes to order the 
previous question, to table, and to order engrossment and third read­
ing, see Cong. Globe, IfO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, lMlt-lf?. The resolution 
was referred to the Committee on the Pacific Railroad in the Senate 
and remained there until the end of the session; ibid., Pt. 3, 1589.
23cong. Globe, hO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, k2h.
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TABLE 3-2
VOTE BY REGION AND PASTY TO ORDER ENGROSSMENT 
AND THIRD READING OP H. J. RES. k6$ 
(Memphis, El Paso, and Pacific Railroad Bill)*
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep,
NE 1 10 • • 6
MA 8 2l* 6 7
MW k 33 2 18
SS 1 2k • m • 0
BS 5 8 2 0 •
PS • • # * e •
Total 19 102 10 31
Grand Total 1P3 In
aCong. Globe, 1*0 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, lM+5 (February 22, 1869)
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corporations rather than homesteaders.
On the first resolution to curtail further subsidies in bonds 
or money, the Southerners stuck by their determination to support 
subsidies and voted 6-19 against the resolution.^ With the exception 
of the three Pacific states, the South was the only region to vote 
against the resolution. Given the wording of the resolution, their 
vote was decisively in favor of continued subsidies in bonds or 
money. Despite Southern opposition, however, the resolution passed by 
a vote of 89-68 (see Table 3-3! A). On the vote on the second 
resolution to cut off land grants, Henry Washburn (B-1N) moved to 
table rather than to order the previous question. With this escape 
route opened, Southerners joined the majority and voted 24-2 to 
table (see Table 3-3: B). Again the Southern margin in favor of 
tabling the resolution was overwhelming in comparison to all other 
regions except the Pacific states. The vote on both resolutions, 
however, must have had an unsettling effect on those who desired con­
tinued federal subsidies. For while the House had effectively avoided 
the question of granting land as subsidies, a majority of the Repre-
^Ibid. The two Southern Democrats split on the first Holman 
resolution, with Tift (GA) voting with the Republicans against the 
resolution and Young (GA) voting for it. Of the five Republicans who 
voted for the resolution, four were from North Carolina, and one,
Jacob Sypher was from Louisiana. Why the North Carolina Republicans 
voted against the measure remains unknown. Sypher typically voted 
against grants to railroads unless they were intimately connected 
with his district which encompassed part of New Orleans and the parishes 
below Orleans. Sypher was more interested in clearing the lower 
Mississippi River and he offered three bills asking for federal 
subsidies for ship canals— all of which were of greater interest to his 
particular constituency than were railroads; see New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. February 28, 1869; and Debow* s Review. VII (August, 1869)»
691; VIII (March-April, 1870), 2 0 9 ^
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IABIE 3-3: A and B 
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY ON THE HOMAN RESOLUTIONS
a pass the first resolution8.
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep,
NE • • 7 7
MA 10 15 2 8
MW 8 33 1 18
SS 1 5 1 IB
BS k 5 2 7
PS JL -i Js -1
Total 2k 65 7 61
Grand Total 89 68
> table the second resolutiona
Yea Nay
Region Dem, Rep. Dem. Rep,
NE 13 7
MA 1 17 8 9
MW 9 1A
SS 1 23 1 1
BS k 7 3 3
PS _2 __2
Total 8 102 21 31*
Grand Total 110 55
aS2S£* Globe, UO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, U2U (January lfl, 1869).
sentatives had demonstrated a willingness to halt further subsidies in 
the form of bonds and money. The Southern editors were generally 
correct in their uneasy feeling that support for federal subsidies was 
declining in Congress, but they could not blame their own Represen­
tatives—who were overwhelmingly scalawags and carpetbaggers.
If the "Southern position*' can be defined as favorable to con­
tinued federal subsidies for internal improvements, then the region was 
well represented in the Third Session. On eight measures dealing with 
such subsidies, seventeen Southern Republicans supported their con­
tinuance on all eight votes; seven supported the southern position 
seven times, and three supported it six times.^  One Republican,
Jacob Sypher of Louisiana, voted against the South five times and 
was absent for the other three ballots. Another Louisiana Republican, 
Michel Vidal, was present for only one vote which he cast against 
further subsidies. Of the Democrats, Tift supported the Southern 
position seven times and Young favored subsidies five of eight times, 
but Young had voted for both Holman resolutions.
Southern Republicans worked diligently to secure federal subsidies 
for specific internal improvements projects in the South. Despite their 
inexperience and the short time they had to serve, Southern Republicans
2?The eight votes include three votes on the Memphis, El Faso, and 
Pacific Railroad {+ = Southern position): to order previous question 
(+ = yea), to table (+ = nay), to pass (+ = yea); the two votes on the 
Holman resolutions: to pass the first resolution (+ = nay), to table
the second resolution (+ = yea); a vote to table S. 570, a bill granting 
public lands to Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company (+ “ nay), 
Cong. Globet to Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 587; and two votes on H. J. Res. 
O T 7  a resolution which proposed In part to regulate further grants of 
lands for aid to railroads: to table (+ = yea), to refer (+ = yea); 
ibid., Pfc. 2, 959, 1221.
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submitted ten bills calling for federal aid to local and state rail­
road projects during the Third Session. Nine Republicans submitted a 
total of twelve bills for other projects ranging from ship canals to 
river and harbor improvements, and ten bills for the establishment of 
mail or post roads. All of the bills were referred to committees and 
none passed, but Southern Republicans did make the effort.
A third economic issue in the Third Session concerned alternate 
methods of discharging the government's obligations to holders of its 
securities. The issue of public credit had been the focus of 
considerable partisan controversy during the presidential campaign 
of 1868. The Democrats, particularly those from the Midwest, endorsed 
the so-called "Ohio Idea" to pay government obligations (bonds) in 
lawful money (greenbacks) unless payment in coin was specified by law.
To most Republicans, this amounted to nothing more than repudiation 
of the national debt— a clear violation of the public trust. The 
Republican platform of 1868 accordingly upheld the sanctity of the 
public debt, denounced repudiation, and pledged the "payment of public 
indebtedness in the uttermost good faith . . . not only according to 
the letter but the spirit of the laws under which it was contracted. ,,27 
Grant's victory in the fall of 1868 seemed to indicate that the 
"respudiators" had been repudiated. The issue might have rested there
26Figures on the number of bills introduced by Southern Represen­
tatives were compiled fran Cong. Globe. *tO Cong., 3 Sess., Pts. 1-3. Of 
the two Democrats, only Tift offered any bills for internal improvements.
^Quoted from Robert Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party; An Economic 
Study of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1959), 122. See also; Robert T. Patterson, Federal Debt-Manage- 
ment Policies, 1865-1879 (Durham: Duke University Press, 195577 72.
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had not President Johnson revitalized the controversy in his last 
annual message in December 1868. With the assumption that bondholders 
had already received a just return on their investment, Johnson proposed 
that the government confiscate the interest now being paid to bond­
holders and apply it to the principal in order to retire the bonds.
Thus challenged, congressional Republicans moved quickly to guarantee 
the sanctity of the public debt, first by resolution, then by the 
passage of a public credit bill.
The public credit resolution, introduced on December l1*, 1868,
contained a preamble and resolved
That all forms and degrees of repudiation of national indebt­
edness are odious to the American People. And that under no 
circumstances will their Representatives consent to offer the 
public creditor, as full compensation, a less amount of money 
than that which the Government contracted to pay him.29
Southern Republicans voted as a unit in favor of the resolution on four
recorded roll calls. The two Democrats voted against the resolution
with the exception that Nelson Tift voted in favor of passing the
preamble and the first sentence of the resolution on the fourth vote. 30
The House split almost perfectly along party lines on all four voues.^3*
The bill to strengthen the public credit (H. R. 1744) was reported
g9cong. Globe. 40 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 71*
30The first vote was to suspend the rules and consider the 
. resolution; the second was to table a motion to reconsider the first 
vote; the third was to table the preamble to the resolution; and 
the fourth was to pass the preamble and first sentence of the 
resolution. The vote on the passage of the second sentence of the 
resolution was not recorded. Ibid., 72-73.
3^The Senate passed a similar resolution on December 17, 1868 
by a strict party vote, see Sharkey, Money. Class, and Party. 124.
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from the House Ways and. Means Committee on February 22, I869. The 
heart of the bill pledged the "faith of the United States . . .  to the 
payment in coin of all interest bearing obligations of the United 
States, except in cases when the law was expressly directed other­
wise. "32 Motions to table and to weaken the measure by amendment 
were easily defeated by a partisan vote. The House passed the bill 
on February 2b by a margin of 121-60 and sent it to the Senate.33 a 
House-Senate conference committee returned the bill to the House with 
several changes on the last day of the session. The most important 
alteration was the addition of a clause promising an early return to 
resumption of specie payments:
And the United States also solemnly pledges its faith to make
provision at the earliest practicable period for the redemption
of the United States notes in coin. 3*+
Both Houses approved the conference report, but Andrew Johnson got in 
the final blow in the controversy by pocket-vetoing the bill.
The vote on the bill, as on the resolution, was highly partisan. 
The two Southern Democrats voted against it on every recorded vote. 
Southern Republicans, with few exceptions, favored the measure. By 
region, the vote followed party lines with the exception that a handful 
of Eastern Democrats supported the measure and a substantial number
3sCong. Globe, ^0 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1bb6.
33por debate on the bill and the votes to table, amend, and 
pass, see ibid., Pt. 3j 153^-39*
3^Ibid., 1879.
35ibid., 1883. A similar bill would pass during the First 
Session of the Forty-First Congress.
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of Midwestern Republicans opposed it. Robert Sharkey has concluded 
that the vote on the public credit measure "separated the principled 
greenbackers from the politicians." The Republican greeribackers and 
ultra-Radicala, such as Benjamin F. Butler, John Covode, William D. 
Kelly, and Ignatius Donnelly, joined Democrats in opposing the 
measure.36 Little is known about the financial views of the Southern 
Republicans who opposed the bill.
Southern attitudes on the public credit issue are difficult to 
determine. The issue evoked little comment in the Southern press, 
and the newspapers that did notice it were of a divided mind. If any 
specific group benefited from the promises of the act it was the 
holders of government securities and there were few bondholders in 
the South. The New Orleans Daily Picayune, for example, disliked the 
idea of "legislating bonds into a higher value for the benefit of 
brokers," and doubted that Johnson was a "repudiator."38 But the
3^Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, 279.
37Five Southern Republicans expressed opposition to the Public 
Credit Act. Four voted against passage on February 2b, 1869, ana three 
voted against the conference report on the bill on March 3* An inves­
tigation of their background and constituent characteristics reveals no 
real common denominator Which might indicate why they opposed their 
party on the bill. Three were scalawags, two were carpetbaggers; three 
were from North Carolina, two were from South Carolina. With one 
exception, they represented marginally white agricultural districts.
In terms of occupation and personal wealth they had nothing in common. 
Only two, James Goss (SC) and John Deweese (NC), opposed the public 
credit bill on every vote* Goss, a country merchant, represented the 
poor, rural, and marginally-white fourth district in western South 
Carolina and he probably favored soft money. Deweese was on record as 
being in favor of paper money and currency expansion and against specie 
resumption. See his speech in support of a bill to expand the currency 
in Cong. Globe, UO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, Appendix, 215-17.
33ncw Orleans Daily Picayune, March 1869; December 19, 1868.
Picayune, like many other Southern Democratic newspapers, favored specie 
resumption, and the conservative newspapers certainly did not want to 
be connected in any way with the heretical schemes of Radicals like 
Benjamin Butler (who had voted against the public credit bill) to 
establish a paper currency with no specie base.39 The extant Repub­
lican newspapers seemed to have favored the public credit measure.*4®
The ambiguous stance of Southern newspapers on the public credit 
issue makes it difficult to determine whether or not the Southern 
Republicans were properly representing their constituents'. interests 
in voting for the measure. One historian has expressed the opinion 
that by their votes for the public credit bill the majority of the 
Southern Republicans demonstrated "their subservience to whatever
.Jii
Republican dogma might be fashionable at the time. Such an 
unsubstantiated explanation will not do. Even In the Midwest, where 
the "Ohio Idea" was strongest, Republicans favored the measure by a 
substantial majority (see Table 3-k); and the Southern Republicans 
demonstrated that they were not merely party rob01 s by their vote on 
other economic issues. The public credit bill was a partisan issue, 
buc support for the motions of safeguarding the public credit and
39ibid., January 21, 1869; Richmond Whig, January 1, I869.
Several other Democratic and Conservative newspapers approved of 
Grant’s premise to maintain the public credit in his inaugural address. 
See, for example, the Arkansas Gazette, March 9, 1869; and New Orleans 
Times, March 5, 1869. But other newspapers, like the Atlanta Con­
stitution, doubted that Grant's policy would "meet with much popular 
favor*4--"outside of New England and the bonded interest," see Atlanta 
Constitution, March 3, 1869.
®^See, for example, The Weekly Raleigh (NC) Register, September 
Zh, 1867; March h, i860.
^Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, 128.
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TABLE 3-U
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO AGREE TO 
THE CONFERENCE REPORT ON H. R. 17Mf 
(Public Credit Bill)a
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dan. Rep.
NE 1 20 • • 1
MA 6 33 9 2
MW * » 30 10 19
SS • * 20 2 3
BS • • k 9 3
PS JL _1 • •
Total 8 H O 31 28
Grand Total 118 59
aCong. Globe« UO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1883 (March 3, 1869).
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returning to specie payments did exist in the South. At the very 
least, there is no evidence of strong opposition among conservative 
Southern newspapers. There was a shortage of currency in the South, 
and Southerners were tired of the unsecured state and local, scrip 
and the lack of credit arrangements, hut they were not ready to endorse 
and wildly inflationist proposal in 1869. Southerners could swallow 
paying the governments obligations in coin on the assumption that it 
was a first step toward specie resumption. Finally, it should he kept 
in mind that the measure did nothing more than pledge the faith of 
the government to the payment of its obligations in coin and to promise
an early return to specie payments. As Robert Sharkey has noted, the
Upbill "did not affect the redemption of a single bond or greenback."
Of the economic measures considered during the Third Session, 
the issue most directly related to the South was the proposed redistri­
bution of the national bank notes* As the national banks and their 
issue were a topic of continuing importance during Reconstruction, the 
system bears explanation. Congress had created the national banking 
system as a war measure to provide for more stable banking facilities 
and a sound and uniform currency. In addition, the national banks 
could serve as a market for government bonds, and their currency, 
called national bank notes, would be receivable for most public debts 
and government obligations. The system, as established in 1863 and 
revised in l£36U, provided that "associations" with a minimum capital of 
$50,000 and a deposit of federal bonds with the newly-created office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, would be granted charters as national
4gIbid., 130.
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'banks. They were then allowed to Issue national hank notes in specified 
proportion to their hond deposits. The number of national hanks grew 
slowly until March 1865, when Congress imposed a ten percent tax on 
state hatik notes which accelerated the conversion of state hanks to 
national hanks. As a result, by the end of 1865, most of the allotted 
$300 million was taken up by new national banks.^3
The national hanking system had a number of shortcomings. The 
law establishing the system had set a ceiling of $300 million on 
national hank note circulation to help avoid further wartime inflation. 
This amount proved to he insufficient for the needs of the country in 
the postwar period. In addition, the minimum capital requirement for 
organization was often prohibitive for sparsely-settled areas in 
the West and South— areas which most needed currency, loanable 
funds, and a stable hanking system. But the most evident sectional 
inequity in the system was the maldistribution of the $300 million in 
hank notes.
Originally, the $300 million was to he distributed to each state 
on the basis of population, existing hank capital, resources, and 
business interests. The actual distribution did not, however, proceed 
in accordance with the quota system. Through misadministration and
S^jprits Redlich, The Molding of American Banking; Men and Ideas 
(2 vols•, New York: Hafher Publishing Co., 1951), II, 99-121; Sharkey,
Money, Class, and Party, 223-28; Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era; A 
Social and Political History of American Finance, 1865-1879 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 19^ ), 18-19.
T^Por a discussion of defects in the system, see Redlich, 
Molding of American Banking, II, 117-20; and Sharkey, Money. Class, 
and Party, 229-37.
ambiguities in the law, New England, New York, and Pennsylvania ended 
up with 999 of the 16^7 national banks and $218 million of the $293 
million in national bank notes that were issued. Comparative 
statistics on the actual distribution show an incredible sectional 
imbalance. Rhode Island's "share" of the national bank note 
circulation exceeded that of the entire South. The tiny burg of 
Waterville, Maine, had as much as the state of Alabama, and Florida 
had no national bank note circulation at all. On a per capita level, 
Rhode Island had $77.17 while Arkansas had thirteen cents.^5
The unequal distribution did not generally attract the attention 
of Congress until the spring of 1866 when most of the authorized 
circulation had been distributed. It was evident that the South 
and the West had not received their rightful quotas. Northeastemers 
argued that they needed more circulation for trade and manufacturing, 
but, as several historians have pointed out, the South and West badly- 
needed an adequate supply of sound currency and stable banking 
institutions. In addition, the West and the South did not have the 
readily available credit facilities which the Northeast could use to 
conduct business. There is little doubt that the postwar recovery 
of the South was hindered by a lack of an adequate circulating medium.
1
In its place, the South could either purchase bank notes from the 
Northeast at a premium or rely on the unstable and unauthorized issues
maldistribution of the national bank currency is compre­
hensively treated in George LaVeme Anderson, "The National Banking 
System, 1865-1875: A Sectional Institution" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Illinois, 1933)? especially chs. Ill and 
IV.
issues of state and local scrip for business.*^
The maldistribution of the national bank currency was the 
subject of a great deal of debate but very little action until tne 
Third Session of the Fortieth Congress. In February 1669» the House 
received for consideration Senate Bill No. 440, a four section bill 
to supplement the 1864 act which had altered the original 1863 law 
establishing the national banking system. In the Senate version 
of the bill, the first three sections provided needed correctives to 
the 1864 Act. It was the fourth section than aroused controversy 
by providing for partial redistribution of the national bank note 
circulation. Section four proposed to withdraw up to $20 million 
from those states whose bank note circulation exceeded their lawful 
quota and distribute it to states with less than five dollars of such 
circulation per capita.^
Representative Theodore Pomeroy (R-NY) of the Committee on 
Banking and Currency reported S. 440 and several proposed amendments 
to the House on February 13, 3869. One of the amendments proposed 
to replace section four of S. 440 with a section that provided for 
greater redistribution by scaling existing national banks having more 
than their quota of circulation and redistributing "twenty to twenty- 
five million dollars of currency, 12,000,000 to go to southern States 
and the rest to western States which have not received their portion
^Anderson, "National Banking System," 105, In, 115-16, 136; 
Redlich, Molding of American Banking, II, 118-19; Sharkey, Money, 
Class, and Party, 236-37.
47cong. Globe, 4o Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1181.
under existing law. On the floor of the House, however, "both the 
Senate version of section four and the committee amendment lost out 
to a more comprehensive redistribution plan. Under the lead of 
John Coburn (D-IN), members from the South and West passed an amend­
ment for complete redistribution of the $300 million in national bank 
circulation. In its final form, the Cobum amendment proposed that 
half of the $300 million be distributed by states according to their 
representation in Congress and half according to the official 
valuation of all real and personal property in each state.^ 9
The vote on the Coburn amendment and the subsequent votes on 
S. ¥(0 with the amendment incorporated as section four were bipartisan 
and sectional. The Hew England and Mid-Atlantic states, guarding 
their bank nose circulation jealously, voted against the Cobum 
amendment; the South and the West voted overwhelmingly in favor of the 
amendment. The South, in fact, was the only section solidly in favor 
of the amendment (see Table 3-5)- With minor exceptions the South 
continued to vote as a unit on the bill incorporating the Cobum
amendment. 50
In reference to the problem of redistribution, Professor George
^Ibid., 1183.
^Ibid., 1325. In earlier debate on the bill, Cobum pointed 
out that section four of the Senate version of the bill, and the 
committee's proposed substitution for section four would not correct 
the inequity—primarily because both proposals limited the amount to 
be redistributed to $20-25 million. See ibid., 1270-72.
5°For debate and recorded roll-calls on S. kkO, see ibid., Pt. 2, 
1181-86, 1269-7^, 1319-3^.
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TABLE 3-5
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY ON THE 
COBURN AMENDMENT TO S. hkO 
(Redistribution Bill)8-
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep
NE a • 1 1 21
MA 2 • • 11 36
MW 8 kz 2 10
SS 2 22 • • • »
BS 5 8 2 1
PS _2 _1 JL
Total 18 75 17 69
Grand Total 93 86
^ong. Globe, 1*0 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1325 (February 17, 1869)
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LaVeme Anderson has remarked that the readmlssion of the Southern 
states "was not a decisive factor In influencing legislation as had 
heen expected due largely to the fact that many of the men sent to 
Congress during the early years of renewed statehood did not represent 
the true Southern point of view. "51 But Anderson* s own evidence belies 
his observation; he later notes that House passage of S. ttO would have 
failed without Southern votes.52 There is little doubt that the 
South needed more currency and desired redistribution of the national 
bank currency.53 One Southerner was not greatly exaggerating the 
situation when he wrote President Johnson that "the present financial 
system is a greater curse to the South than would be a standing army 
of 200,000 men to be supported by the South. As for the Beard- 
Beale thesis, it is obvious that in supporting the Cobum plan of 
redistribution the carpetbaggers and scalawags were voting against 
Northeastern Republicans.
Efforts to achieve redistribution during the Third Session, how­
ever, were of no avail as the Senate refused to agree to the House 
amendments to S. ttO. A House-Senate conference committee appointed on 
March 2, 1869, failed to resolve the differences between the two bodies.
53-Anderson, "National Banking System," 151.
5gIbid., 283.
53gee, for example, Richmond Whig. February 2t, 1869; Weekly 
North Carolina Standard. April It, 1869; "Apportionment of the National 
Currency," Debow1 s Review, VIII (April-May 1870), 3^ 9-51; Anderson, 
"National Banking System," ch. V; and Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements 
in the South, 1865-1933 (Los Angeles: University of California Press,
196o]7 9-13,
511 Quoted from Anderson, "National Banking System," it6.
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The issue of redistribution would resurface early in the Forty-First 
Congress which began two days later. ^
Early in 1869, the Washington correspondent of the Cincinnati 
Commercial published an interview with a carpetbagger congressman 
that was widely and favorably copied in conservative Southern news­
papers. The journalist concluded that
these gentlemen of the paper collar and extra dickey follow 
New England, and vote all the time against the interests of 
their own constituents.
I had a long talk with one of these Representatives 
ad interim last night, and tried to convince him that it 
would be well, just for the appearance of the thing, to cast 
a vote now and then for the region he claimed to represent.
But no! I found my friend had intense contempt for one half 
of his people, and a deadly hatred for the other half. It 
was a Connecticut Congressman elected in the South.56
Such an "observation" reinforces the Beard-Beale thesis, but it is 
clearly in conflict with reality as it does not apply to the voting behav­
ior of Southern Republicans on economic issues in the Fortieth Congress.
55cong. Globe. IfO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1 ^ ,  1816, 1897-1908.
In the Senate, the Southerners (all Republicans) voted solidly with 
the West in favor of redistribution, but they could not overcome the 
combined vote of the New England and Mid-Atlantic states against S. hto 
as amended by the Hbuse. See Anderson, "National Banking System," 283.
56Cincinnati Commercial as quoted in the Richmond Whig. January 
5, IB69. The correspondent did not identify the carpetbagger. Of the 
Southern Representatives in the Fortieth Congress, only Nelson Tift, a 
Democrat and long-time resident of Georgia, had been born in Connecticut. 
While several of the Representatives were natives of other New England 
states, as far as can be ascertained, none viewed Connecticut as their 
home, nor had any served in the Union army from Connecticut. Although 
he specified a carpetbagger Representative, he may have been talking 
about carpetbag Senator Adonijah S. Welch of Florida who was born in 
Connecticut— but Welch had been a resident of Michigan since 1839. The 
correspondent may have erred, intentionally or unintentionally, in 
identifying the native state of the carpetbagger. Whatever his 
intentions, he added to the inaccurate portrayal of the carpetbagger 
stereotype.
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The problem of determining the degree to which the twenty-nine 
Republicans accurately represented "Southern interests" on economic 
issues during the Third Session is compounded by the difficulty of 
defining those interests on any given issue. If a positive vote on 
the copper biU was detrimental to the South, and it probably was, 
then Southern Republicans tended to vote with protectionists in the 
House and against the interests of their own constituents. As noted 
above, however, the vote on the copper bill has limited value as an 
indicator of attitudes on the tariff. It is inpossible to determine 
where the South stood on the issue of public credit. Obviously, there 
were few Southern bondholders to benefit from the bill. On the other 
hand, Southerners seemed inclined to accept the notion that the nation's 
public credit should be upheld, and, at this time at least, Southerners 
tended to agree that specie resumption was desirable. But the measure, 
as a declaration of intent, had no effect other than to put Congress 
on record as favoring payment of the public debt in coin and promising 
eventual resumption of specie payments.
Southern interests were well represented on the two economic 
issues that were most important to the section. Carpetbaggers, 
scalawags, and Democrats alike compiled a solid record on measures 
continuing federal subsidies for internal improvements and redistributing 
the national bank currency. Southern Republicans differed from New 
England Republicans on the issue of federal subsidies, and the break 
between the two wings of the party was complete on the issue of 
redistribution. While Beale correctly noted that the Northeasterners 
should fear a reunion of the South and the West on economic issues, he
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maintained that if Republicans represented the South, the South and 
West would not unite because the Southern Republicans would vote with 
Northeastemers on economic questions. Such was not the case on the 
important questions considered in the Third Session. On the forty 
recorded roll calls on economic measures in the Third Session, the 
most evident sectional combination is that between the South and 
Midwest against the Northeast.
On the economic issues most vital to the South, the Southern 
Representatives voted as a bloc. Thus sectional interests, rather 
than party interests appear to be the key to the voting behavior of 
Southern congressmen, especially on the issues of federal subsidies 
and redistribution. The public credit proposal and, to a lesser 
degree, the copper bill, were partisan issues, and political affiliation 
best explains the voting behavior of most Southern Representatives.
On all the economic issues, the scalawag and carpetbag Representatives 
tended to vote as a bloc whether for sectional or party interests.
Member ana constituent characteristics therefore offer little insight 
into the voting behavior.
By examining the response of the thirty-one Southern Repre­
sentatives on economic issues in the Third Session, it is possible to 
rank them in terms of how well they represented Southern interests 
(see Table 3-6). The resulting ranking of the Representatives 
actually reveals very little as most of the Representatives voted 
similarly. If the relatively insignificant vote on the tariff is 
dropped, there was no appreciable difference in voting behavior between
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TABLE 3-6
RANK OF SOUTHERN CONGRESSMEN ACCORDING 
TO THEIR VOTE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES0-
1. Deweese (R-NC) C + N + 4 1
2. Tift (D-GA) 4 N + 4 10
3. Dockery (R-NC) S 4 Y 4 4 6
If. Goss (R-SC) S 4 N 4 4 if
5. Young (D-GA) + N 4 4 2
6. Whittemore (R-SC) C 4 Y t 4 9
7. Hamilton (R-FL) C 4 Y + 4 21
8. Norris (R-AL) C Y 4 4 • •
9. Newsham (R-IA) C - Y 4 4 9
10. Clift (r-ga) C • Y 4 4 U
11. Boyden (R-NC) S - Y 4 4 * «
12. Corley (R-SC) S - Y 4 4 2
13. Buckley (R-AL) C - Y 4 4 5
14. Haughey (R-AL) s - Y 4 4 5
15* Callis (R-AL) C - Y 4 4 7
16. Pierce (R-AL) C #* Y + 4 8
17* Roots (R-AR) C - Y 4 4 8
18. Prince (R-GA) c - Y 4 4 10
19. French (R-NC) c - N 4 4 11
20. Bowen (R-SC) s - N 4 4 17
21. Jones (R-NC) s • Y + 4 » *
22. Lash (R-NC) s - Y 4 4 2
23. Heaton (R-NC C Y 4 4 If
24. Boles (R-AR) s mm Y 4 4 31
25. Elliott (R-AR) s - Y 4 4 10
26. Kellogg (R-AL) c - Y 4 4 7
27. Gove (R-GA) s * Y + 4 8
.
0
0(M Edwards (R-GA) s - Y + 4 19
29. Sypher (r-la) C _ Y M 4 21
30. Blackburn (R-LA s — Y 4 - 26
31. Vidal (R-LA) s - Y - A 27
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TABLE 3-6— Continued
Congressmen are ranked according to how often they voted for 
Southern Interests on economic issues (total of forty roll-call votes). 
Southern interests are defined as being against the blU raising duties 
on copper and copper products (H. R. lk6o)t for continuation of 
federal subsidies to internal improvements, and for the redistribution 
of the national bank currency (S. UUo). The Representatives are ranked 
within each category according to the number of times they supported 
the Southern position. In case of identical voting patterns, they are 
ranked according to the number of times absent* No rank is given for 
their vote on the public credit bill (H. R. 17^) as a "Southern 
position" on the issue could not be determined.
= carpetbagger; S = scalawag.
c+ c= a position against the copper bill (H. R. l46o). An 
exception is made in the case of Deweese who represented the only 
Southern district with extensive copper mining interests. Deweese 
voted for the bill.
%  = a position against the public credit bill; Y = a position 
for the public credit bill (H. R. 17^)*
®+ « a position for continuation of federal subsidies for internal 
improvements.
f+ =: a position for S. UUo incorporating the Cobum amendment;
A = absent on all votes.
^Figure given is the number of times absent out of a total of 
forty roll-calls on economic issues.
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John Deweese (rank one) and William Edwards (rank twenty-eight). 57
As noted above, the Southern Representatives entered the Third 
Session of the fortieth Congress under a number of handicaps. With 
two exceptions they had no experience in such an august body and most 
had a mere three months to serve. All were concerned with their 
political future and, given the situation in the South, most were in 
political trouble. Seven had already failed to be re-elected to the 
Forty-First Congress* The six Georgia Representatives were in trouble 
because Georgia had not complied with the Reconstruction Acts and none 
of the six would be seated at the beginning of the Forty-First Congress. 
Only Pierce M. B. Young, the Democrat, survived subsequent elections 
to the Forty-First Congress. The six Alabama Republicans were like­
wise unsure of their future, as Alabama, for same inexplicable reason, 
did not hold elections until after the First Session of the Forty-First 
Congress. In those elections, only Republican Charles Buckley 
survived. Of the remaining Representatives, only nine had been clearly 
re-elected; the others faced pending contests for their seats.
Under such circumstances a lesser set of men might have totally 
ignored their constituents* interests and sold their votes to the 
highest bidder to secure their future. Southern Republican Represen­
tatives obviously antagonized conservative elements in their constit-
57of the three Louisiana Republicans given the lowest rank,
Jasper Blackburn and Michel Vidal, both lame ducks, were absent on 
over 50 percent of the votes. Jacob Sypher is set off from the rest 
of the Representatives by his failure to support continued federal 
subsidies for internal improvements (see fh. 2b above).
uencies by actively supporting the proposed Fifteenth Amendment,58 
hut on economic issues they faithfully represented Southern interests. 
Given the issues, the time, and the circumstances, to say that a 
solidly conservative delegation could have better represented the 
economic interests of the South is speculation and nothing more.
58jhe Southern Republicans were vocal in their support of the 
Fifteenth Amendment. Most of the speeches given by Southern Repub­
licans related to the passage of the amendment. While it is not 
to be denied that the political future of many of the Republicans 
depended upon passage of the amendment, their speeches also reflect 
a strong humanitarian concern for the welfare of blacks. For their 
speeches, see Cong. Globe, bO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, Appendix. Southern 
Republican Representatives received no praise in the conservative press, 
but the two Democrats, Tift and Young of Georgia, were cited, not for 
their votes on economic issues, but for maintaining the proper attitudes 
on reconstruction legislation. See Atlanta Constitution, February 
March 3, lJb 1869*
CHAPTER IV
THE FORTY-FIRST HOUSE
The Forty-First Congress convened on March b, 1869, the day 
following the conclusion of the Third Session of the Fortieth Congress. 
The Forty-First House met in three sessions. In terms of issues con- . 
sidered and legislation, little was accomplished during the First 
Session which lasted until April 12, 1869, hut the House was quite 
productive during the Second Session (December 6, 1869 to July 15,
I870) and the Third Session (December 5, 1870 to March 3, 1871). As 
had been the case in the two previous Congresses, the continuing 
problems of political reconstruction overshadowed economic issues but 
a number of important economic measures were considered. In particular, 
the Forty-First House guaranteed the sanctity of the public credit, 
refunded the national debt, and grappled, with varying degrees of 
effectiveness, with redistribution, currency expansion, internal 
taxes, the tariff, and federal subsidies for internal improvements.•
^According to a law passed during the Second Session of the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress, the House and the Senate were obliged to 
convene each new Congress on the day following the conclusion of the 
old Congress. Thus the Fortieth, Forty-First, and Forty-Second Con­
gresses each had three major sessions. The law was revoked during 
the Forty-Second Congress, and the House and Senate returned to the 
original two-session foimat beginning with the Forty-Third Congress. 
For the acts establishing and revoking the law, see Cong. Globe,
39 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 3, Appendix, 180-81; Cong. Globe. b2 Cong.,
1 Sess., Pt. 2, Appendix, 335-
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The South sent fifty-four men to the Forty-First House, hut due 
to contested elections, resignations, deaths, failures to elect on 
time, and the policy of staggered readmission, over 90 percent of the 
Southerners served partial terras. During the First Session, the 
House seated only fifteen Southerners, including the full delegations
p
from Arkansas, Florida, and North Carolina. In the following session, 
from December 1869 to July 1870, another twenty-six Southerners took 
their seats. Those seated during the Second Session included the 
delegations from the newly readmitted states of Virginia, Mississippi, 
and Texas and the Representatives from Alabama. The remaining thir­
teen Southern seats, including seven from Georgia, were filled during 
the Third Session beginning in December 1870*^  When Richard H. 
Whiteley (R-GA) took his seat on February 9, 1B71, the South finally 
attained full representation in the House— twenty-two days before the
biographical Directory, 19^-96• Also seated during the First 
Session were Republicans Benjamin F. Whittemore, C. C. Bowen, and 
Solomon L. Hoge of South Carolina and Lionel A. Sheldon of Louisiana. 
Because of disputed election returns, the two states' other seats 
remained vacant for the duration of the First Session.
3ibid., 193-97- Alabama did not hold elections to the Forty- 
First Congress until August 1869— between the First and Second Ses­
sions. Virginia was readmitted on January 26, I87O; Mississippi on 
February 23, 1870; and Texas on March 30, 1870- Two more Louisiana 
Representatives, Joseph P. Newsham and Chester B. Darrall, and 
Alexander S. Wallace of South Carolina won their contests and were 
seated late in the Second Session. But the House forced the resig­
nation of two Southerners, Benjamin F. Whittemore (R-SC) and John 
Deweese (R-NC), during the session, and two other Southerners, David 
Heaton (R-NC) and Robert Ridgeway (R-VA), died before the Third 
Session convened in December 1870.
Slid., 19I+-97. In addition to the seven Georgians, the House 
seated the final two Representatives from Louisiana and four replace­
ments for those Rep re s entat ive s who had died or had been forced to 
resign during or after the Second Session.
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end of the Forty-First Congress. As the average term for Southerners 
■was only 12.it- months, it is obvious that the South was not well 
represented in the Forty-First House.
Fifteen of the fifty-four Representatives were Democrats. The 
Democrats included two outsiders (or "settlers" according to Southern 
conservatives) who had arrived after 1865 in the states they repre­
sented. The wealthy iron and coal mine owner, William Milnes, Jr., 
had crossed the state line from Pennsylvania to Virginia in 1865 to 
purchase and operate the Shenandoah Iron Works. The heavily white 
valley constituency selected him as their Representative when Virginia 
was readmitted in January 1870.5 The other outside Democrat, John C. 
Connor of Texas, was a Union army veteran who had waged an unsuccessful 
campaign in 1866 as a national Union candidate for the Indiana House. 
After his defeat, Connor rejoined the army in Texas and ran for the 
U. S. House from the heavily white second district with the support 
of such eminent Texas Democrats as former Provisional Governor James 
W. Troclcmorton. Most of the Democrats, like Milnes and Connor, were
^Biographical Directory, 1460; Benjamin P. Poore (comp.), Con-
fressional Directory for the Third Session of the Forty-First Congress 2d ed., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1871), 51. There 
is some dispute as to whether Milnes had served in the Union army.
Jack P. Maddex, Jr. refers to him as a Union veteran, hut Catherine 
Silverman classifies him as a non-participant. See Maddex, The Virginia 
Conservatives, 1867-1879: A Study in Reconstruction Politics (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 80; and Silverman,
"’Of Wealth, Virtue, and Intelligence*: The Redeemers and Their
Triumph in Virginia and North Carolina" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
City University of New York, 1971), 301.
^Biographical Directory, 775-76; Walter Prescott Webb and H.
Dailey Carroll (eds.), The Handbook of Texas (2 vols., Austin: Texas
State Historical Association, 1952), I, 393; John Pressley Carrier, "A
moderates and, although half had served the Confederacy, most had 
"been unionists or cooperationists during the secession crisis.
The thirty-nine Republicans consisted of twenty carpetbaggers, 
seventeen scalawags, and the first two blacks to be seated in the 
House of Representatives. Both blacks served for but a short time.
The first, Joseph H. Rainey of South Carolina, was chosen by a predom­
inantly black constituency to fill the vacancy created by the forced 
resignation of carpetbagger Benjamin P. Whittemore. Rainey, a barber 
by trade and a well-known state politician, was seated on December 12, 
1870. He served less than three months in the Forty-First House, but 
he was re-elected to four more terras and served until 1879* The 
other black, Jefferson Bong of Georgia, had been bom a slave and 
was, at the time of his election, a relatively well-established 
merchant-tailor in Macon. Long was a lame duck when he began his 
one and one-half month terra in January 1870.?
The Southerners ranged in age from twenty-six year old Clinton
Political History of Texas During The Reconstruction, 1865-187^" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1971)? 283; 
James Alex Baggett, "The Rise and Fall of the Texas Radicals, 1867- 
1883" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, North Texas State University, 
1972), 110.
?For Rainey's career, see: D.A.B., XV? 327-28; Biographical
Directory. 1581; Emily Bellinger Reynolds and Joan Reynolds Paunt 
(comps.), Biographical Directory of the Senate of the State of South 
Carolina, 1776-196^ (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department,
196^0, 2§5; and Joel Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro in South
Carolina During Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1965), 1^3,359? 369-70. For biographical information 
on Long, see: Biographical Directory. 1305; Poore (ccanp.), Congres­
sional Directory for the Third Session of the Forty-First Congress, 11; 
and Maurine Christopher, America* s Black Congressmen (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1971)*27-29.
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L. Cobb (R-NC) to sixty year old Edward Degener (R-TX). The median 
age was a youthful thirty-eight with well over half the carpetbaggers 
under the age of thirty-five while half the Democrats and scalawags 
were forty-five years of age or older. Twenty-nine had been born in 
slave states, twenty in free states, and five were foreign bom.
Five possessed no formal education and twenty-two had no more 
than an eleaentary education. Fourteen of the seventeen scalawags 
had no formal training beyond the elementary level while fourteen of 
the twenty carpetbaggers had attended college and eleven had taken one 
or more degrees. The educational experience of the Democrats paralleled 
that of the carpetbaggers.
Thirty-two of the fifty-four Representatives resided in the 
South prior to the war, but only nine (six Democrats and three scala­
wags) were identified as former slaveholders. Information on their 
former political affiliations remains fragmentary. Of the nine 
identified as Democrats during the 1850s, six remained in the party 
and three became scalawags. Of ten former Whigs (all native Souther­
ners), six joined the Republican party and three became Democrats.
Only five (all carpetbaggers) were clearly identified as having belonged 
to the Republican party prior to i860. At least five carpetbaggers 
supported Lincoln in the election of i860, three Democrats and two 
scalawags voted for Douglas, and two scalawags favored Bell. Only one 
Democrat was identified as having supported Breckinridge and only two 
(both Democrats) were active secessionists. Sixty-six percent of the 
Democrats and 75 percent of the scalawags were unionists or cooper­
ationists during the secession crisis (seven unknown). The figures
on Civil War service indicate that seven Democrats and six scalawags 
served in the Confederate army, twenty-two (including two scalawags 
and one Democrat) sided with the Union, and seventeen (including 
eight scalawags and five Democrats) were non-participants.
Half of the Representatives were lawyers and 25 percent were 
involved in agricultural pursuits. Of the remainder, seven were 
merchants and businessmen, three were bankers, one a minister, one a 
pilot, and one a tailor. For the thirty-five whose wealth was 
discovered, seventeen claimed less than $10,000 in personal and real 
estate and ten admitted to a personal worth of less than $5,000. 
Another ten claimed an estate valued between $10,000 and $20,000 and 
eight were worth more than $20,000. William Milnes (D-VA) headed the 
list with a property evaluation of $70,000— most of which was wrapped 
up in the Shenandoah Iron Works. Charles Hays, the Alabama scalawag, 
valued his plantation holdings at $50,000 and admitted to another 
$6,000 in personal estate.®
Six of the Representatives apparently had no previous elective 
political experience, but fifteen had held local offices, forty-two 
had served at the state level, and seven had held appointive federal 
positions. Another fourteen had served briefly in the Fortieth House.
^Manuscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules, Virginia, Page 
County; ibid., Alabama, Green County. Hays could have been worth more 
than the $56,000 he admitted to in I87O. He had inherited a large 
estate from his father and he was often referred to as one of the 
largest planters in Alabama. In i860 he owned 92 slaves with real 
estate valued at $112,500 and a personal estate of $98,750. See 
Manuscript Census, i860, Schedule of Slave Population, Schedule of 
Free Population, Alabama, Green County; Hays to Andrew Johnson,
August 1, 1865, Amnesty Papers, Alabama.
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In terns of prior political experience, the Southern delegation to 
the Forty-First House compared favorably with those to other Recon­
struction Congresses. Most of the Representatives had relatively 
easy elections. Thirty won by margins of over 10 percent, and 
twenty-one by more than 20 percent. There were, however, some 
extremely close contests since fifteen won their seats with margins 
of less than five percent, and nine (including four scalawags) with 
margins of less than two percent of the vote. Opponents unsuccessfully 
contested the elections of eight Southerners; three others won their 
seats by contest. All of the Louisiana seats were contested. Three 
Louisiana Republicans won their contests but the House refused to 
seat the other two Republicans until they presented new credentials 
won in special elections.
Cross-tabulations of the Representatives* political affiliation 
with the congressional district data yields some interesting relation­
ships. As might be expected, the two blacks represented constituencies 
that were Uo to U5 percent white, and sixteen of the twenty carpet­
baggers were elected by constituencies that were under 55 percent 
white. Over half of the Democrats, on the other hand, came from 
districts that were more than 70 percent white. The scalawags again 
represented marginally white or black districts with six elected by 
constituencies that were from 50 to 5k percent white. Carpetbaggers 
represented n.n five of the districts that were less than 50 percent 
agricultural (urban districts), and Republicans represented 88 percent 
of the districts that were over 80 percent agricultural. Nearly all 
the Democrats came from districts that were 50 to 79 percent agricultural.
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The fifty-four Southerners entered a charged atmosphere in 
Washington. The political calm pledged by Ulysses S. Grant in the 
campaign of 1668 was noticeably absent during the Forty-First Congress. 
The volatile issues of political reconstruction remained in the fore­
front as the last four Southern states were "reconstructed" and 
readmitted. In the interim, Congress generated volumes of rhetoric on 
disputed Southern elections, debated the feasibility of a general 
amnesty, and finally passed two controversial "force bills" to 
facilitate enforcement of the newly-approved fifteenth amendment. Less 
than one-fourth of the 6^3 recorded roll-call votes in the Forty-First 
House related to economic issues, but several pieces of important 
economic legislation were considered and passed. During the First 
Session, the public credit bill was revived and made law, while the 
central piece of legislation to emerge from the Third Session was the 
act incorporating and subsidizing the Texas-Pacific Railroad Company.
In terms of economic legislation, the Second Session ranked among the 
most important during Reconstruction. During that session, the 
national debt was refunded, a currency bill incorporating redistribution 
was passed, and the House approved a bill reducing internal taxes and 
tariff duties.9
^Full analysis of the response of Southerners to economic issues 
during the Forty-First Congress is impossible because the South was 
only partially represented during the First and much of the Second 
Session. In particular, scaling techniques lose their value unless 
a representative number of members responded to the issue being con­
sidered. A scale encompassing all the important economic issues 
considered in the Forty-First House, for example, is relatively 
meaningless, because so many Southern seats were vacant when key votes 
were taken. The value of the scalograms that have been constructed on 
specific economic issues must be qualified by an awareness that the 
South was incompletely represented. The one exception is the scalogram
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The first significant economic measure to be considered by the 
Forty-First House was a bill to strengthen the public credit. Presi­
dent Johnson had pocket-vetoed a similar bill at the conclusion of 
the Fortieth Congress, but President Grant had announced that he 
favored paying in gold “every dollar of the Government indebtedness 
. . . unless otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract."3-0 With 
Grant's blessing, Congress revived and passed "An Act to Strengthen 
the Public Credit of the United States," and on March 18, 1869, it 
became the first act of the Forty-First Congress to receive Grant's 
approval. In its final form, the act pledged the faith of the United 
States to pay in coin all non-interest bearing and interest-bearing 
obligations except in cases where the law authorizing the issue 
stipulated otherwise. To this was added a clause pledging "to make 
provision at the earliest practicable period for the redemption of the 
United States notes in coin."33- The response to the bill was as 
highly partisan as it had been in the Fbrtieth Congress. House 
Republicans favored a motion to order the engrossment and third reading 
of the bill by a margin of 96-12 while Democrats voted 1-36 in opposition 
(see Table 4-1: A). The handful of Southern Republicans to be seated 
favored the measure by a margin of 8-2.
on the Texas-Pacific railroad question— a measure considered when the 
South was at full strength. All fifty Southern Representatives scale 
on the Texas-Pacific question.
30James D. Richardson (comp.), A Compilation of the Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents. 1784-1897 (10 vols.. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1897), VII, 7 .
^^ Cong. Globe, 4l Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 35.
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TABLE 4-1: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY 
OR THE PUBLIC CREDIT ISSUE
A. To order engrossment and third reading of H. Res. 7 
(Public Credit Act)8,
Yea Ray
B.
Region Dem, Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE a a 12 • • a *
MA • * 27 7 a a
MW * • 37 15 8
SS • a 8 a • 2
BS a a 6 12 2
PS 1 2 2 a »T_M_LJ ■
Total 1 92 
Grand Total 93
0 table the McNeely Resolution1*
Yea
36 12
48
Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE • a 23 a • • a
MA 2 29 10 a a
MW a • 44 16 1
SS # • 14 3 a a
BS a • 7 9 a •
PS 1 2 2 a a~1"n
Total 3 119 4o 1
Grand Total 122 4l
aCong. Globe, 41 Cong., 1 Sess., 60 (March 12, I869)
?Ibid., 4-1 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 913 (January 31, 1870),
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The passage of the Public Credit Act did not completely resolve
the question of how bondholders were to be paid. The issue reappeared
during the Second Session when Representative Thompson W. McNeely
(D-IL) offered a resolution stating that
the national debt should be paid in strict compliance with the 
contract, whether it is made payable in gold or greenbacks; 
that the five-twenty bonds are payable in greenbacks or their 
equivalent, and we condemn the policy of the Administration, 
which is squandering millions of money by buying such bonds 
at a high rate of premium when the Government had the clear 
right to redeem them at par.^2
The reaction to a motion to table the resolution was even more partisan
than the earlier division on the Public Credit Act (see Table 4-1: B).
The anti-administration tone of the resolution undoubtedly stimulated
Republican party unity. Only one Republican voted against tabling
the resolution; only three Democrats voted for tabling. The vote on the
resolution, which offers a slightly larger sample of Southern opinion
on the issue, split the South along party lines.^
The public credit issue was closely associated with a successful 
effort during the Second Session to refund the national debt with 
lower-interest, longer-term bonds and to make the new bonds specif­
ically payable in coin. Refunding was a sound fiscal move, as the 
government was then paying relatively high rates of interest on
•^ Cong. Globe. 4l Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 913* The five-twenty 
bonds are explained below.
^The three Southern Republicans, Bowen (SC), Deweese (NC), and 
Dockery (NC), who had opposed the Public Credit Act, fell into line 
and voted to table the resolution. All three had also opposed the 
public credit bill in the Third Session of the fortieth Congress. For 
a discussion of Southern reaction to the public credit issue, see 
above, ch. III.
136
several short-term issues. Of particular consequence, were the series 
of bonds issued between 1862 and 1868, known as "five-twenties," which 
accounted for approximately 75 percent of the interest-bearing part of 
the federal debt. The five-twenties were tax-exempt securities, 
initially purchasable with greenbacks, and bearing 6 percent interest. 
The interest was specifically payable in gold, but the law had not 
stipulated in what kind of money the principal was to be paid. As 
their name indicates, the five-twenties were optionally redeemable at 
any time between five and twenty years after their purchase. Most of 
the five-twenties were optionally payable by 1870; and, as the last 
issue was made in 1868, all would become redeemable by July 1, 1873.
The refunding legislation eventually passed in 1870 was almost solely 
concerned with refunding the $1 .6 billion of five-twenties still 
out standing.
Both Houses of Congress generally agreed that the short-term, 
high-interest five-twenties should be refunded, but the exact means of 
doing so stimulated considerable debate. Early in the session, the 
Senate considered and passed a bill (S. 380) which proposed to refund 
the bonded indebtedness with three new bond issues of $k00 million each, 
at interest rates ranging from k to 5 percent, and at maturities of 
ten to twenty years. The House considered S. 380 but offered a sub­
stitute bill (H. R. 2167) which proposed a single bond issue of $1
•****0n the origin and nature of the five-twenties and the refunding 
issue, see Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political
History of American Finance, 1865-l879Ti?riricgbon: Princeton
University Press, 196k), lfj-17, 179-80; and Robert T. Patterson,
Federal Debt -Management Policies, 1865-1879 (Durham: Duke University
Press, l W ,  78-10k.
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"billion, redeemable in thirty years and bearing t percent interest. 15 
The first report of the conference committee between the two Houses 
resulted in a compromise bill (S, 380) which authorized three issues:
$1 billion at k percent interest, redeemable after thirty years;
$300 million at k.5 precent, redeemable after fifteen years; and $200 
million at 5 percent, redeemable after ten years.^
The House rejected the first conference report on S. 380 for
reasons other than the terms of the proposed refunding issues.
Opposition to the first conference report centered on three provisions.
Throughout the consideration of the refunding bills, one group (mostly
Democrats) opposed replacing the five-twenties with new bonds whose
interest and principal were both payable in coin as S. 380 stipulated.
This was essentially the same group that had opposed the Public Credit
Act with the argument that the national obligations should be paid 
17in greenbacks. A second provision of the conference report 
authorized a commission of 1 .5 percent payable to banking and business 
syndicates to negotiate and sell the bonds. Several Representatives
^ Cong. Globe, Ul Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5070-71.
•^ Ibid., 51^ - 65. Patterson, Federal Debt-Management Policies,
82.
^Both the House and the Senate versions of the bill had stip­
ulated payment of the new issues in coin. At the time of the bill's 
passage, the term "coin” signified gold, but the choice of the term 
later created considerable controversy during the Forfcy-Fifth Congress 
when the silverites argued that the bonds might be paid in either gold 
or silver coin. See Patterson, Federal Debt-Management Policies, 82; 
Walter T. K. Nugent, The Money Question Piping Reconstruction (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), 99; and Allen Weinstein, 
Prelude to Populism: Origins of the Silver Issue, 1867-1878 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1970T, 307-16.
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argued that the commission rate was too high and proposed a reduction
l O
to one half of one percent. A final provision of the refunding bill 
clearly affected Southern interests. As first reported back from the 
conference committee, section seven of S. 380 stipulated that any new 
banking associations would be compelled to organize by purchasing the 
new, lower-interest government bonds at par in gold. Established 
banks, on the other hand, would be able to continue to base their 
banking on bonds paying 6 percent interest— at least until those bonds 
would be refunded with the new lower-interest bonds. Thus established 
banks would have a distinct advantage over banks to be organized after 
the passage of the refunding proposal. As has already been discussed, 
the national banking system was highly sectional in character; most of 
the established banks were in the Northeast. S. 380 discriminated 
against new banks in that the established banks, based on 6 percent 
bonds, would have a 1 or 2 percent advantage over new banks which 
would have to be based on bonds yielding either ^ or 5 percent interest. 
On the surface, the distinction seemed minor, but if allowed to stand, 
section seven would definitely hinder the organization of new banks—  
most of which would be in the South and West. Radical Republican John 
F. Benjamin of Missouri found ready support among Southern and Western 
members when he declared that section seven was "a gross injustice to 
the South and to the West."1^
^Sentiment to lower the allowable commission rates for negoti­
ation of the bonds was widespread among the Democrats, but many Repub­
licans also supported the move. See, for example, the remarks of James 
A. Garfield (R-OH) in Cong. Globe, Ul Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5^5.
19rbid. For similar comments, see the remarks of Samuel S. Mar­
shall (D-IL), James A. Garfield (R-OH), Norman B. Judd (R-IL), and the
ITABLE 4-2
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VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO ADOPT THE FIRST REPORT
OF THE CONFERENCE CO&MITTHE ON S. 380a 
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep
RE 21 1 1
MA 32 21 4
MW l4 27
SS 4b 4 13
BS 6 14 2
PS
Total 90 57 47
Grand Total 90 104
aCong. Globe, 41 Cong., 2 Sess., Pb. 6, 5k67 (July 12, 1870. 
bAyer (VA), Boles (AR), Buck (Al), Roots (AR).
I1U0
The various groups opposing the first conference report on S. 380 
successfully prevented its adoption and the bill was returned to the 
same conference committee. The vote on the first conference report 
represents the height of opposition to the funding bill (see Table k-2). 
Section seven undoubtedly prompted thirteen of seventeen Southern 
Republicans to join the Democrats to defeat the bill, and the closeness 
of the vote indicates that they played a crucial role in its defeat.
It is somewhat surprising that the Southern Republicans were not 
joined by more of their party colleagues from the Midwestern and 
Border states in opposition to the Northeastern wing of the party.
The conference committee reconsidered S. 38O and reported it 
back to the House on July 13, 1870, with two major changes. The 
commission rate was reduced to one-half of one percent and section 
seven was eliminated. Those who favored payment of the new bond 
issues in greenbacks now stood alone against the refunding measure 
and it easily passed the House by a margin of 139-53.20
The partisan nature of the funding issue is clearly indicated 
by a scalogram of six votes on the matter (see Tables U-3: A and 
1+-3: B). Seventy-five percent of the Democrats opposed refunding at 
every opportunity (scale position 0) while sixty percent of the 
Republicans supported it on every vote (scale position 5). Democratic
countering argument of Robert C. Schenck (R-OH), the floor leader for 
the measure; ibid., 5^2-67.
onFor the text of the funding bill as finally passed and the 
debate on the second conference report, see ibid., 5522-23. Only two 
Southerners, McKenzie (R-VA) and Sherrod (D-Ai), opposed the bill on 
the final vote.
TABLE 4-3: A
HJNDING SGALOGBAM:
REGIONAL AND PARTY DISTRIBUTION OP SCALE POSITIONS
REGION MQ3 PARTY
Scale
Position D
NE
R D
MA
R D
MW
R D
SS
R
BS
D R D
PS
R
Total 
D R
0 * *
* 0
10
# •
15
1
1
• •
10
1
2
• •
38
2
1 • •
• •
4
• *
• •
• «
1
* •
2
♦ •
• •
• •
7
• 9
2 1
« •
2
1
* •
1
■ •
la
1
m m
1
• •
5
3
3 « *
• •
• •
1
• •
6
« ■
5
• •
• •
• •
• *
• *
12
4 • •
1
* •
5
• 0
18
ih
6
• *
5
■ •
• 9
1
35
5 • •
18
* •
27
■ *
21
• •
4
• •
3
• *
2
• •
75
Total 1 19 16 34 15 47 3 16 13 9 3 2 51 127
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .984 
McKenzie (VA). 
looker (VA).
I ■
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TABLE 4-3: B 
ITEMS IN HJNDING SCALOGRAM
Scale
Position Identification
To amend H. R. 2167 By striking out the words "coin in the 
Treasury of the United States" and insert "United States 
notes in the Treasury of the United States arising from 
the sale of honds authorized to he issued by this act, 
or other such notes in the Treasury." 42-127; + = NAY. 
Cong. Globe, 4l Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 6, 5059 (July 1, ip ).
To pass H. R. 2167. 128-43; + = YEA. Ibid., 5070 (July 1, 
1870).
To adopt the second report of the committee of conference 
on S. 380. 139-53; + = YEA. Ibid., 5523 (July 13,
1870).
To table the first report of the committee of conference 
on S. 380. 55-123; + = NAY. Ibid.. 5467 (July 12,
1870).
To amend H. R. 2167 by providing that "nothing in this act 
shall authorize the Secretuary of the Treasury to allow 
or pay any commission or percentage for the sale of the 
bonds so issued, or any part thereof." 57-103; + = NAY. 
Ibid.. 5026 (June 30, 1870).
To adopt the first report of the committee of conference 
on S. 380. 88-102; + = NAY. Ibid.. 5^7 (July 12,
1870).
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TABLE k-3: B— Continued 
A NOTE OH SCALE CONSTRUCTION
The roll-call votes used for scale construction in this study 
were taken from the roll-call data sets for each House compiled by the 
ICPR. The computer programs used for scale construction were those 
in the ICPR's Osiris II package. By examining the content description 
of each roll call in the ICPR data set and the Congressional Globe, 
all roll calls relating to economic issues in each House were listed 
to form a "preliminary universe of content.” From this universe, a 
series of subsets relating to specific economic issues (e.g., the 
tariff, currency, taxation) were selected. The universe was then 
reordered by subset and the roll-calls were recoded and subjected to a 
program to compute Yule1s Q correlation coefficient for each pair of 
roll-calls in the universe. Yule's Q (which ranges from -1 to +l), 
is the generally accepted measure of the scalability of a pair of roll 
calls. A high value of Q between a pair of roll calls indicates that 
they scale— that is, few (if any) members will be found who reject an 
easier-to-support item and then accept a harder-to-support item. Every 
roll-call in a given subset was required to have a Q value of above 
dfc.7 with every other measure in that subset to be considered scalable. 
The Q limit was lowered to *.6 on several occasions in order to include 
certain desired items within a scalable subset, but in «.n cases the 
mean Q, for each subset exceeded .7 and in most cases it exceeded .85. 
The computer-generated matrix of Q, coefficients for the universe was 
then examined to determine which measures scaled within each subset and 
within the whole universe. To double-check the manual "clustering" of 
scalable roll-calls the matrix was subjected to a computer program to 
produce clusters of scalable votes on a particular issue. Those roll- 
calls in each cluster with negative Q values were "reflected"— the yeas 
and nays reversed to produce the correct response category indicating 
the positive position.
Each cluster of roll-call votes was then subjected to a scaling 
program which ordered the items in the cluster in a rank from largest 
passing set to smallest passing set and assigned a scale position to 
each member. In most cases, members who were absent for more than 
30 percent of the votes in a scale were excluded from that scale. 
Similarly, those with more than one inconsistent vote (e.g., voting 
for a harder-to-accept proposition after rejecting an easier-to- 
accept proposition) were usually excluded from the scale except when 
the scale size could legitimately accommodate more than one inconsistent 
vote (referred to as an "error"). In cases in which a member had an 
acceptable number of errors or absences, his scale position was deter­
mined by choosing the median score out of his possible scores. Careful 
use of the Q coefficient and proper controls on errors and absences 
consistently yield valid scales. A further customary check on the 
adequacy of each scale is its coefficient of reproducibility which 
measures the percentage of responses on scale items that could be 
correctly predicted from a member's position on the scale. Scales 
with a coefficient of reproducibility above .9 are generally considered
11*
to be satisfactory.
For a discussion of scaling methods and examples of their 
applications see Duncan MacRaes Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting: 
A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-First 
Congress (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California PresSs 
1956}s especially 218-23; Joel H. Silbey, The Shrine of Party: 
Congressional Voting Behavior. I81fl-l852 (Pittsburg: University of
Pittsburg Press, 1967)9 14-17; Thomas B. Alexander, Sectional Stress 
and Party Strength: A Study of Roll-Call Voting Patterns in the United 
States House of Representatives, l536-l86b tNashville: Vanderbilt 
University Press, 1967)9 7-8; John Kent Folmar, "The Erosion of Repub­
lican Support for Congressional Reconstruction in the House of Repre­
sentatives, 1871-1877: A Roll-Call Analysis," (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Alabama, 1968); and John Lockhart McCarthy, 
"Reconstruction Legislation and Voting Alignments in the House of 
Representatives, l863-l869,, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale 
University, 1970). Two useful guides to the application of scaling 
are Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, 
Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1966), ch. VI; and Charles M. Dollar and Richard J. Jensen, 
Historian*s Guide to Statistics: Quantitative Analysis and Historical
Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971)» especially 
116-21.
The format used to present the scale results has been adapted 
from Alexander, Sectional Stress and Party Strength; and Folmar,
"Erosion of Republican Support for Congressional Reconstruction."
Unless otherwise indicated, all scales are ranked from the largest 
passing set to smallest passing set. The initial table (A) in each 
set gives the distribution of scale scores by region and party, the 
coefficient of reproducibility, and any notable deviant scores for 
Southerners. The second table (b) in each set identifies the items 
in each scale position, the vote, the positive position, and the 
citation to the Congressional Globe.
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opposition stemmed from the declared intent of both proposals (H. R.
2167 and S. 38O) to pay the interest and principal on the new bond 
issues in coin. Southern Republicans generally followed their party 
in support of refunding, but the scale distribution by region indicates 
that they were less enthusiastic in doing so than were Republicans 
from other regions, especially those from the New England and Middle 
Atlantic states.21
After being killed by the Senate in the Fortieth Congress, the 
question of redistribution of the national bank notes resurfaced in 
the Forty-First Congress. This time redistribution was coupled with 
an attempt to alter the volume of circulating currency. During the 
Second Session, the House and the Senate skirmished over the currency 
question, the House generally favoring expansion and the Senate 
inclining toward maintaining the existing volume of paper money. Also 
at issue was the kind of currency to be expanded or contracted. In 
both Houses, the currency question transcended party lines. Southerners 
and many Midwesterners appeared willing to accept any expansion in 
either greenbacks or bank notes. A sizable contingent of Northern 
Democrats disliked bank notes and favored expanding greenbacks, but 
certain hard-money advocates in the Northern wings of both parties 
opposed expansion of paper currency in any form. Other Northeasterners
P I For the nineteen Southerners who were present often enough to 
be assigned a scale position, there appears to be very little connection 
between personal or constituent characteristics and their vote. The 
only evident difference is that scalawags scaled somewhat lower than 
did carpetbaggers: Scale position: 3 ^ 5 6
Scalawags: 1 ^ 3 1
Carpetbaggers: 0 1 3  3
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(primarily Republicans) opposed expansion of any kind, not necessarily 
because they favored hard money, but because their section already 
possessed adequate currency and banking facilities. 22 Redistribution 
further complicated the issue by splitting the House along sectional 
lines.
The disposition of the House in favor of complete redistribution
had been evident in the previous Congress.23 On the question of
currency expansion, the mood of the House m s  reflected by its passage
of a resolution offered in February 1870 by William Loughridge (R-Lfl.):
Resolved, That in the opinion of the House the business interests 
of the Country require an increase in the volume of circulating 
currency, and that the Committee on Banking and Currency are 
instructed to report to the House, at as early a day as practi­
cable, a bill to increase the currency to the amount of at 
least $50,000,000.24
The vote on the resolution m s  bipartisan and sharply sectional. The
New England and Middle Atlantic States opposed it by a margin of
9-57, 'while the Midwest and the South favored it 8U-10 (see Table
h-h: A). The potent bipartisan combination of the South and West
against the Northeast (in defiance of the Beard-Beale thesis) dcmon-
22por Northern attitudes toward greenbacks, national bank notes, 
currency expansion and contraction, and specie resumption, see Sharkey, 
Money, Class, and Party, passium; and Unger, The Greenback Era, 
especially chs. II-IV. The debate over redistribution and currency 
expansion during the Second Session is more specifically discussed in 
George IaVerne Anderson, "The National Banking System, 1865-1875: A
Sectional Institution" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Illinois, 1933), chs. VI-VIII.
23During the Third Session of the Fortieth Congress, the House 
had approved the Coburn amendment to S. hkO which proposed complete 
redistribution of the national bank notes, see above, ch. III.
2l*Cons. Globe, to. Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1**60.
TABLE l*-V. A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY 
ON THE CURRENCY ISSUE
To pass the Loughridge resolution0.
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE * * 1 1 21
MA 1 7 Ik 21
MW 17 *+7 0 0 9
SS 5 15 « * 1
BS 10 7 • 0 b
PS 1 • • 1 2
Total 3b 77 16 58
Grand Total 111 7^
j pass S. 378 
Region
as amended by the House13
Yea 
Dem. Rep. Dem.
Nay
Rep.
NE • • 1 0 0 18
MA • • 19 19 11
MW 2 U7 11 5
SS 3 21 3 * 0
BS • * 6 10 1
PS 0 * * * 2 11 — »
Total 5 9b b5 36
Grand Total 99 81
aCong. Globe, Ul Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 2, ll(60 (February 21, 1870). 
bIbid., Pt. 5, hh78 (June 15, 2870).
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strated that the South and West could control economic legislation in 
the House— if the coalition could he maintained.
The Senate had killed the House's plan for complete redistri­
bution during the Fortieth Congress and was on record as opposing 
currency expansion. Early in the Second Session, the Senate passed 
a bill (S. 378) providing for partial redistribution and a change in 
the volume of national bank currency.^ S. 378 called for an 
additional issue of $1*5 million in national bank notes to banking 
associations organised or to be organized in states or territories 
having less than their share. The additional issue would increase 
the bank note circulation to $31*5 million. As compensation for this 
increase in the circulating medium, and to prevent any inflationary 
effect, the Senate proposed cancellation of the $1*5 million in 3 
percent temporary loan certificates still outstanding. The 3 percent 
certificates had been issued to banking associations as a temporary 
loan in 1867 and 1868 and most were then being held in Northeastern 
national banks as a portion of their reserve requirement. As the new- 
national bank notes were issued, the 3 percent certificates would be 
retired at the same rate, and their place as part of bank reserves
25southem newspapers strongly favored a "natural alliance" 
of the South and West against the Northeast on economic issues. See, 
for example, Richmond Whig. August 13, 1869, January 28, 1870;
Atlanta Constitution. July 15, 1870, March 3, IB7U; Daily Arkansas 
Gazette (little Rock), April 4, 1869; and Debow1 s Review (After the War 
SeriesJ, VII (October, 1869), 837-38.
2^ See Cong. Globe, 1+1 ConG., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 697-701, 9^»
Pt. 2, 970; for the initial text of S. 378, Senator John Sherman's 
explanation of the bill, the amendment adding redistribution, and the 
vote on final passage.
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would have to he filled with greenbacks. Thus the net effect would be 
to leave the volume of circulating medium at the same level. For every 
dollar of new national bank notes issued, an equal amount of 3 percent 
certificates would be retired, and an equal amount of greenbacks would 
be withdrawn from circulation to serve as bank reserves.To satisfy 
Southern and Western members, the Senate added a section to S. 378 
proposing a limited redistribution of $20 million in bank notes to be 
taken from states having more than their pro rata share and given to 
states in the South and West that had not received their quota of 
national bank notes. This section, however, provided that no redis­
tribution would take place until the $1+5 million in newly authorized
po
circulation was "taken up.
2?The 3 percent temporary loan certificates were issued by the 
Secretary of the Treasury as a stopgap measure in 1867 and 2J868 to 
meet government obligations to pay a large amount of maturing compound 
interest notes being presented by banks for payment. Congress had 
made the low-interest certificates more attractive by allowing banks 
to hold them as part of their required reserve in place of greenbacks. 
Theywere, according to Senator John Sherman, "the most dangerous and 
offensive form of Government indebtedness" because they were payable 
in greenbacks on demand or after ten days notice. Gherman feared that 
in event of a panic the government might be called upon to redeem them. 
Furthermore, if specie payments were resumed, the 3 percent certificates 
could become payable in gold. In part, Sherman's proposal to retire the 
certificates was simply a roundabout way to withdraw greenbacks from 
circulation without rousing popular animosity. Sherman acknowledged 
that withdrawing the greenbacks directly "would probably not receive 
the assent of the House," as "the greenbacks are a great favorite of 
the people." See Sherman's explanation in Cong. Globe. 1+1 Cong.,
2 Sess., Pt. 1, 700.
o O
eoFor the text of the amendment adding redistribution to S. 378, 
see Cong. Globe. 1+1 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 9W+. The Senate bill also 
contained two other less controversial provisions that were included 
in the final version as approved by both Houses. The first allowed 
any banking association established in a state having more than its 
sliare of bank note circulation to move to any state having less than 
its share of circulation. The second provision provided for banking 
on a gold basis. The requirements were similar to those established
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On June 9* 1870, Janies A* Garfield. (H-OH) of the House Committee 
on Banking and Currency reported S. 378 to the House with a committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute.^9 The amendment stipulated 
that $9? million of new bank notes be issued instead of $45 million.
The $95 million would cancel $45.5 million in 3 percent certificates . 
and $39-5 million in greenbacks. Thus the net addition to the circula­
ting currency would amount to only $10 million. 3® in addition, the 
substitute bill provided for a redistribution of $25 million in national 
bank notes instead of the $20 million as provided in the Senate bill.
A host of amendments, mostly inflationist, were offered during the 
House debate but only one was adopted. That amendment offered by 
Norman B. Judd (B-XL), struck the clause in the substitute bill which 
stipulated that $39*5 million of greenbacks would be retired along 
with the $45*5 million in 3 percent certificates.^ in its final foim,
for regular national banks, with the major exception that instead of 
being issued bank notes, the Comptroller of the Currency would issue 
"coin notes" to the banking association. The coin notes were redeem­
able upon presentation to the association in gold or silver coin.
This banking on a gold or specie basis was desired by areas (e.g., the 
West Coast, New Orleans, and New York) having a gold and silver circula­
tion and wishing to bank on that basis. The House modified this section 
by striking out the word silver.
29£he substitute bill was almost identical to a House bill 
(H. B. 1900} which had been under extensive discussion; see Cong.
Globe, 4l Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4176-94; 4224-44.
3°Some confusion existed as to the exact amount of 3 percent 
certificates that were outstanding. Senator Sherman used the figure 
of $45 million while Bepresentative Garfield used $45.5 million. The 
bill stipulated neither figure— but merely stated that all would be 
redeemed and canceled. The figures used herein are those used at 
the moment in debate.
31ibid., 4477. The yeas and nays were not ordered on the Judd 
amendment.
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the House substitute for S. 378 provided that an additional $5 million 
be redistributed, that $95 million of additional national bank notes 
be issued, and that $45.5 minion in 3 percent certificates be retired 
•which meant that a corresponding amount of greenbacks would be with­
drawn from circulation to replace them as bank reserves. The balance 
of $50 million in bank notes was the increase in the circulating medium 
asked by the Loughridge resolution. Members estimated that the House 
bill would, produce an inflation ranging from $11 million to $21.5
million.
Whatever its exact inflationary effect, the South and the Midwest 
again combined to pass the bill by a margin of 99-81 (see Table 4-4: B). 
The substitute bill represented a compromise between inflationists and 
contraction!sts in the House. Opposition to the bill included Northern 
Democrats and Northeastern Republicans— an unlikely combination of 
bank note-hating greehbackers, hard-money advocates, and. those who 
simply desired a more inflationary measure. The modest redistribution 
clause offered an additional reason for Northeasterners to oppose the
32No one seemed quite sure about the amount of inflation or 
increase in the circulating medium which the measure would produce, 
but two calculations were offered. The $95 million in bank notes 
would require a 20 percent cash bank reserve to be made up by with­
drawing at least $19 million in greenbacks from circulation. Thus the 
absolute increase of $50 million in bank note circulation, reduced by 
$19 million reserve requirement, yields an increase in actual circula­
tion of $31 million. Others argued that the actual inflation would be 
reduced further as the new banks required an additional 20 percent 
reserve to secure their deposits. If deposits in the new banks to 
be created by the measure amounted to $100 million, an additional $20 
million in greenbacks would have to be withdrawn from circulation to 
be held as a reserve on the deposits. Thus the actual inflation 
might be as low as $11 million. See GarfLeldfs discussion of the 
potential inflationary effect of the substitute bill in Cong. Globe,
41 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5> 4472-73.
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"bill. The South probably stood to gain the most from the hill and 
Southern Representatives responded by voting 2^-3 in favor of its
passage.33
Two conference committees were necessary to resolve the differ­
ences between the House and Senate on the substitute passed by the 
House. The first reported a bill agreeing to a redistribution of $25 
million as desired by the House, but the $95 million increase in bank 
note currency was reduced to $1*5 million as stipulated in the original 
Senate bill.3**- The House rejected the report of the first conference 
committee by a decisive margin of 53-127 and called for a new committee 
to represent the House in conference.35 House members on the second 
conference committee managed to raise the increase in bank notes to
33rhe three Democrats who opposed passage were Connor (TX), Dox 
(AL), and Shober (NC). Their vote on previous amendments indicates 
that they favored a more inflationary measure. All three represented 
heavily white, agricultural districts with a low level of per 
capita wealth and low land values. Such constituencies probably 
favored inflationary measures, but other Southerners, representing 
the same type of constituency, voted for the inflationary amendments 
and the House susbtitute bill. While the three Democrats stuck to 
their principles and voted against the bill, the other zh Southern 
Representatives were willing to take what they could get. As might 
have been anticipated, the three bankers among the Southerners led 
the way in supporting S. 378.
3**Cong. Globe, 1*1 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 1*91*8. The House 
representatives on first conference committee were Garfield, who 
opposed any increase in paper currency, Thomas L. Jones (D-KY), an 
ardent greeribacker with a thinly-disguised hatred for the national 
banking system, and Lionel A. Sheldon (R-LA) who favored currency 
inflation in any form. Garfield approved the conference report;
Jones and Sheldon were not pleased, but both were convinced that the 
Senate had yielded as much as it would. All three were roundly crit­
icized for not representing House opinion on the bill, see ibid., 
9^**9-50, 1*961-61*, 1*966-70.
35Ibid., 1*970.
$5h million, "but otherwise the bill remained unchanged. With the end
of the session only a week away, the House voted to take what they 
could get from a reluctant Senate and approved the hill by a margin of 
100-77. Southerners favored final passage 16-2.^
The Southern Representatives, both Democrats and Republicans,
tended to favor efforts to make the bill more inflationist. They
were obviously disappointed that they did not get more currency and
fuller redistribution, but carpetbagger Lionel A. Sheldon of New
Orleans seemed to sum up the reasons for the Southerners1 willingness
to take what they could get:
I believe in an expansion, and I believe it not only to the 
extent of $50,000,000, as contemplated by the gentleman fran. 
Illinois [Mr. Judd,] bub of $300,000,000; and I am willing to 
vote for it to-day, whether in greenbacks or national bank 
notes. But, Mr. Speaker, it is not always the case that a 
man can have what he wants. I suppose if the Senate should 
send to us a proposition to contract the currency we could 
defeat the Senate. We send to the Senate a proposition to 
expand the currency, and they can defeat us. Our demand is 
for additional legislation; they are satisfied without further 
legislation. I do not agree that this is all we want or ought 
to have; but I am not willing to deny to Louisiana the advantage 
of seven or eight millions more of banking capital because we 
cannot get all that I think we ought to have .3?
A survey of Southern newspapers indicates bipartisan support of
3^ibid., 5302-303. The two Democrats opposing the bill were 
Connor and Dox. Shober was absent. Future events proved that the 
South did not receive all it anticipated due to the wording of the 
bill to the effect that the $5h million would have to be "taken up" 
by new banks before any of the $25 million could be redistributed.
The manner in which the Comptroller of the Currency eventually inter­
preted this clause hindered assignment of the $5h million and thus 
effectively undid redistribution. See below, ch. VI; and Anderson, 
"The National Banking System," 298-312.
37cong. Globe, hi Cong,, 2 Sess., Pt. 6, h950.
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redistribution and currency expansion. The editor of the Richmond Whig, 
for example, concluded that "Increased banking capital is the peculiar 
want of the Southern States," and he endorsed a movement in the North 
Carolina legislature to instruct that state's Congressmen to procure 
"an increase in banking facilities."38 Regarding redistribution, the 
Whig's editor wondered "how long will it take the country to under­
stand that if all the vital fluid is confined to one part of the body, 
the other parts must wither and waste away? "39
The Whig favored currency expansion in any form and cautioned 
against urging immediate resumption of specie payments. Other con­
servative newspapers were often contradictory in their attitudes on 
the currency issue. The editor of the New Orleans Daily Picayune, for 
example, belittled inflationists "who live in terror of the contracting 
process through which we can return to a sound currency" and later 
lamented that "we have paper money, too much to count, and irredeemable 
at that." 1*0 Still, the editor approved of S. 378 and noted "that the 
South needs more currency is apparent to all engaged in business." 
Always suspicious of Republican motives, the Picayune editor suspected 
that the passage of S. 378 was a calculated maneuver to gain additional
^^Richmond Whig, December 17, 1869. See also Montgomery (AL) 
Advertiser as quoted in Debow1 s Review (After the War Series), VIII 
'(August, I870), 686.
39Richmond Whig, March 15, 1870. For other pleas for redistri­
bution, see, for example, ibid., February 24, I869, December 14, 1869, 
March 2, I87O; New Orleans Republican, November 23, 3870; We^ly 
North Carolina Standard (Raleigh), April 4, 1869; and Debow's Review 
(After the War Series), VIII (April-May, 1870), 349-51.
4°New Orleans Daily Picayune, January 21, 1869; July 16, I87O.
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Southern recruits for the Republican party, and he speculated that the 
currency expansion might he "more apparent than real," hut he con­
cluded, "whatever the motives, we must he thankful for .favors, even if 
small. 11 Ironically, the conservative editor was echoing the sentiments 
earlier expressed by Lionel A. Sheldon, the carpetbagger representing 
the Picayune's home district.^1
The Forty-First Congress produced no comprehensive revision of 
tariff schedules, hut during the Second Session, the House did debate 
a hill to reduce duties (H. R. 1068), and a portion of that bill was 
later grafted onto a hill to reduce internal taxes (H. R. 20^5). The 
House debate on H. R. 1068 indicates that most Representatives favored 
reduction of the high wartime duties hut differences emerged regarding 
the degree of revision and the specific items on which the duties were 
to he lowered.**2 The recorded roll calls on H. R. 1068 were not 
content-orientated, hut the yeas and nays were recorded on several 
related motions to reduce tariff duties. On May 27, 1870, for example, 
Norman B. Judd (R-IL) offered a motion to suspend the rules and pass
^ •Ibid., July 10, 1870. Regardless of how well Republicans might 
represent Southern interests on economic issues, they seldom received 
approval of the conservative press. Political affiliation meant so 
much to Southern conservatives that they might approve an inflationist 
proposal if offered by a Northern Democrat like Samuel Randall of 
Pennsylvania or William S. Holman of Indiana, and then turn around and 
disapprove of a similar measure sponsored by a Republican like Ben 
Butler of Massachusetts or Robert Ingersoll of Illinois. Other con­
servative newspapers simply ignored Republican sponsored economic 
measures that benefited the South— rather than give the Republicans 
credit. The Atlanta Constitution. a vehement critic of the national 
banking system, did not bother to comment on S. 378. See Atlanta 
Constitution. June 9, 23, 1870.
**%. R. 1068 was thoroughly debated in the House from March-May 
1870; see Cong. Globe, kl Cong., 2 Sess., Pfcs. 3 and k.
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a simple resolution to reduce duties on certain items.**3 In part, 
the Judd resolution represented the efforts of an impatient group of 
reductionists to bypass the Ways and Keans Committee, hut the division 
on the resolution does offer an indication of attitudes in the House 
on tariff reduction (see Table 4-5: A). The Democrats lined up solidly 
in favor of the motion, but the Republicans split, with well over a 
third of the party, led by the Midwesterners, joining the Democrats.
Southern Republicans were much more reluctant than their Midwestern 
colleagues to favor the resolution.1*1*
Southern Republicans better demonstrated their independence on 
other proposals for tariff reduction. The clearest evidence came 
on the vote on a resolution instructing the Committee on Ways and 
Means "to report to this House forthwith a bill reducing the present 
duties on all classes of salt fifty percent."1*? Southern and Mid­
western Republicans joined the Democrats to pass the resolution over 
the opposition of Northeastern Republicans (see Table 4-5: B). A 
small sample of similar votes and an examination of speeches on the 
tariff bill indicates that Southern Republicans favored reduction—
^3judd proposed reduction of duties on all sugars and salt by 
33 1 /3 percent, on coffee and tea by 20 percent, and on pig and scrap 
iron by 22 percent. Ibid., Pt. If, 3727.
^Ibid. The five Southern Republicans siding with the Democrats 
to vote for passage were Ayer (VA), Barry (MS), Dockery (NC), Heflin 
(Alt), and McKenzie (VA). Nothing was found in their backgrounds 
on constituency characteristics that might explain their voting 
behavior. With the occasional exception of Barry, all five consis­
tently supported duty reduction. All 14 Republicans opposing the 
resolution later supported proposals to reduce duties on specific 
items.
u?Ibid., Pt. 6, 4862.
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TABLE k-5: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY 
ON THE TARIFF ISSUE
A. To suspend the rules and pass the Judd resolution0.
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep
NE 3 18
MA 17 1* 25
MW Ik 3*f 16
SS 8 5 1^
BS 11 1 8
PS _2 _2 J. ^
Total 52 k9 1 81
Grand Total 101 82
B. To pass a resolution instructing the Committee on Hays and Means 
to report a bill reducing duties on salt by 50 percent
Yea Nay
Region Bern. Rep, Dem. Rep
NE 6 *« 9
MA 11 2 2k
MW 15 39 13
SS 5 1^ • « • •
BS 9 5 3
PS _2 _2 m 0 m m
Total k2 68 k9
Grand Total 110 k9
aCon£. Globe, 4l Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3727 (May 23, 1870). 
The resolution did not pass as a two-thirds majority was 
needed to suspend the rules.
bIbid., Pt. 6, U863 (June 27, 187<J>.
particularly on items widely used in the South. ^  But most Southern 
Republicans were not willing to abandon all of the protective features 
of the tariff in favor of free trade. Neither, however, were they as 
protectionist as Republicans from the New England and the Mid-Atlantic 
states.^
The House bill to reduce tariff duties was never put to a final 
vote, but most of its proposals were incorporated in a bill "to reduce 
internal taxes and for other purposes” (H. R. 2045). The measure 
gathered bipartisan support in both Houses, but the Democrats were 
inclined to favor a more drastic lowering of tariff duties. After 
considerable debate, H. R. 2045 easily passed the House by a margin 
of 152-35* Robert Schenck (R-PA), the floor leader for the bill, 
estimated that it would reduce internal taxes by $45 million and tariff 
duties by $25 million. ^9 The Senate returned the bill to the House 
with a large number of proposed amendments. On the few significant 
roll-call votes on the bill as amended the Democrats tended to vote 
as a unit in favor of reduction, but the Republicans were badly
^Southerners were adamant that duties be reduced or eliminated 
on certain items. See, for example, the rigorous, but unsuccessful 
efforts of two Alabama carpetbaggers (Buckley and Buck), to reduce 
the duties on cotton bagging materials; ibid., Pt. 3, 2695-96, 2257;
Pt. 6, 5^ 19*
**7See, for example, the speeches of Hays (R-AL), ibid., Pt. 3 
2202-204; McKenzie (R-VA), ibid., 2262-63; Perce (R-MS), ibid., 2697-98 
Connor (D-TX), ibid., 3042.
^Por the text of the amendment attaching tariff reduction to 
H. R. 2045, and the vote on its passage, see Cong. Globe, 4l Cong.,
2 Sess., Pt. 5j 4090-91. The amendment included sections listing 
the new duties on certain items, and considerably expanded the number 
of items on the free list. The amendment passed 137-44. Democrats who 
favored greater reduction in tariff duties made up the opposition.
^Ibid., 4091, 4107
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spilt. A sizable number of Southern and Midwestern Republicans, for 
example, voted with the Democrats to concur in a Senate amendment to 
abolish a series of special taxes (see Table 4-6: A).
The conference committee called to resolve differerences between 
the two Houses on H. R. 2045 submitted its report on July 13, 1870.
In its final form the bill reduced internal taxes and tariff duties 
by an estimated $80 million. Most popular seemed to be the reductions 
on such common commodities as coffee, sugar, spices, and certain 
kinds of liquor. In addition, a large number of items (mostly drugs) 
were added to the free list.5° The reductions, however, were not 
enough to satisfy the Democrats, some of whom were quick to point out 
that the duties were raised on certain items manufactured in Hew 
England.'**' As Table 4-6: B indicates, most Democrats opposed passage 
of the bill. Southerners, including three or four Democrats, were 
apparently satisfied with the reductions and voted for the measure by 
a margin of 19-2. The conservative Southern press reprinted the 
provisions of the bill, but most editors refrained from comment— an 
indication of backhanded approval. 52
5°The revised estimation of $80 million was cited by Schenck 
during his final explanation of the bill. The figure must have been 
fairly accurate as it was not challenged by the Democrats, see ibid.,
Pt. 6, 5517* For the text of H. R. 204? as passed, see ibid., Pt. 7, 
Appendix, 701-707.
5-**See in particular the charges brought against the bill by Samuel 
S. Cox and James Brooks, two New York Democrats, and Schenck*s countering 
remarks, ibid., Pt. 6, 5517-22.
52See, for example, New Orleans Daily Picayune, July 20, 21, 1870j 
Atlanta Constitution, June 9, 1870, Richmond Whig, July 12, 19, 1870, 
December 31, 1876"; Tuskaloosa (AL) Independent Monitor, November 1,
I87O; and Debow*s Review (After the War Series), VIII (August, 1870),
i£ o
TABLE If-6: A and B 
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY ON H. R. 2045
A. To concur in a Senate amendment to H. R. 2045 to abolish special 
taxes8.
Yea Nay
Region Bern. Rep. Dan. Rep.
NE 1 9 • • 9
MA 15 9 • a 20
MW 12 28 ♦ • 25
SS 4 12 1 9
BS 12 • • e • 9
PS 2 2 '* * • 0
Total 46 60 1 72
Grand Total 106 73
0 adopt the conference report on H.
Yea
R. 2045b
Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE 1 20 • a • •
MA • • 37 20 a •
MW * * 52 03 1
SS 3 16 lc ld
BS 2 11 11 • a
PS 1 2 _2 • aT r ^ "T
Total 7 138 47 2
Grand Total 145 49
aCong. Globe, Ul Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5417 (July 9, IB70), 
bIbid., 5522 (July 13, 1570). 
cSherrod (AL). 
dHays (AL).
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One internal levy not eliminated toy H. R. 20^5 was the income 
tax— another product of the wartime search for revenue. Northeastern 
Republicans and most Northern Democrats conducted a strong campaign 
to repeal the income tax. Considerable sentiment for its abolition 
also existed among conservative Southern newspapers. The Atlanta 
Constitution, for example, referred to it as "odious,” and the New 
Orleans Prices Current declared that such a tax was clearly uncon­
stitutional. 53 & scalogram of the significant roll calls on the matter 
(see Tables h-7: A and k-7: B) indicates that Republicans from the 
Southern, Midwestern, and Border states favored retention of the 
income tax, although many were willing to increase the exemption from 
$1,500 to $2,000 (scale position l) and several favored reducing the
686. Only the Richmond Whig commented (favorably) on the bill. Other 
Southern newspapers appeared to toe more interested in the outbreak of 
the Franco-Frussian War than they were with the bill to reduce internal 
taxes.
The bill did prompt an encounter between one Southern Senator 
and a rabidly conservative newspaper in his heme state that reveals 
the kind of irrational opposition which occasionally greeted Southern 
Republicans. Senator George E. Spencer, a carpetbag Senator from 
Alabama, had sent the editor of the Tuskaloosa Independent Monitor a 
copy of his speech on the tax and tariff bill. The editor indignantly 
dismissed Spencer's speech and noted, with a certain amount of pride, 
that "We did not even look to see what side of the question the 
Senatorial adventurer took. . . .  We will not thank the toad-resembling 
Senator1 for his remembrance of the 'Monitor'." In that speech, 
Spencer had been very defensive of Southern economic interests and 
had called for complete repeal of duties on tea and coffee and for 
reductions on gunny cloth and sacks and cotton bagging materials. See 
Independent Monitor, July 19, 1870; and Cong. Globe, 5l Cong., 2 Sess., 
Pt. 6, 9^27-2$.' ibe Monitor ranked among the most vehement critics of 
all things Republican; for a sampling, see Sarah Van V. Woolf oik, "The 
Political Cartoons of the Tuskaloosa Independent Monitor and Tuskaloosa 
Blade. 1867-1873," Alabama Historical Quarterly, XXVTT (Fb.11 and Winter, 
19^ 1^0-66.  ------
^Atlanta Constitution, July 12, 1870, February 28, 1871; New 
Orleans Prices Current, January 3, 1873,
TABLE U-7: A
INCOME TAX SCALOGRAM:
REGIONAL AND PARTY DISTRIBUTION OP SCALE POSITIONS
REGION AN!D PARTY
Scale
Position
NE 
D R D
MA
R D
MW
R D
SS
R
BS 
D R D
PS
R
Total 
D R
0 • *
5
• •
2
3
20
1
4
3
5
* ■
♦ m
7
36
1 • •
2
1
3
1
20
2
7
1
3
• •
• •
5
35
2
1
1
8
1
5
« *
6
1
3
« •
• *
3
23
3 • ■
5
• •
8
b
3
1
5
• •
• «
♦ «
* •
5
21
b • •
10
18
15
5
3
2
1
7
• •
3
2
35
31
Total .. 23 20 36 11* 51 6 23 12 11 3 2 55 11*6
Coefficient of reproducibility = .978
TABLE U-7: B 
ITEMS IN INCOME TAX SCALOGRAM
Scale
Position
0
1
2
3
h
Identification
To amend H. R. 20**5 by increasing the amount of income
exempted from $1,500 to $2,000. 138-52; + = YEA.
Cong. Globe. Ul Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 5> **063 (June 3f 
1570).
To amend H. R. 20^5 by reducing the income tax rate from
5$ to %. 11^-76; + = YEA. Ibid.
To suspend rules and pass a bill to repeal the income tax 
(H. R. 299*0 * 91-116; + = YEA. Ibid.. 4l Cong.,
3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1851 (March 2, 1871)7
To suspend rules and strike out a section in a Senate 
amendment to H. R. 20**5 relating to the income tax. 
67- H 6; + = YEA. Ibid., lfl Cong., 2 Sess., Ft. 6,
5**15 (July 9, 187071
rate from 5 percent to 3 percent (scale position 2).^ But most Repub­
licans from the South and Midwest apparently viewed the tax as a just 
means of securing revenue as very few of their constituents had to pay 
the tax. It has been estimated, for example, that only 250,000 
citizens paid a tax on their income in 1868.^5 During the House dehate 
on the measure, carpetbagger Logan H. Roots of Arkansas summarized the 
arguments of the supporters of the tax. Roots declared that "it is 
my most positive opinion that the demand of the people is that the rich 
men who are accumulating wealth rapidly should continue to pay an 
income tax. Most Southern Republicans apparently agreed, and they 
were willing to vote against the unlikely combination of conservative 
Southern newspapers and Northeastern Republicans who wanted to retain 
the tax.
Of all the economic measures considered during the Forty-First 
Congress, those calling for federal appropriations and subsidies for 
a variety of internal improvement projects commanded the most attention 
and created the most controversy. Substantial disagreement developed, 
for example, when a Massachusetts Republican offered an amendment to 
strike from a public works bill appropriations for all new public 
projects not already commenced. In part, the amendment was a serious
5^No significant correlation was found between position on the 
income tax issue and such member characteristics as personal wealth. 
Milnes (D-VA), the wealthiest of the Southerners, favored abolishing 
the tax while Hays (R-AL), the second wealthiest, voted to retain the 
tax. A moderate correlation (gamma = .3^), existed between scale 
position and the percent agricultural index— in that members from heav­
ily agricultural districts tended to vote against abolishing the tax.
- - ^patterson, Federal Debt-Management Policies» 116.
^Cong. Globe, 1*1 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 5> *+308. See also the 
speech of Hays (R-AL), ibid., Pt. 2, 2202-20h.
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effort to cut government expeditures, but the retrenchment was to be 
accomplished primarily at the expense of the South, whose Repre­
sentatives had offered numerous proposals for new federally-funded 
projects (e.g., public buildings). The amendment carried over the 
opposition and protests of most Southerners (see Table 4-6: A). On 
the surface, the issue seems of little consequence, but securing 
federal appropriations for district projects was particularly impor­
tant to the survival of Southern Republicans. They received little 
assistance from New England Republicans who voted 21-5 for the amend­
ment . 57
Southerners were usually unanimous in their support of federal 
subsidies, in the form of land grants, to aid in the construction of 
internal improvement projects— even those outside the South. They, 
for example, voted 25-1 for a bill granting a right of way and ten 
alternate sections of public land per mile to the Oregon Central 
Railroad to build a line frcm Portland to Astoria and McMinnville.^ 
They probably did so in the hope that west coast Representatives would 
return the favor on similar projects in the South (see Table 4-8: B).
The internal improvement measure most vital to Southern interests 
was the bill incorporating and subsidizing the Texas-Pacific Railroad 
Company which was considered and passed late in the Third Session when
See the comments of Stevenson Archer (D-MD) regarding the 
effect of the amendment on Southern projects in Cong. Globe, 4l Cong..
3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1756.
5®For the text of the bill, see ibid., 4l Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 7, 
Appendix, 644-45.
a£6
TABIC k-Q: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY 
ON APPROPRIATIONS AND SUBSIDIES
A. To amend H. R* 30&U to strike out appropriations for every new 
puDlic work not already commenced8.
Yea Nay
Region Den. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
• •
5 
k 
* • 
1 
m m
21 
25 
37 
11 
6 
■ m_
1
15
11
10
11
_2
b
10
13
19
If
_2
Total 10 100 50 52
Grand Total 110 102
0 pass S. 396 granting public lands 
line in Oregon8
for a railroad and telegraph
Region
Yea 
Dem. Rep. Dem.
Nay
Rep.
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
• «
a *
6
7 
• •
11
18
25
18
7
_2
» a
33
7
1
9 
• •
5 
Ilf 
18 
9 • 
2 
• »
Total 16 81 30 39
Grand Total 97 69
aCong. Globe,> Ifl Cong,>, 3 Sess., Pb. 3, 1756-57 (February 28, 1971)
bIbid., 1*1 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. h, 3110 (April 29, 1870).
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the South was finally at full strength in the House. During the Second 
Session the Senate had passed a hill (S. 647) "to aid in the construc­
tion of a railroad and telegraph line from Marshall, Texas, to San 
Diego, California, with branches and connections." S. 647 provided for 
the trunk line and six branch lines— all of which were granted subsidies 
of a right of way and twenty alternate sections of public land per 
mile, as well as the usual rights to resources on adjacent lands. The 
bill granted an estimated twenty-six million acres of the public 
domain to the proposed trunk and branch lines. ^9
The Senate's Texas-Pacific bill was not considered at any length 
in the House until the last month of the Third Session. On February 
21, 1S70, William A. Wheeler (R-NY), chairman of the House Committee 
on the Pacific Railroad, reported S. 647 to the House with a proposed 
amendment that altered everything in the bill after the enacting clause.
5^The Senate's Texas-Pacific bill (originally referred to as the 
Southern-Pacific bill), replaced the proposed Memphis, £1 Paso and 
Pacific route which had passed the House during the Third Session of 
the Fortieth Congress (see above, ch. III). The House had repassed 
the bill during the First Session of the Forty-First Congress, but the 
Senate defeated it. The Richmond Whig reported "rumors" to the effect 
that the Senate had defeated the biU because it granted no subsidies 
other than the right of way and the Senators feared that it might set 
a precedent. The editor of the Whip, however, suspected that the 
negative reaction of the Senate was simply more evidence of sectional 
prejudice against the South. But given the liberal subsidies for the 
Texas-Pacific granted in the Senate bill, the rumors probably had some 
basis in fact. See Cong. Globe, 4l Cong., 1 Sess., 196; Richmond Whig 
April 31 1869. For background on previous efforts to establish a 
Southern route to the Pacific as well as the Texas-Pacific proposal, 
see Lewis H. Haney, A Congressional History of Railways in the United 
States. I85Q-I877 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1910), II, 
120-126; C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of
1877 and the End of Reconstruction '(Boston: Little, Brown, “1951), 
70-73; and Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of Canals and Rail­
roads, 1800-1890 (New York: Columbia University Press, I960), 194-96.
l£8
The effect of the amendment was to subsidize only the trunk line. 
Wheeler explained to a generally approving House that by cutting the 
branch lines out of the bill the land subsidies would be reduced to 
13 milH.on acres. Wheeler was very sensitive to what he referred to as 
"the growing dislike of the American people to these large grants to 
corporations," and he assured the House that the 'bill grants no 
solitary acre of land upon which the cereals can be grown without 
artificial irrigation.
Northern Representatives quickly proclaimed their opposition to 
the bill as amended. One Pennsylvania Democrat bluntly declared that 
"these magnificent endowments to railway corporations by grants and 
subsidies are undermining republican virtue," and another Democrat 
attempted to interrupt the debate "to have read a petition from the 
citizens of New Jersey against the absorption of the public domain by 
land grants to railroad corporations."^1 Even so staunch a Republican 
as James A. Garfield declared that he would not support the measure 
unless subsidies for the branch lines were emitted and guarantees were 
given that no money subsidies or loans on the credit of the government 
were given to aid the railroad. The Wheeler amendment to S. 3^7 met 
Garfield's requirements and he echoed the sentiment of other Northern 
Republicans when he declared, "that as a great act of commercial justice
6°Cong. Globe, Hi Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1H70, IH72. Wheeler also
noted that the bill granted no public lands in Texas as the government
owned no land in the state. For the dealings between the Texas- 
Pacific Company and the Texas legislature for subsidies, see Goodrich, 
Government Promotion of Canftl« and Ra11 roads, 22H-25-
6lCong. Globe, Hi Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, lH71, lU?3.
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to the South) Congress should, by grant of public lands, aid the people
of the South and Southwest to build a great continental line of road,
as we have aided to build a line across the North and the center. "62
In his final arguments, Wheeler justified the bill as "a most important
and potent element in the reconstruction of the South." In Wheeler's
opinion the Southern route would
bring the South into direct contact with northern men, northern 
progress, northern ideas and capital, and in the general 
commingling of interests, in the general prosperity, and in the 
new enterprises opened to the South, the feelings of antagonism 
engendered by the late war will be sure to fade out. "63
The House approved the Wheeler amendment, and the biU passed 136-70.61*
62ibid., 11*70-71.
63lbid., lh73.
^For the text of the bill as amended by the House, see ibid., 
11*68-69. Only two Southern Republicans, Degener (HX) and Buckley (AL), 
opposed amending S. 6U7. Degener opposed the House bill because it did 
not provide for a connecting line to the major cities in his district 
(San Antonio, Austin, and Corpus Christl). Buckley's opposition was 
based on the fact that the House amendment provided that the Texas- 
Pacific have a "uniform gauge" and not the standard Southern five-foot 
gauge as the Senate bill had provided. Buckley's complaint was well 
justified as the South had over 12,000 miles of railroad with a five- 
foot gauge whereas the standard gauge on Northern railroads was 1* feet, 
85 inches. If the directors of the Texas-Pacific Company so chose, 
they could build the line on the Northern gauge, making it incompatible 
with Southern rolling stock. Despite Buckley's persistent questioning, 
Wheeler would not admit why the gauge was not specified nor did he 
allow Buckley to move to amend the bill to require a five-foot gauge. 
Frank Morey of Louisiana, another carpetbagger, declared that Wheeler 
clearly intended the Texas-Pacific to become a feeder to the Northern 
lines and that "it would cost the South $70 million to change the gauge 
to the Northern standard of 4 feet, 8§- inches." The two carpetbaggers 
defended the South and sharply denounced the Northeastemers with fire- 
eating rhetoric. Their actions and rhetoric should have been applauded 
by Southern conservatives— but the section's conservative press made no 
mention of their able defense of Southern interests. Two other South­
erners, Whitmore (R-TX) and Harris (R-MS), also made major speeches 
favoring the bill. No Southern Democrat spoke on the bill. See ibid., 
11*88-72 (Buckley-Wheeler exchange); ibid.. Pt. 3» Appendix, 175-76 
(Morey's speech), 177-78 (Whitmore's speech), 237-38 (Harris's speech).
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The Senate refused to agree to S. 6k7 as amended by the House and 
the bill vent to a conference committee. On March 3, 1871, the last 
day of the Congress, Wheeler submitted the conference repo it to the 
House. Two significant changes had been made in the House version of 
the bill. One added a branch line from the eastern terminal, to New 
Orleans via the Red River Valley; the other provided authorization for 
the Southern Pacific Railroad to connect with the new line by estab­
lishing a route running from Tehachapl through Los Angeles to connect 
with the trunk line at or near the Colorado River.
The two branch lines, added at the insistence of the Senate, were 
Justified by the advantages of connecting the line with the New Orleans 
and the San Francisco ports. The two branches added between five and 
six million acres of the public domain to the thirteen million acres 
granted to the trunk line. Wheeler reassured the restless House 
members that most of the additional subsidy was desert land and the 
House passed what proved to be the last huge subsidy for railroad 
construction. The South voted 4h-0 for the bill; the Pacific states 
6-0, and the border states 15-2. Support in the Northeast was more 
reserved; New England favored passage 12-9, and the vote in the Middle 
Atlantic states was 27-21. The Midwestern states, the South's occasional
^For the conference report see Cong. Globe, lfl Cong., 3 Sess.,
Pt. 3, 1899- The beneficiary of the subsidy to build the eastern 
branch was the New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Vicksburg Railroad Company. 
One of the three House members of the conference committee was William 
C. Sherrod (D-AL). That a Southern freshman Democrat should be selected 
to serve on an important conference committee was highly unusual at 
this time. Sherrod was a former slaveholder, but he had a record as a 
unionist and he had supported Douglas in i860. See Biographical Direc­
tory, 1690; Sherrod to Andrew Johnson, November 23, 1&65; Joseph C. 
Bradley to Andrew Johnson, November 22, 1865, Amnesty Papers, Alabama.
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ally, voted against the measure ty a margin of 23-33*^
There was little doubt that the South desired the long-sought 
route to the Pacific along the 32nd parallel. Even such conservative 
papers as the New Orleans Picayune and the Atlanta Constitution were 
enthusastic about the Texas-Pacific grant. ^  But in comparison to the 
earlier grants to the Union Pacific and the Northern Pacific, the grant 
to the Texas-Pacific was small. The company received no bonds or 
money subsidies, its bond issues were not to be guaranteed by the 
government, and the public lands were not of the quality or the quantity 
that had been granted to the other transcontinental railroads.6® Yet 
the Southerners gladly took what they could get. As the scalogram on 
the Texas-Pacific issue indicates, most Northeastern and Midwestern 
Democrats opposed the bill (see Table k-9% A), Republican support was 
moderate in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states, but Midwestern 
Republicans provided only grudging backing to the bill. Representatives 
from the Southern, border, and Pacific states scaled high in support of 
the measure.
The tone of the House debate on the Texas-Pacific bill forecast
66cong. Globe, lfl Cong., 3 Sess., Pfc. 3, 1889-1900.
^Tsew Orleans Daily Picayune, March 4, 1871; Atlanta Constitution, 
March 5, 1871; April 21, 1B71. Both papers had previously spoken 
against the policy of granting public lands to aid in the construction 
of railroads; see, for example, Picayune, June 17, I87O; and the Con­
stitution, January 16, 20, I869, July 13, 1870, March 1, 3, 1871. Most 
other Southern newspapers were consistent supporters of continued 
federal subsidies for internal improvements.
^®For a comparison of the size of land grants to the trans­
continental lines, see Goodrich, Government Pranotion of American 
Canals and Railroads, ch. 5*
TABLE 4-9: A
TEXAS-PACIFIC SCALOGRAM:
REGIONAL AND PARTY DISTRIBUTION OF SCALE POSITIONS
REGION m I PARTY
Scale
Position D
NE
R D
MA
R D
MW
R D
SS
R
BS 
D R D
PS
R
Total 
D R
0 • *
6
9
7
11
21
• •
1*
1
• •
• *
• ♦
21
35
1 « *
3
2
2
V •
4
■ •
• •
2
• •
• •
■ ■
4
9
2 • *
1
3
1
• •
4
• *
• •
• *
• *
• •
t «
3
6
3 1
* •
* •
2
1
2
• •
• »
» •
» %
• •
♦ •
2
4
4 • *
1
• •
1
1
2
2
1
2
• *
• •
1
5
6
5 + *
11
5
23
3
22
12
34
6
10
3
1
29
101
Total 1 22 19 36 16 55 14 36 11 10 3 2 64 l6l
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .978 
aDegener (R-TX).
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TABLE 4-9: B 
ITEMS HI TEXAS-PACIFIC RAILROAD SCALOGRAMa
Scale
Position Identification
To consider S. 64-7 as amended by the House Committee on 
the Pacific Railroad. 143-50; + = YEA. Cong. Globe,
41 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1470 (February 21, 1871).
To suspend rules, and have the House insist upon their 
amendments to S. 647 and agree to a conference committee. 
137-595 + “ SEA. Ibid.. Pt. 3, 1759 (February 28, 1871).
To suspend rules, and take S. 647 from Speaker's table
and to refer it to the Committee on the Pacific Railroad 
with leave to report at any time after February 15,
1871. 129-61; + = YEA. Ibid., Pt. 2, 999 (February 6, 
1871).
To agree to conference report on S. 647. 125-645 + = YEA.
Ibid., Pt. 3, 1900 (March 3, 1871).
To pass S. 647 as amended by the House. 136-70; + = YEA.
Ibid., Pt. 2, 1470 (February 21, 1871).
difficulty for future proposals for federally-subsidized, projects. The 
measure gathered Northern support almost solely on the strength of 
the argument that the South should have its own route to the Pacific.
The House appeared particularly sensitive to Northern sentiment that 
the public domain should he reserved for settlers and not given to 
corporations. The prospects for continued subsidies dimmed still 
further when the Credit Mob ill er scandal was exposed in 1872. At the 
conclusion of the Forty-First Congress, the South faced increasingly 
frustrating times in its quest for an equal share of federal subsidies 
for internal improvements.
The South1 s economic interests were well represented by the 
section's thirty-nine Republicans and fifteen Democrats in the Forty- 
First House. The South was of a divided mind on the public credit and 
funding issues. If certain areas of the South favored paying govern­
ment bonds in greenbacks, other sectors liked the promise of an early 
return to specie payments and placing the credit of the government on 
a sound financial basis. The South certainly approved of redistribution 
of the national bank currency and Improved banking facilities for the 
section. Certain sections of the South undoubtedly desired a greater 
inflation of the currency— as did most Southern Representatives. But 
it was the Senate, not the House, that set the limits on currency 
expansion. On the other hand, the modest expansion finally approved 
did not arouse the displeasure of hard-money elements in the South. 
Similarly, the moderate reduction in tariff duties did not satisfy 
Southern advocates of free trade, but reductions beneficial to the 
South were made on certain widely used commodities. The more sub-
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stairtlal reductions in internal taxes should bare found favor in all 
portions of the South. Finally, Southern Republicans and Democrats 
clearly represented the interests of their section on questions of 
continuing federal subsidies for internal improvements. The passage 
of the Texas-Pacific hill was a major achievement for Southerners—  
particularly since it was the first, and last, large subsidy the 
section would receive from the federal government.
The creditable voting record of Southern Representatives, partic­
ularly the Republicans, on economic issues was neither praised nor 
damned by the section's conservative press. But if Southern Repub­
licans could not be attached for their response to economic issues, 
they were vulnerable for their support of civil rights and reconstruction 
legislation. Their open activity in this area led Speaker of the House 
James G. Blaine (R-ME) to conclude that the Southern Republicans in the 
Forty-first House "were doomed to a hopeless struggle against the 
influence, the traditions, [and] the hatred of a large majority of the 
white men of the South. "^9 If conservative newspapers accurately 
reflected public opinion, the question of home rule remained paramount 
in the Southern mind. Wien Southerners assessed the work of the Forty- 
First Congress, they thought only of the measures of political recon­
struction— particularly the two force acts and another, harsher measure 
that was in the offing. The force bills, in fact, seemed to provide an 
additional impetus for the inevitable process of redemption. The
69jgjmes G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress: From TAnpnip to 
Garfield. (2 vols., Norwich, CT: The Henry Bill Publishing Company,
1886), II, UH8 .
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Southern Republicans were obviously caught in a bind. To vote for the 
force bills, as most did, would only bring them additional abuse and 
the increased opposition of Southern conservatives, but if they voted 
against the force bills they would betray their party and risk their 
already slim chances of survival in Southern politics. As it was, 
only 1*6 percent of the Southern Representatives were re-elected to 
the Forty-Second House and only 2k percent survived to serve in the 
Forty-Third House.
Finally, in reference to the Beard-Beale thesis, it is quite 
dear that the Northeastern Republicans did not dictate how Southern 
Republicans should vote on economic issues. On most such issues, 
in fact, Southern Republicans found themselves opposing Republicans 
from the New England and Middle Atlantic states. The alliance between 
the South and Vest against the Northeast was especially evident on 
the important currency and redistribution questions, but the coalition 
broke down on the issue of continuing federal subsidies. Southern 
Representatives, for example, found greater support among Northeastern 
rather than among Midwestern Republicans for the Texas-Pacific bill. 
Economic issues dearly transcended party lines in the Forty-First 
House and the Southern interests were well served by its Representatives.
CHAPTER V
THE FORTY-SECOND HOUSE
The Forty-Second Congress convened in the first of three sessions 
on March 4, 1871. The Republicans retained a sizable majority in both 
branches, but for the first time since the Thirty-Ninth Congress, the 
party bad less than a two-thirds majority In the House of Repre­
sentatives.^ - The Forty-Second Congress passed a record number of acts 
and resolutions, but in terms of significant economic legislation, it 
was the least productive of the Reconstruction Congresses.2 The only- 
major piece of economic legislation it adopted was a downward revision 
of the tariff enacted during the Second Session. The House did, how-
-*The Republicans numbered between 57 and 58 percent of the total 
membership. The Tribune Almanac set the figures at 138 Republicans 
and 103 Democrats, and George B. Galloway gives party membership as 139 
and 104 respectively— which tally to a correct total membership of 243. 
The Biographical Directory and Congressional Globe list 25k members 
with 253 voting— a split of 147 Republicans and 106 Democrats. The 
member not voting was James McC leery, an obscure Louisiana carpetbagger 
who did not attend the First Session because of an illness resulting 
in his death before the beginning of the Second Session. See The 
Tribune Almanac and Political Register For 1B72 (Hew York: The Tribune
Association, 1972), 51-52; George B. Galloway, History of the House of 
Representatives (Hew York; Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 196l)', 296'; 
Biographical Directory, 198-202; Cong. Globe, k2 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 
ix-xii; ibid., k2 Cong.. 2 Sess., Index, adL-xiv; ibid., 1*2 Cong.,
3 Sess., Pt. 1, ix-xii.
^The House passed 531 public acts and resolutions and 481 private 
acts and resolutions. The total of 1012 was not exceeded until the 
Forty-Ninth Congress (1885-1887). See Galloway, History of the House, 
304.
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ever, consider other economic subjects. Some indication of attitudes 
on such Issues as internal taxation, the currency question, and sub­
sidies for internal improvements can be determined from scattered roll- 
call votes on those items.
All ten Southern states were entitled to membership in the Forty- 
Second House, bub the section's fifty seats were rarely completely 
filled. Texas did not hold elections to the House until October I870—  
well after the First Session— and contests and deaths created additional 
vacancies during the three sessions. 3 The South was, however, more 
fully represented than it had been in the two preceding Houses. Fifty- 
five men occupied the fifty Southern seats during the course of the 
Congress.
The twenty-four Southern Democrats and thirty-one Republicans 
were unevenly distributed among the ten Southern states. The dele­
gations from Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina remained 
solidly Republican, but Alabama sent three Republicans and three 
Democrats, and Democrats formed a majority in the delegations of 
Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia. Texas claimed the first 
solidly-Democratic delegation when Democrat De Witt C. GlddLngs un­
seated Republican incumbent William T. Clark on May 13, 1372, near the 
end of the Second Session. The Republicans consisted of twelve scala­
wags, fourteen carpetbaggers, and five blacks. But as time passed,
^Texas held elections to the House on October 3-6, 1371. One of 
the Texas Representatives was seated late and another, carpetbagger 
William T. Clark, was seated in January 1872 and unseated in May by 
Democrat De Witt C. GiddLngs.
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contests and deaths thinned the Republican ranks. Initially, twenty- 
one Democrats, ten scalawags, fourteen carpetbaggers, and five blacks 
made up the Southern delegation. By the middle of the Third Session, 
the delegation was nearly balanced, with Democrats holding twenty- 
four seats, scalawags eleven, carpetbaggers eleven, and blacks three. 
The fiftieth Southern seat was vacant.^ The Democratic gains clearly 
reflected the redemption process In the South, but the advances were 
only temporary. Proportionally, the Southern Democrats lost seats in 
the 1872 elections— largely because of the attempted fusion between 
Democrats and Liberal Republicans in support of Horace Greeley's 
challenge to President Grant.
Among all House members, whose median age was years, the 
Southerners were again the youngsters with over 60 percent under the 
age of forty.5 The age profiles by party are similar to those in 
preceding Congresses. Nearly half the Democrats were over the age of 
forty-five while the same percentage of Republicans were under thirty- 
five years of age. The youngest was twenty-eight year old Josiah T. 
Walls, the black first-tenner from Florida, but five others, including 
one Democrat and two blacks, were trader thirty. The oldest was the 
well-traveled John Edwards (R-AR), who at sixty-five was the oldest 
carpetbagger to serve during Reconstruction.
**In one of several contested elections, a South Carolina seat 
was finally declared vacant during the Third Session, when the House 
could not satisfactorily unravel the dispute between Robert De Large, 
the seated member, and his challenger, scalawag C. C. Bowen.
'’The median age for all members of the Forty-Second House was 
45.^1 and for first termers Ult-.jlf. See Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative 
Methods in Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 297.
The trend toward native representation continued. Thirty-six of 
the Representatives (including four of the five blacks) had been bom 
in slave states, seventeen in free states, and two were foreign bom. 
The fifty-five Southerners were also better educated than their prede­
cessors. Only four possessed no formal education, and while eighteen 
had not progressed beyond the elementary level, 67 percent had gone to 
college and k5 percent had taken one or more degrees. Among the whites, 
the carpetbaggers were again the best educated with nearly 80 percent 
having attended college for seme period of time. Two-thirds of the 
Democrats had college experience but only l+l percent of the scalawags 
had attended college. Most of the blacks bad been denied access to 
formal education.^
^The blacks varied considerably in education. Benjamin S. Turner 
(Mi) had apparently attained a fair education by "clandestine study." 
Josiah wails (FL) had only a "rudimentary education," but he could read 
and write well and later was admitted to the Florida bar. According to 
a recent account, Joseph C. Rainey (SC) was "barely literate” although 
he received some education while in Bermuda during the war. Robert C.
De large (SC) had graduated from high school in Charleston after the 
war. Robert B. Elliott (SC), a lawyer, appeared to be the best trained 
of the group, but his biographer found no evidence that he had been 
educated at Eton College in England as he claimed. See Biographical 
Directory, 8*+5 (be Large), 908 (Elliott), 1581 (Rainey), 1835 (Turner), 
1874 (Walls); Peggy Damson, The Glorious Failure: Black Congressman 
Robert Brown Elliott and the Reconstruction in South Carolina (Hew York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1973)> 26-28; Bnily Bellinger Reynolds 
and Joan Reynolds Fount (comps.), Biographical Directory of the Senate 
of the State of South Carolina, 1776-196^ (Columbia: South Carolina
Archives Department, 19*S), 295 (Rainey); Okon Edet Yya, From Slavery 
to Public Service: Robert Smalls, 1839-1915 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1917), 163 (Rainey); and Peter David Klingman,
"Josiah Walls: Florida's Black Congressman of Reconstruction” (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1972), 15. For 
biographical data on the three South Carolina blacks, see Joel William­
son, After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965); and for all 
the black congressmen, see Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, "Negro Congressmen 
A Generation After," Journal of Negro History, VII (April, 1922), 127-71 
Samuel Denny Smith, The Negro in Congress, 1870-1901 (Chapel Hill:
lSl
Sixty-seven percent of the Representatives had resided in the 
South in i860. Thirteen (eleven Democrats and two scalawags) had been 
slaveholders and two were formerly slaves. Of the twenty-one whose 
antebellim political affiliations are known, eight were Democrats 
(seven Democrats and one scalawag), nine were Whigs (six Democrats 
and three scalawags), and four, all carpetbaggers, were Republicans.
Two Democrats are known to have supported Breckinridge while two favored 
Douglas and. two were Bell men. Most Democrats and scalawags had taken 
a unionist or cooperationist stance during the secession crisis* Only 
three, all Democrats, were found to be secessionists; thirty-nine were 
unionists, and the position of thirteen (nine Democrats and four scala­
wags) remains unknown. During the war, twenty-three (seventeen Democrats 
and six scalawags) sided with the Confederacy, seventeen (including one 
Democrat and one scalawag) served the Union, and thirteen (including 
five Democrats and four scalawags) did not participate on either side.
lawyers continued to increase their dominance in the Southern 
delegations. Sixty-four percent of the Southerners claimed the prac­
tice of law as their primary vocation while only 20 percent were 
involved principally in agriculture. The remainder consisted of five 
merchants and businessmen, two bankers, one engineer, one barber, and 
one livery stable owner. For the thirty-three whose real and personal 
estate holdings were discovered, fifteen were worth less than $10,000, 
six claimed property valued between $10,000 and $20,000, and twelve 
admitted to an estate worth over $20,000. A cross-tabulation of party
University of North Carolina Press, 19**0); and Maurine Cristopher, 
America's Black Congressman (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company *
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and wealth indicates that the Democrats were the wealthiest and the 
scalawags the poorest. For seventeen (of twenty-four) Democrats the 
median position for real and personal estate holdings was $lU,000 
(average $3^,782); for eight (of twelve) scalawags, the median wealth 
was $1),250 (average $ 1 3 , 7 9 9 ) The average wealth in hoth cases was 
raised considerably by the five Democrats and one scalawag who were 
worth more than $30,000. The wealthiest was a thirty-three old railroad 
attorney William S. Herndon (D-TX) who claimed $122,000 in real estate 
and $33,000 in personal estate. Democrat Archibald T. MacIntyre, 
although an extremely wealthy man, was a distant second with $30,000 
worth of Georgia sugar land and $60,000 in personal estate.&
Considering their youth, the Southerners had amassed considerable 
political experience. Only three had no discoverable political 
experience. Sixteen had served in local offices, thirty-nine had held 
office at the state level, and eight had held appointive federal posts. 
Twenty-five had been members of at least one previous Reconstruction 
House and three were veterans of antebellum Congresses. Sion H.
Rogers (D-NC) had served as a Whig in the Thirty-Third Congress (1853- 
1855) and John T. Harris (D-HC) was elected on the Whig ticket, and 
James M. Leach (D-NC) on the Democratic ticket, to the Thirty-Sixth 
Congress (1859-1861) • Leach was also the first former member of the
?The wealth figures for the carpetbaggers and the blacks are too 
incomplete to offer anymore than a rough indication of their rank in 
relation to the Democrats. For five of fourteen carpetbaggers the 
median wealth was $10,^50 (average $18,290) and for three of five 
blacks the median wealth was $7,760 (average $7,760).
^Manuscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules, Texas, Snlth 
County) ibid., Georgia, Thomas County.
183
Confederate House of Representatives to be elected to the U. S. House.9
All of the elections were seriously contested by both parties, 
but thirty-seven Representatives still won by over 10 percent of the 
vote and twenty-two had more than a 20 percent margin of victory.
Twelve of the elections showed close results (under 5 percent margin of 
victory), and in eleven cases the results were formally contested.
Three of the contests were successful and in one South Carolina case 
(scalawag C. C. Bowen vs. black Robert De large) the incumbent was 
unseated and the seat was declared vacant.-10
A cross-tabulation of political affiliation with the racial 
composition of the congressional districts yielded familiar patterns. 
Eighty-four percent of the Democrats came from districts that were over 
50 percent white. Four of the five blacks and 70 percent of the 
carpetbaggers came from black districts, while the scalawags were again 
concentrated in the marginal, districts which were from *+5 to 55 percent 
white. Carpetbaggers continued their hold on the urban districts by 
capturing five of six urban seats. Republicans also fared well in the 
heavily agricultural districts. The middling districts from 50 to 79
^Biographical Directory. 1628 (Rogers), 1075 (Harris), 1273 
(Leach). Leach, an antebellum Whig, was a unionist and self-acknowl­
edged leader of the '‘peace party" in the Confederate House; see Thomas 
B. Alexander and Richard Beringer, The Anatomy of the Confederate Con­
gress: A Study of the Influences of kariber Charac^ Serjstics on 
Legislative Voting Behavior (NasfavSie: Vanderbilt University Press,
1972), h6,261, 37^-75.
^°For the contested elections, see J. M. fhtith (comp.), Digest 
of Election Cases. Cases of Contested Elections in the House of Repre­
sentatives i Forty-Second. Forty-Third, and Forty-Fourth Congresses.
From. 1871~to 1376. Inclusive. House Misc. Document. b5 Cong.. 2 Sess.,
percent agricultural tended to select Democrats
The Forty-Second Congress showed less concern with the emotional 
issues of Reconstruction than had its predecessors* although the most 
explosive issue in the First Session was the consideration and passage 
of the third and harshest force act. The bitterness engendered by 
the final force act was partially alleviated by the enactment of a 
general amnesty during the Second Session.’^' After the Second Session* 
the presidential campaign and election of 1872 commanded public 
attention. In the midst of the canvass* a New York newspaper exposed 
the Credit Mobllier scandal* and the subsequent congressional investi­
gation occupied much of the attention of Congress during the Third 
Session. 12
The issues of Reconstruction* the presidential campaign* and the 
scandals left little time for serious consideration of economic measures 
during the Forty-Second Congress. Fewer than twenty percent of 527
^For the text of "An Act to enforce the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States* and for 
other purposes'1 (the third force act)* see Cong. Globe. k2 Cong.*
1 Sess. * Pt. 2* Appendix, 335-36. The general amnesty act removed the 
political disabilities imposed by the third section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in all but a few cases; see ibid.. k2 Cong.* 2 Sess.* Pt. 6, 
Appendix, 732,
■^ O^n the campaign of 1872 and the ramifications of the Credit 
Mobilier scandal* see William Best Hesseltine* Ulysses S. Grant. 
Politician (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1935)* ch. XVII, 309-12; Earl 
Dudley Ross, The liberal Republican Movement (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1 J & 9 pas slum; Fletcher M. Green* "Origins of the 
Credit Mobilier of America. " Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XLVT 
(September, 1959)» 238-51; and Jay B. Crawford, The Credit Mobilier of 
America . . . .  (Boston: C. W. Calkins and Camp any. 1880) ."“pas slum.
For the House investigation of the scandal, see House Reports. k2 Cong. * 
3 Sess., Vol. 2, Nos. 77, 78, 81, 82, 95.
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House roll calls were concerned with significant economic issues*
Ironic ally, the Forty-Second Congress would he remembered for its 
inadvertent passage of the Coinage Act of 1873* At the time, the act 
seemed of only minor importance, hut it contained a little-noticed 
clause which discontinued the *fl2§- grain silver dollar and limited the 
legal tender power of silver to amounts not exceeding five dollars*
The act effectively demonetized silver and the Forty-Second Congress 
thus unwittingly committed the so-called "Crime of *73*" When the 
demonetization of silver was "discovered" three years later, the act 
was damnedty inflationists in general and silverites in particular for 
the next twenty y ears.Much dehate was spent on a proposal reducing 
tariff duties and internal, taxes. The tariff act was probably the most 
significant piece of economic legislation to emerge from the Congress, 
hut roll-call divisions did occur on several other economic issues of 
continuing importance.
Pressure to reduce tariff duties and internal taxes stemmed from 
a number of sources* Free traders and tariff-for-revenue -only advocates 
had long clamored to reduce the high protective duties imposed during 
the Civil War. Midwestern Democrats constituted the core of the
^%or a discussion of the origins and ramifications of the Coinage 
Act of 1873, see Walter T. K. Nugent, The Money Question During Recon­
struction (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), ch. 5; and 
Allen Weinstein, Prelude to Populism; Origins of the Silver Issue, 
1867*1878 (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1970), especially ch. 1. 
The coinage hill passed without a significant roll-call vote in the 
House. For the text of the act, see Cong. Globe, h2 Cong., 3 Sess.,
Pt. 3, Appendix, 236-hO. The Forty-Second Congress also passed the 
notorious "Salary Grab Act" raising the salaries of the President and 
members of Congress. Public criticism compelled the Forty-Third Con­
gress to restore their salaries to previous levels.
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reductionist movement, but by the lS70s their numbers were augmented by 
a number of Republicans, particularly those representing agrarian 
constituencies. The growing disenchantment with the Grant administra­
tion manifested in the emerging liberal Republican movement added more 
recruits to the ranks of tariff reformers. Moderate protectionists in 
both parties objected to inequalities and excesses in tariff rates and 
even the full-blown protectionists seemed aware that public opinion 
favored further reductions.^
Furthermore, auspicious financial conditions, particularly a 
redundant revenue, necessitated reductions in taxes and tariff duties. 
After paying appropriations and interest on the public debt, the 
government surplus averaged nearly $100 million in the fiscal years 
1871-1872. As several authorities have noted, the surplus greatly 
exceeded sinking fund requirements.^ The act of I87O had brought 
about substantial internal tax reductions and had expanded the free 
list, but the duties on protected items had not been reduced substan­
tially. During debate on the 1872 bill, the central question was 
whether the desired reduction in revenue should be effected by reducing
llfFor the forces compelling tariff reduction, see F. N. Taussig, 
The Tariff History of the United States (8th ed., New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1931)7 lSo-81; and Edward Stanwood, American Tariff 
Controversies in the Nineteenth Century (2 vols., Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin Co., 19037711* 173-77.
^See, for example, Taussig, Tariff History, 181; and Robert T. 
Patterson, Federal Debt-Management Policies, 1565-1879 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 195*0 >""1247 The intricate relationships between the 
tariff and internal tax revenues and the public debt and sinking fund 
are comprehensively treated in ibid., especially chs. VII-VIII.
protective or non -prat e ctive duties.-1^
She mood of the Forty-Second Bouse on the issue of tariff reduc­
tion was indicated early in the First Session with the summary passage 
of hills to repeal the duties on salt, coal, and tea and coffee.1? 
Repeal of the non-protective duties on tea and coffee won nearly solid 
support from Southerners (see Table 5-1: A). Southern Republicans, in 
fact, faced considerable opposition on the hill frcm party colleagues 
from the Northeast and Midwest.1® The vote on the tea and coffee hill 
offers a sample of the raveled motivations of the groups voting for 
the issue. It was later charged that protectionists sought to eliminate
2% >r a discussion of the differences between protective and non- 
protective duties, see Taussig, Tariff History. 186-89. Non-protective 
duties are those on items not produced in the United States (e.g., tea 
and coffee) and are, in effect, indirect taxes, with the whole amount of
the duties recurring to the government. The primary function of non-
protective duties is to produce revenue. Protective duties, as their
name implies, are those imposed on imported items (e.g., wool, coal, and
iron) to enable American producers and manufacturers of the same items 
to compete in the American marketplace* To the degree that they are 
still imported, protected items produce revenue. But if the consumer 
buys a protected item produced at home he is paying a tax, nob to the 
government, hut to the producer of the item. High protective duties 
may prohibit importation of certain items, elevate consumer prices, and 
create monopolies capable of stifling competion.
^The hills eliminating the duties on salt (H. R. 173), coal 
(H. J. Res. 27), and tea and coffee (H. R. 17*0, each passed under 
suspension of the rules and without debate on March 13, 3871. See 
Cong. Globe. k2 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 81-83.
^^The only Southerner to oppose passage of H. S. 17^ was Charles 
R. Thomas, a North Carolina scalawag. Thomas' voting record indicates 
that he favored retention of tariff duties more times than did any 
other Southerner. Thomas, a New Bern lawyer and railroad president 
and the son of a wealthy shipowner and merchant, represented a 
marginally black and heavily agricultural constituency. His pro­
tariff stance may have stemmed from his background as a Clay Whig.
See Biographical Directory. l80lf; and John Gilchrist McCormick,
Personnel of the Convention of 1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1961), 82-83*
3JB8
TABLE 5-1: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY RECION AND PARTY 
ON THE TARIFF ISSUE
A. To suspend the rules and pass a bill (H. R. 17*0 repealing the 
duties on tea and coffeea
Yea Nay-
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE • 0 5 • • 9
MA 20 16 7 9
MW 18 24 1
SS 26 18 • 0
BS 19 3 0 0 0 0
PS 2 0 0 0 0 * 0—nj 1
Total 75 66 8 41
Grand Total 141 49
j suspend the rules and pass a 
repealing the duty on coalc
Yea
resolution (H. J. R< 
Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE m 0 11 « * 3
MA 20 7 6 18
MW 19 38 * * 8
SS 16 4 ld 13
BS 14 • » 6 3
PS 2 0 0 • 0 0 0**•«■*
Total 71 60 13 45
Grand Total 131 58
aCong. Globe, 42 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 82 (March 13, 1871). 
bThomas (NC).
cCong. Globe, 42 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 82 (March 13, IB71). 
dDox (AL).
189
non-protective duties (e.g., those on tea and coffee) in order to 
reduce the revenue and to relieve pressure to trim duties on protected 
items.***9 it should he noted, however, that most anti-protectionists 
also favored eliminating non-protective duties. Most such sentiment 
resided in the Democratic party, and Democrats voted 75-8 to put tea 
and coffee on the free list. The absence of debate on the tea and 
coffee bill makes it impossible to determine which groups were acting 
as protectionists and which as free-traders.
The scattered votes on protective duties indicates that seme 
Southern Republicans did not favor complete elimination of such duties. 
Southern Republicans indicated their opposition to continued protection 
for Michigan and New York salt producers by voting lb-6 to place salt 
on the free list, 20 but they voted U-13 against repealing duties on
^Taussig argues that the protectionists, led by the wool and 
iron interests, adopted this 'bore far sighted policy" in 1872 because 
of the strong public sentiment in favor of tariff reduction. The new 
policy involved making "slight concessions" to the reductionists rather 
than unconditionally opposing further reductions. The first step was 
to repeal non-protective duties and then concede certain minimum 
reductions on protected items— if necessary. Taussig's seemingly 
plausable argument is based on but one source, a speech given by wool- 
lobbylst John L. Hays before a meeting of wool manufacturers in Boston. 
Taussig, no friend of protection as it existed at the time, accepts 
Hay's remarks at face value, and his account of the tariff revision 
during the 1870's strongly suggests that protectionists successfully 
conspired to maintain high duties on protected items. See Taussig, 
Tariff History. 183-86, 189.
^Cong. Globe. kZ Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 81. In a later argument 
to reduce duties on salt, Alabama carpetbagger Charles Buckley noted 
that the South imported most of its salt from Liverpool and as salt 
entered into the production of fertilizer the duties on salt functioned 
as a tax on cotton producers using fertilizer. See the efforts of 
Buckley and Archibald Maclntrye (D-GA) to reduce or repeal the duties 
on salt, in ibid.. kZ Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. h, 321^, 3226, 323^-35»
3569. Very little salt was mined in the South. See the statistics 
on salt productions in Francis A. Walker (comp.), The Statistics of 
the Wealth and Industry of the United States . . . .  (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1873) > Table X, 622.
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coal (see Table 5-1: B), and 3-1^ against a resolution "encouraging pas- 
age of a bill to reduce the tariff on pig iron. ,r2^  On the surface, at 
least, the response of Southern Republicans to the coal and pig iron 
bills appears to reinforce the Beard-Beale thesis. It is relatively easy 
to conclude that most Southern Republicans disregarded the interests of 
their constituents by offering their votes to Pennsylvania and Ohio coal 
interests— or that they served as willing lackeys to protectionists like 
William "Pig Iron" Kelly of Pennsylvania. A paucity of evidence prohibits 
refutation of such charges, but it should be noted that the complex 
tariff issue makes difficult any simple explanation of motivation. Any 
number of factors might have determined the response of Southerners— one 
of which may have been a desire to support Northeastern protectionists. 
Virginia and Alabama either had or were developing substantial coal 
mining and iron manufacturing interests. The three Virginia Republicans 
and the Alabama Democrat voting against repeal may have done so in an 
honest effort to safeguard their fledgling industries. The existence of 
Southern coal and iron interests may have prompted the other nine Repub­
licans (all from the Southeastern states) to oppose tariff reduction.22
If the dissenting Southern Republicans were moderate protectionists, 
as seems to have been the case, they may have been hesitant to eliminate
21Cong. Globe, b2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1217. The motion to 
reduce duties on pig iron to $5 per ton or less did not pass as io 
necessitated suspension of the rules.
^For Southern coal measure estimations and actual productions 
see Kennedy (comp.), Statistics of the Wealth and Industry. 755-56,
761-65. The "Pennsylvania fieldT^ which extended into Virginia, Ala­
bama, and Georgia, was known to be quite rich. It should also be noted 
that pig iron production was particularly important in Virginia, but 
other producing states included North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
and Alabama; ibid., Table IX (B.), lf9^ , 507, 556, 568, 578.
i191
the duties completely on protected items— not, at least, without dehate. 
Southern Republicans exhibited particular interest in the development 
of manufacturing and extractive industries in the South, and they may 
have felt that an anti-protectionist stance would prove detrimental to 
the future development of Southern industry. Among the additional 
rationales for the retention of both protective and non-protective 
duties was a desire to keep revenues high in order on the one hand,
to retire the public debt and, on the other, to increase appropriations
/
for internal improvements.
Nor should it be assumed that the protective tariff had no support 
among Southerners other than Louisiana sugar producers. Early in the 
period, Debow* s Review quoted, with approval, an article in the Boston
Post to the effect that the central economic problem was not the tariff
but rather the deficiency of cheap money for economic growth.23 stronger 
sentiment for a protective tariff existed in certain areas of the South­
east. The editor of the conservative Richmond Whig, for example, 
declared in early 1870 that Virginia needed a high duty to protect local 
iron industries:
Virginia may came to the conclusion that her welfare may best 
be promoted by a high protective tariff. . . . our repre­
sentatives should ponder this matter very seriously before
they determine to settle down in the old rut."'
Most conservative Southern newspapers, however, were not willing to
consider the benefits of a protective tariff. The Atlanta Constitution
^jjebow1 s Review (After the War Series), VIII (March-April, I87O),
285.
2^Rlchmond Whig. January 25, 1870.
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for example, led the onslaught against protection while simultaneously 
proclaiming that Atlanta's future lay in manufacturing and Industry.2^ 
Although most Southern Democrats voted against protective duties, the 
traditional Southern defense of free trade was open to question. At 
the very least, the range of potential motivating factors for a Repre­
sentative's response to the complex tariff issue is too broad to con­
clude that some Southern Republicans were simply servants of north­
eastern protectionists.
The preliminary skirmishes over tariff duties foreshadowed the 
more comprehensive legislation considered during the Second Session. 
Tariff legislation inevitably- presents problems, but the maneuvering 
resulting in the act of 1872 was particularly intricate. The House 
proposals to place salt, coal, and tea and coffee on the free list 
during the First Session became lodged in the Senate Finance Committee. 
At the beginning of the Second Session, the House passed a second bill 
repealing the duties on tea and coffee which was reported in the Senate. 
Rut during its deliberations on the bill, the upper chamber transformed 
it into a measure making duty changes on a large number of items 
including a horizontal reduction of 10 percent on most manufactured 
goods. Irritated at the Senate's assumption of the House prerogative to 
originate revenue bills, the House, on April 2, 1872, voted 153-9 for 
a resolution chastising the Senate and tabling the Senate bill.
2^see Atlanta Constitution. Jhly 8, 1870, January 1, 1871,
April 2, 1872, January 23, 1873.
2^ Cong. Globe, k2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 3* 2105-12; Stanwood, 
American Tariff Controversies, II, 179-81.
Ia the interim the House Committee on Ways and Means completed 
-work on its own measure to reduce tariff duties and internal taxes 
and on April 16 Chairman Henry L. Daves (R-MA) reported the hill 
(H. R. 2322) to the House. According to Daves, the bill offered an 
$18.9 million reduction of tariff duties and a $12.8 million reduction 
of internal revenue* Following three weeks of debate and amendments, 
Kelly (R-PA), in a surprise move during debate on the bill in the 
Committee of the Whole, offered a motion to strike the enacting clause 
of the bill. Kelly* s motion, which was tantamount to killing the 
measure, passed 95-75* Kelly then moved to return H. R. 2322 to Ways 
and Means with instructions to report another tariff bill— one presumably 
more favorable to Kelly's interests.2? Within the next few minutes, 
the entire complexion of H. R. 2322 changed as Daves moved to amend 
Kelly* s instructions to require the Ways and Means Committee to report 
H. R. 2322 with a clause reducing by 10 percent the duties on most 
protected manufactures. While the two motions were still pending, 
Gustavus A. Finkelburg (R-MO), a sincere reductionist, offered an amend­
ment to the Daves amendment to reduce the duties by another 10 percent. 
The Finkelburg amendment would have provided a reduction on the 
specified items to 80 percent of their existing level. As the last 
motion pending, the Finkelburg amendment was voted on first and the 
House defeated it 86-114. The division on the amendment tended to 
follow party lines with Republicans comprising the opposition. Nine­
teen Midwestern Republicans voted for the amendment and thirteen 
Democrats from the Middle Atlantic states— where protectionist
27Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3157.
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sentiment was strong— sided with the Republicans to defeat the measure 
(see Table 9-2; A). After defeating the 20 percent reduction, the 
House passed the Dawes amendment and referred H. R. 2322 to Ways and 
Means with instructions to report it with a clause stipulating a 10 
percent horizontal reduction.2®
When H. R. 2322 re-emerged from the committee, another clause-by- 
clause amending process occupied the House for two weeks. No signif­
icant roll-call votes were recorded during the amending process, hut 
judging by the amendments offered by Southerners and their arguments 
on the bill, they made a sincere effort to reduce tariff levels.
Southern Republicans offered amendments to reduce duties on a variety 
of items from salt, cotton bagging, and iron used in the construction 
of cotton machinery to vermouth, tropical plant bulbs, and fresh 
fruit— and in some cases their proposals were approved. ^  During the 
debate, another shred of evidence emerged that reinforces the view that 
Southern Republicans were not merely passive followers of Northern 
manufacturers. John F. Farnsworth (R-XL), an ardent tariff reformer, 
charged that "protectionists" were "fixing up" Southern Representatives 
to induce them to join the protectionist "ring" and vote to retain high 
protective duties. A day later, after offering an amendment to put
2®The vote on the Dawes amendment was 111-77 and on the motion 
to refer, 117-75. See ibid., 3158-59* Southern Republicans opposed 
the amendment 6-12 and the motion to refer, 8-11. Southern Democrats 
favored both motions by margins of 11-3 and 10-U respectively. For 
brief secondary accounts of the transformation of H. R. 2322, see 
Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies. II, 181-83; and Taussig,
Tariff History, i M ^ H
29see, for example, Cong. Globe, kZ Cong., 2 Sess., Pt.
323^-35, 3399, 3^3, 3^56,“^,"35^9-70.
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TABLE! 5-2: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY 
ON H. R. 2322
A. To pass the Finkelburg amendment6.
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE 2 * 9 2 19
MA Ilf 9 • 13 29
MW 15 19, 1 27
SS 12 lb 2® 15
BS 21 • ■ • ■ 3
PS _2
Total 66 20 18 96
Grand. Total 86 111).
B. To suspend the rules, discharging the Committee of the Whole from 
further consideration of H. R. 2322 and passing the samed
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE If 13 • • 6
MA Ilf 11 11 15
MW 16 36 If 16
SS 19 l£ 9 9 lfe
BS 17 2 If 1
PS Js _1 9 9 JL
Total 72 79 19 1*3
Grand Total 151 62
aCong. Globe, lf2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. If, 3158-59 (May 7, 1872).
^Turner (AL).
cHarper (NC), Leach (NC).
^Con«. Globe, lf2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 3652 (May 20, 1872). 
eBarry (MS), Elliott (SC), McKee (MS), Perce (MS).
soap ingredients on the free list, Jacob H. Cypher, a Louisiana carpet­
bagger, responded to Farnsworth*a charge:
If there is any fixing up of members on this floor fran the 
South on this question, I do not know it. If I have 
observed the votes of southern Representatives correctly on 
the different interests involved in the pending bill, they 
have not placed themselves under the would-be leadership of 
either free-traders or protectionists in this House or out of 
it, but they have uniformly voted independently and in the 
interests of their constituents. I repel the charge that we 
belong to any ring. . . .  my colleagues from the South on this 
floor have voted to reduce the duty on coal, salt, and
lumber.30
The bill that emerged from the extensive amending process appar­
ently satisfied all but a hard core of Democratic and Republican pro­
tectionists and a few diehard Democratic free-traders. Democrats 
voted 72-19 and Republicans 79-^3 to pass a motion to suspend the rules 
thus cutting off further consideration in the Committee of the Whole, 
and ensuring passage of H. R. 2322 (see Table 5-2: B). The bill 
received particularly strong support from Southern Representatives. 
Southern Democrats supported it by a margin of 19-0» and the Southern 
Republicans outdid Republicans from all other regions by voting 16-4 
for passage. Given the response of the Southern Democrats, the South 
could hardly criticize its Republican Representatives. Nor does the 
response of the Southern Republicans on this final vote offer credence 
to the Beard-Beale thesis, 31
30ibid., 3509.
3%he four Southern Republicans voting against H. R. 2322 were 
Elliott of South Carolina, and Barry, McKee, and Perce from Mississippi 
Elliott's tariff attitudes remain unknown as he remained silent during 
the debate, but the opposition of the three Mississippians is baffling* 
Perce was particularly active in the debate on the bill and secured 
reductions on iron used in constructing cotton machinery "in favor of
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Although the vote to pass the House version was the last roll 
call on the hill, differences between the House and Senate necessitated 
a committee of conference whose report won the approval of both Houses. 
In the interim, the reductions created by H. R. 2322 were augmented when 
the Senate resurrected and passed the first House bill repealing the 
duties on tea and coffee. Taken together, the two bills trimmed 
revenues by $53>057,259-06. A little over half of the amount came 
from revision of the tariff schedules, the balance being produced by 
reductions of internal taxes, particularly those on liquors and tobac­
co.^2 The act of 1872 was the most substantial reduction of tariff 
duties enacted during the Reconstruction period. The duty on salt was 
cut in half, coal duties were reduced from $1.25 to 75 cents per ton, 
and the greatly expanded free list included such key items as paper 
stock, hides, and jute. Of greater consequence was the horizontal 
reduction of 10 percent on such protected items as manufactures of 
cotton, wool, iron and other metals, India rubber, glass, paper, and 
leather. ^  But as Professor F. W. Taussig has noted, the central
the manufacturers of the South," but he may have been irked at not 
securing reductions on cotton bagging; see ibid., 3*f03, 3^56. Barry 
and McKee were not active in the debate and they were quite often 
absent on other tariff roll calls, but both had favored reductions on 
tea and coffee and McKee was one of a very few Southern Republicans to 
favor putting coal and salt on the free list. Personal and constituent 
characteristics reveal nothing that differentiated the four from other 
Republicans voting for the measure.
32cong. Globe. h3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5, ^206, 4215. For the 
final text of the bill, see ibid., Pt. 6, Appendix, 764-7^5 for a more 
useful chart showing tariff duties and the rates of reduction proposed 
by an earlier version of H. R. 2322, see ibid., Pt. If, 3201-203.
3 % a u s s i g ,  Tariff History. 185; Stsnwood, American Tariff 
Controversies, II,183-8^.
198
problem with a horizontal reduction of any amount Is that it easily 
be revoked. In the name of financial urgency, the Forty-Third Congress 
repealed the 10 percent horizontal reduction imposed by the Tariff Act 
of 1872.^
The reductions in internal taxes imposed by H. R. 2322 marked the 
climax of a repealing process that had eliminated nearly all the import­
ant taxes created during the war. 35 As the internal tax provisions 
excited little controversy, few roll calls were taken on the subject, 
and only one, that reducing the tax on tobacco, was of particular 
importance to the South. Richard T. W. Duke (D-VA), a Charlottesville 
lawyer and country gentleman, led efforts to reduce taxes on manufactures 
of tobacco. Privately convinced that "enormous taxes11 was "one cause 
of the great disruption of our agricultural interests," Duke appealed to 
the agrarian West and northwest to unite with the South and discard the 
politics and economics of the Northeast.^ An appropriate first step 
in this direction would be to reduce the tax on tobacco. Although it 
was a product of special interest to Duke's constituents, Southerners,
3**Taussig, Tariff History. 189-91. For the repeal, see below, 
ch. VI.
35patterson, Federal Debt-Management Policies. U9-21; Taussig, 
Tariff History. 172. Taussig notes that the only significant internal 
taxes remaining after 1872 were those on liquor and beer. In addition, 
taxes were retained on matches, patent medicine, and a few other 
"comparatively unimportant" items, ibid.
3&Richard T. W. Duke to Edmund Wilcox Hubard, February 8, 1872, 
in Edmund Wilcox Hubard Papers, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Cong. Globe. k2 Cong.,
2 Sess., Pt. h, 3012-16. For biographical information on Duke, see 
Biographical Directory. 88h; and Iynn Gardner Tyler (ed.), Encyclo­
pedia of Virginia Biography (3 vols., New York: Lewis Historical
Publishing Company, 1915;, III, 115-16.
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Democrats and Republicans alike, rallied to bis appeal. A last minute 
amendment to H. R. 2322 succeeded in reducing taxes on most tobacco 
products from 24 cents to 16 cents a pound. House Democrats, led by 
the Southerners, favored the reduction by a decisive margin of 74-7.
But Southern Republicans, in supporting the amendment 14-2, again 
found themselves lined up against a majority of Hew England Republicans 
and a surprising number of Midwestern Republicans (see Table 5-3: A). 
Nevertheless, Southern Republicans, conceiving of tobacco as a 
"Southern interest," supported the reduction, even though very few of 
their districts produced tobacco.37
A far more controversial issue, and one with serious sectional 
overtones, was that of refunding the tax that had been collected on 
raw cotton from 1862 to 1B68. During that period, particularly in 
the postwar years, raw cotton had been taxed at rates ranging frcm 
one-half of one cent to five cents a pound. By the time the tax was 
repealed in January 1868, over $57 million had been collected on cotton 
produced in the ten Southern states.^ Southerners charged that the 
tax had been an unconstitutional levy upon the products of a particular 
section while that section was not represented in the national councils. 
Foregoing the fine legal arguments on the constitutionality of a direct 
tax on agricultural productions, a North Carolina editor claimed that
37For the involved section of H. R. 2322 revising tobacco taxes, 
see Cong. Globe. 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6, Appendix, 771-73*
3%'heodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, 1865-1933 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, I960), 25-26; Milton M.
Me Pherson, "The Federal Cotton Tax in the South, 1862-68” (unpublished 
M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1959), 103; Cong. Globe. 42 Cong.,
2 Sess., Pt. 6, Appendix, 49*
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TABLE 5-3: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY 
ON INTERNAL TAXES
A. To amend an amendment to H. R. 2322 By reducing the tax on 
tobacco from 2k cents to l6 centsa
Yea Nay-
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE 1 5 3 12
MA 15 22 2 3
MW 15 18 2 29,
SS 21 11+ * * 2b
BS 20 2 • • 1
PS _2 JL • * • »
Total 74 62 7 1+7
Grand Total 136 5k
B. To suspend the rules and pass a resolution instructing the
Committee on Ways and Means to report a bill refunding the 
cotton tax (H. R. 3561+) and making said bill a special 
order of business0
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE • « • * 3 16
MA 5 1 13 19
MW 7 2 9 39„SS 22 19 * * ld
BS 18 2 1 1
PS _1 • * _1 _2
Total 53 2l+ 27 78
Grand Total 77 105
aCong. Globe. 1+2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 1+100 (May 31, 1872). 
kperce (MS), Morphis (MS).
cCong. Globe. 1+2 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 891 (January 27, IS73)- 
dPorter (VA).
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the levy on cotton was a simple case of "taxation without represen­
tation. "39 Most Southerners were willing to concede that portion of 
the tax collected during the war, hat the section was united in favor 
of refunding the balance. Carpetbagger Legrand W. Perce of Mississippi, 
the leader of the refunding movement, summed up the case in a speech 
on May 1, 1872. After noting that most Southern legislatures had 
passed memorials favoring refunding, Perce presented an involved 
argument against the constitutionality of the tax. He claimed that the 
tax was akin to "highway robbery," but he toned down the partisan over­
tones in his argument and proclaimed that the "subject is entirely out­
side party issues . . . .  it is an appeal from one entire section of 
the country, Including all classes, all colors, all parties, to the 
General Government." 110 He might have added that the introduction of 
$57 million into the South would give a healthy boost to its languishing 
economy.
Southern Republicans were particularly active in the effort to 
refund the cotton tax. The three memorials from Southern legislatures 
formally requesting the refund were presented by an Alabama black, a 
Georgia scalawag, and a Mississippi carpetbagger.^ Of the eight
39rhe Raleigh (NC) Register, July 5, 1867. As over $1(0 million 
of the tax had been collected in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi, conservative newspapers in those four states particularly 
desired the refunding legislation, but Southern Republicans were seldom 
given credit for leading the refunding movement. See, for example, 
Atlanta Constitution. March 8, 1873; New Orleans Prices Current, Jan­
uary 3, 1873; The Vicksburg Daily Herald, January l4, 1873> The Weekly 
Clarion (Jackson), October 10,""1872.
^Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6, Appendix, 411-19.
4lpor Alabama memorial presented by Benjamin S. Turner, see 
ibid.. 5*10-41; Richard H. Whiteley presented Georgia's memorial, ibid.,
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refunding proposals submitted by Representatives of the ten states, 
Southern Republicans submitted five, and Republicans made two of the 
three major speeches supporting refunding.^ Southern Democrats and 
Republicans presented a united front on the issue, but Internal 
differences existed as to the beneficiaries of the refunded revenues.
The state legislatures ashed only for a refund to "the people1' of the 
cotton-producing states, and several of the proposed bills had similarly 
vague clauses. Benjamin S. Turner, the Alabama black, concluded that 
the tax fell heaviest on the Southern laborer, and that it was there­
fore due to "the poor people of the South, regardless of caste or 
color. 1,lf3 Initially, the Republicans tended to favor general proposals 
refunding the tax to the states which would then either distribute the 
funds or use them for public purposes, but most of the Democrats favored 
some proposal which would return a major portion of the tax directly to 
the cotton planters. Archibald T. MacIntyre (D-GA) went a step further 
and stated that restitution should be made to each state which in turn 
would reimburse those who actually paid the tax including elements other 
than the producers such as commission agents or factors.^
Pt. 2, 1300-301; and Ferce presented the memorial from the Mississippi 
legislature, ibid., Pt. 6, Appendix, 1*U.
^Southerners presenting bills to refund the cotton tax were 
Sheldon (R-LA), Morphis (R-MS), McKee (R-MS), Handley (D-GA), Niblack 
(D-FL), MacIntyre (D-GA), Perce (R-MS), and Harris (R-MS). Of the 
Democrats, only MacIntyre spoke on the issue.
^3cong. Globe. 1*2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6, Appendix, 51*0-1*1.
Turner quite plainly felt that the refund should go to the Negro 
laborers who produced the cotton, but he proposed no plan of 
implementation.
^waclntyre summerized his proposal and three other pending refund­
ing bills in ibid., 1*2 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3j Appendix, 1*8-52.
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During the Third Session a caucus of Southern Representatives 
finally agreed to support a hill (H. B. 3564) making restitution to the 
party paying the tax. But Southern unity was of little value as the 
HOuse was not disposed to consider, let alone pass, a refund of the 
cotton tax. On January 27, 1872, with time running out in the Third 
Session, George C. McKee (R-i4S) finally secured the floor and moved to 
suspend the rules to call up H. B. 3564 and make the hill a special 
order of business "from day to day until the same is disposed of. “
Prior to the vote on the motion, Perce, the bill* s sponsor, noted that 
refunding legislation had been pending in the Committee on Ways and Means 
for a year and that it was time for action on. it. The vote on the 
motion clearly split the House along sectional lines. Southerners 
supported the motion 41-1 and the border state Bepresentatives re­
sponded favorably by a margin of 20-2, but members from the other 
sections offered a resounding 14-102 negative vote (see Table 5-3: B).^ 
Southerners continued to press the issue in Congress during and beyond 
the Reconstruction period but the efforts of solidly Democratic 
delegations were no more successful than that led by carpetbaggers and 
scalawags in the Forty-Second House.
Currency and related issues received very little attention in 
the Forty-Second House. The period after the passage of the funding
^Ibid., Pt. 2, 891. Southerners failed in a final attempt to 
suspend the rules to set a time for consideration of the refunding bill 
on February 17, 1873* This time the South was completely unanimous as 
Porter (R-VA), the solitary dissenter on the earlier McKee motion, 
joined his Southern colleagues in their 4-5-0 vote to bring the bill 
before the House. She motion (suspension of the rules) failed 94-83.
For the vote, see ibid.. 1430.
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and currency legislation of 1B70 was relatively prosperous, and little 
effort was made to agitate the question of the circulating medium of 
the country. The Panic of IB73 and the following depression shattered 
that calm and the Forty-Third Congress did little else than to try to 
resolve the resulting currency problems. The Coinage Act of 1873, 
which later became infamous in inflationist and silverite circles, 
passed the House with scarcely a ripple of comment, but two unrelated 
roll calls dealing with the currency are worthy of noue.
During the Second Session, Ben Butler, the Massachusetts green- 
backer and ultra-Radical, offered a motion to suspend the rules and 
pass a bill authorizing and directing the Secretary of the Treasury 
"to collect and receive one-third of the amount of customs duties 
assessed upon imports in legal tender notes of the United States.
Butler claimed that his bill would "hasten the return to specie pay­
ments," but he was not allowed to explain exactly how the proposal 
related to specie resumption. Butler was probably more concerned with 
enhancing the prestige of the greenbacks and further establishing them 
as the central part of the nation's circulating medium than he was 
with hastening the day of specie resumption.Denied time to debate
^Cong. Globe. 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1585,
^Ibid.. The legal tender acts bad stipulated that customs duties 
on imports were to be paid in specie. Butler may have been trying to 
enhance the value of greenbacks in relation to the national bank notes 
which were not receivable for import duties. Like most greeribackers,
Butler disliked the national banking system and its currency. See 
Robert Sharkey, Money. Class, and Party; An Economic Study of Civil 
War and Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959) 46,
108-1X3, 212; and Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era; A Social and Political 
History of American Finance. 1B&5-1B79 fPrinceton:- Princeton University 
Press, 1954), 19.
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the MU., Butler made the offhand remark, "we understand it; it is the 
people against the hanks; that is all.
The motion to suspend the rules and pass the hill split the 
Republicans 47-50> hut Democrats supported the move 43-17 (see Table
i
5-4: A). With Southern Republicans united solidly behind the bill, 
the section1 s margin of 22-3 for the bill was greater than that for any 
other region. Northern Republicans, however, provided enough votes 
against rules suspension to defeat the proposal 9 0 - 6 7 * The measure 
was not inflationist and therefore would, have done nothing to solve 
the currency shortage in the South, but it did propose to strengthen 
the legal tender qualities of the greenbacks and to make custom duties 
partially payable in greenbacks.
As the South needed additional currency, Southern Representatives 
were equally willing to support an unsuccessful attempt to expand the 
national bank note circulation. On February 17, lfl73» James Monroe 
(R-OH) moved to suspend the rules and pass an amendment to the 
Currency Act of 1870 to provide for an additional issue of $25 million 
in national bank notes “to banking associations organized or to be 
organized” In those states having less than their quota of such
^Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 2, I585.
49it is notable that most Southern Democrats were willing to 
forgo their obvious dislike for Butler and support his motion. The 
three Southern Democrats opposing the motion, Braxton (VA), Terry (VA), 
and Waddell (NC), may have simply disliked the idea of enhancing the 
value of greenbacks, but as all three were Southern natives and 
Confederate veterans and two were former slaveholders, the possibility 
exists that they simply could not bring themselves to vote for a bill 
offered by "Beast" Butler.
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TABLE 5-b: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY 
ON THE CURRENCY ISSUE
To suspend the rules and pass the Butler hill "to hasten the
return to specie payments "a
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE 7 7
MA 10 k 4 19
MW 10 20 7 23
SS 10 12 3*
BS 12 1 3 1
PS J= -2. a ♦ t •
Total to h7 17 50
Grand Total 90 67
To suspend the rules and pass H. R. 397^ a bill providing for
an additional Issue of $2? million in hank notes0
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE 4 1+ 13
MA 3 16 18 7
MW 9 to 9. 6
SS 17 23 2
BS 5 3 11 ..
PS JL _1 _2
Total 3^ 87 to 28
Grand Total 121 73
^ong. Globe, to Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1585 (March 11, 1872).
^Braxton (VA), Terry (VA), Waddell (NC).
°Cong. Globe, to Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, lto5 (February 17, 1873)
^Beck (GA), MacIntyre (GA).
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circulation. As a concession to the Northeast, the hill also proposed 
repeal of the clause in the 1B70 act ■which proposed redistribution of 
$25 million in bank notes.5° The issue m s  clearly one of currency 
expansion with the South being the primary beneficiary. Southerners 
voted 40-2 to secure the expansion, but, despite the fact that the 
New England and Middle Atlantic states did not stand to lose any of 
their bank note circulation, they still voted 23-40 against the 
measure (see Table 5-4: B). Their opposition was more than enough 
to deny the two-thirds majority needed to suspend the rules.
In the area of federal aid to internal improvements, two important 
river and harbor appropriations bills were considered and passed by 
the Forty-Second Congress. Southern Representative^ particularly the 
Republicans, participated effectively in the scramble to secure 
federal monies for the improvement of their section's rivers and harbors. 
The appropriation bill (H. R. 2208) approved during the Second Session 
generated no roll-call divisions, but Samuel S. Cox (D-NY) initiated 
a spirited sectional debate by charging that the Southern states received 
less than their fair share of the appropriations in H. R. 2203 as 
reported by the Committee on Commerce. Cox was joined by Democrat 
John Hancock of Texas who claimed that Michigan received almost as 
much money as did all the Southern states combined. The target of the 
two Democrats was Omar D. Conger (R-Ml), the Chairman of the Commerce 
Committee and the floor leader on H. R. 2208. Conger denied the 
charges of sectional discrimination and responded with a set of figures
^Cong, Globe, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1425.
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showing that the South received at least one-third of the appropri­
ations— including those for work on the tipper Mississippi and its 
tributaries, which he correctly cited as work in which the South had 
a vested interest. Conger noted that Southern members on the Commerce 
Committee were "as talented and as zealous in behalf of the interests 
of the section as the gentleman from New York [Cox] could possibly be 
for them."'’1 In the heated exchange that followed, William S. Holman 
(D-IN), Fierce M. B. Young (D-GA), and Lionel A. Sheldon (R-LA) came to 
Conger* s support and denied the existence of any sectional bias against 
the South in the committee. An examination of H. R. 2208 reveals 
that the Great Lakes area did receive something more than its propor­
tional share of appropriations, but the Southern states also did quite 
well, primarily because of the actions of Southern Representatives in 
amending the bill.^3
Southerners fared better on the second rivers and harbors bill 
(H. R. 3922) passed during the Third Session. Charges of sectional bias 
again entered the deliberations. At one point, Mississippi carpetbagger 
George C. McKee, having failed to secure an appropriation of $50,000 
for the improvement of the Yazoo River, moved "that the Yazoo river be 
considered as lying within the boundaries of Wisconsin and Michigan,
53-Ibid., 1+2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1^25.
5gIbid.
53por the text of bill, see ibid., Pt. 6, Appendix, 81^-16. For 
Southern efforts to secure additional appropriations by amendment, see 
ibid.. Pt. 3, 21+1+3-52.
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for then my amendment would get through.McKee's motion provoked 
laughter, "but same Southerners were clearly irritated at not receiving 
what they considered their fair share. Carpetbagger James H. Hiatt,
Jr., for example, called for defeat of an additional appropriation for 
a Massachusetts harbor, with the remark, "1 think Massachusetts is 
pretty well provided for In this bill already," and Thomas Boles (R-AR)
and James M. Hanks (D-AR) denounced Northerners for refusing an
55
appropriation for Arkansas rivers. "
The scattered roll-call votes on H. R. 3922 indicate that South­
erners were nearly unanimous in support of additional appropriations 
for their region, but the divisions also indicate a lack of enthusiasm 
for such measures among Northern Republicans. Democrats, for example, 
strongly supported an additional appropriation of $50,000 for the 
improvement of two Arkansas rivers, but Northern Republicans reacted 
sharply against it (see Table 5-5: A). Southerners apparently con­
sidered the relatively obscure rivers as "Southern interests" and 
voted 40-2 for the appropriation. As an indication of their concern 
for improving the upper Mississippi river, the section's Representatives 
voted 41-3 to double the appropriation for improvements between St.
Louis, and Cairo, Illinois (see Table 5-5: B). Opposition to the increased 
appropriation was particularly pronounced in the Northeast, and Mid­
western Republicans split 20-19 on the measure.
^Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3> 1463> 1469.
55jbid., 165a, 1643, 1549-50, 1657.
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TABLE 5-5: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY ON H. R. 3922 
(RIVERS AND HARBORS APPROPRIATION BIEL)
A. To amend H. R. 3922 by appropriating $50,000 for the improvement 
of the White and St. Francis rivers (AR)a
Yea Nay-
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE 1 3 2 13
MA 13 3 1+ 18
MW 15 10 2 22
SS 22 18 0 0 2b
BS 13 2 1 1
PS _2 • * _2
Total 66 36 9 58
Grand Total 102 67
B. To amend H. R. 3922 by increasing the appropriation for the 
improvement of the Mississippi River (between the Missouri 
and Ohio Rivers) by $100,000c
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE • • * • 3 12
MA 8 • • 12 19
MW Ik 20 3, 19
SS 21 18 ld 2
BS 13 1 3 1
PS _2 • • » • _2
Total 58 39 22 55
Grand Total 97 77
aCon£. Globe, 1+2 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1758 (February 2k, 1873)* 
bSheldon (LA), Stowell (VA).
°Cong. Globe, k2 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1&59 (February 2*+, 1873). 
dBeck (GA).
eBuckley (AL), Platt (VA).
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Lacking an extensive railroad system, the South depended heavily 
on its natural network of water transportation to move its agricultural 
products to market. And there is no doubt that the South, more than 
any other region of the country needed federal assistance in renovating 
its river and harbor facilities which had been damaged or neglected 
during the conflict. The section's Representatives did as much as 
could be expected of any delegation to secure appropriations for marine 
improvements, but the continued opposition of Northern Republicans 
aroused the ire of Southern Republicans on more than one occasion. In 
the long run, the reluctance of Northern Republicans to assist their 
Southern party colleagues could not have but hurt the party's chances 
of survival in the South.
The Forty-Second House was swamped with scores of proposals to 
grant land subsidies or rights of way to aid in the construction of 
railroads. Over the three sessions, Southerners offered more than 
forty railroad bills, most of which asked for seme form of federal 
assistance for local Southern lines.56 As an indication of the House's 
growing opposition to the policy of granting public lands to railroad 
corporations, most of the proposals never emerged from committee. Of 
the proposals offered by Southern Representatives, only a handful 
passed— and those without roll-call divisions. The House was particularly 
unreceptive to outright grants of public lands, but substantial opposition 
developed to proposals granting only the right of way over public lands,
56lbid., 42 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, Index; 42 Cong., 2 Sess.,
Index; 42 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, Index, In addition, the House con­
sidered a number of Senate proposals for aid to Southern railroads.
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renewing of antebellum land grants, or extending couplet ion times for 
lines already under construction. 57
A scalogram of railroad issues reveals partisan patterns of 
support (see Tables 5-6! A and 5-6: B). Southern Republicans were 
the most consistent supporters of efforts to grant rights of way, time 
extensions, and other privileges to railroad companies. Overall, they 
scaled higher than did party colleagues from other regions, but Repub­
lican support was quite strong in all areas except the Midwest. On the 
other hand, over half of the Northern Democrats, including those from 
the border states, offered no support at all to the scale items (scale 
position 0). The partisan nature of the subsidy issue obviously 
placed those Southern Democrats favoring railroad development in a 
quandary. The voting behavior of the Southern Democrats might be 
explained by the fact that the scalogram includes no items relating 
to Southern railroads. But Southern Democrats could hardly have 
expected outside support for their own projects if they voted with the 
majority of their party against projects outside the South. Under the 
circumstances, over half of the Southern Democrats abandoned their 
party and offered at least seme support to the proposals considered in
57see in particular a series of roll-call votes and the debate 
on a bill (S. 565) extending the time for the state of Wisconsin to 
complete a railroad from take St. Croix to Lake Superior, ibid., kZ 
Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 127^-78, 1301-13, 171^-21, Pt. 3, 2^ 183783. The 
Senate bill had extended the grants and privileges to the line for 
another five years, but a House amendment eliminated everything after 
the enacting clause and provided that the land grant revert to the 
public domain. The Senate refused to agree to the amendment, and a 
committee of conference recommended the House recede from its amendment. 
The House, however, voted to adher to its amendment 110-54— thus killing 
the bill. Southern Republicans and a large bloc of Southern Democrats 
consistently supported the time extension.
TABLE 5-6: A
RAILROAD SCAIOGRAM:
REGIONAL AND PASTY DISTRIBUTION OP SCALE POSITIONS
REGION AND PARTY
Scale
Position D
NE
R D
MA
R D
MW
R D
SS
R D
BS
R D
PS
R
Total 
D R
0 2
1
18
* «
7
1
10
• m
13
• *
■ 9
• 9
50
2
1 • •
2
2
• »
if
9
2
• •
if
• •
• •
• 9
12
11
2 1
1
1
1
2
10
1
• •
1
« •
* *
9 9
6
12
3 • •
2
2
1
1
5
if
« •
1
• •
1
• •
9
8
if • •
2
* •
3
1
U
2
if
1
2
1
• •
5
22
5 * *
10
2
19
1
11
3
18
1
* *
• ■
2
7
60
6 9 *
2
• •
U
• •
3
• ■
1
• •
« #
• •
1
• •
11
Total 3 20 25 28 l£ 50 22 23 21 2 2 3 89 126
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .957
TABLE 5-6: B
ITEMS IN RAILROAD SCALOGRAM
Scale
Position Identification
0
1 . To table a bill (H. R. 2199) incorporating the Great Salt
Lake and Colorado River Railway Company and granting the 
Company right of way through public lands. 63-105;
+ = NAY. Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 3, 2547 
(April 1B,“W 2 ) .
2 To table a bill (S. 242) enabling the Atlantic and Pacific
Railroad Company to mortgage its road. 63-104; + = NAY. 
Ibid., 42 Cong., 1 Sess., Pfc. 2, 745 (April 18, 1871).
3 To suspend the rules and pass a bill (H. R. 3743) granting
the right of way through public lands to the Atchison, 
Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad. 98-77; + = YEA. aid., 
42 Cong., 3 Sess., Pfc. 2, 1577 (February 21, l£73T»
4 To pass a bill (H. R. 1553) relating to lands for the
Central Pacific Railroad Company. 100-87; + = YEA. 
Ibid.. 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 4, 2739 (April 24, 1872).
5 To suspend the rules and pass a bill (S. 1537) granting
rights to a right of way for a western branch of the 
Texas Pacific Railroad Company. 89-79; + = YEA. Ibid., 
42 Cong., 3 Sess., Pfc. 3, 2131 (March 3, 1873).
6 To table a bill (H. R. 3^3) repealing the appropriations
the Central Pacific Railroad Company made in an army 
appropriations bill for fiscal IB72. 12-163; + = YEA. 
Ibid., Pfc. l, 540 (January 13, 1B73).
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the s c a l o g r a m .  5® Quite clearly, the willingness of the House to 
subsidize railroad corporations continued to decline during the Forty- 
Second Congress. In the face of the Credit Mobilier scandal and a 
declining Republican majority, the Southerners and others who desired 
to continue federal subsidies for railroads confronted difficult 
times.
Economic issues were not of major import in the Forty-Second Con­
gress— a situation due largely to the seemingly prosperous times. The 
divisions on the economic issue that were considered indicate that the 
Southern delegations continued to serve the interests of their section 
in a creditable manner. Southern Republicans and Democrats tended to 
vote as a sectional, unit, particularly on questions relating to 
internal taxes, currency, and internal improvements, which indicates 
that both parties had similar conceptions of what constituted Southern 
interests. The inclination of seme Southern Republicans to favor at 
least a moderately protective tariff presents a problem if the South 
is considered to be united in favor of free trade. As an agricultural 
region, the South probably favored greater reductions in tariff duties
5®The Southern Democrats ranking highest on the railroad scaln- 
gram were Connor (TX), Critcher (VA), Harper (NC), Leach (NC), and 
Sloss (AL). The five had little in common except that they had all 
been unionists as had been most other Democrats. But other factors 
in their backgrounds suggest seme reasons for their interest in rail­
roads. Connor, an Union army veteran, was extremely interested in rail­
road penetration of his north Texas district through which the pro­
posed Texas-Pacific line was to pass. Harper was a civil engineer and 
railroad builder. Leach, a West Point graduate, had been a prominent 
North Carolina Whig in the antebellum period. Sloss, a Douglas Demo­
crat, had been involved in railroad dealings for all of his adult life. 
Sloss offered more bills (8) aiding Southern railroad projects than 
any other Southerner in the Forty-Second House.
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than those finally enacted hy the Forty-Second Congress, hut it is 
evident that the concept of a tariff for protection 'was not without 
friends in some sections of the South. She substantial tariff and 
internal tax reductions in the act of 1B72 received the nearly unanimous 
support of Southern Republicans and Democrats, and the act did not create 
adverse comment in the Southern press.
Those seeking evidence of a strong combination between Southern 
Republicans and Northeastern Republicans would be sorely disappointed 
by the roll-call divisions on economic issues in the Forty-Second 
House. If any combination was more evident than others it was that 
between Southern Republicans and Democrats and Northern (primarily 
Midwestern) Democrats on questions relating to currency, internal 
taxes, and appropriations for rivers and harbors. On these matters, 
Southern Republicans deserted their party and sided with the Democrats.
On other questions, Southerners found greater support among Midwestern 
or Northeastern Republicans, and the Southern Democrats were forced to 
break with their party. And on the question of refunding the cotton 
tax, the Southerners stood alone. The willingness of the Southerners, 
Republicans and Democrats alike, to accept support wherever they could 
get it strongly suggests that regional interests were far more important 
than political affiliations on economic questions in the Forty-Second 
House.
CHAPTER VI
THE FORTY-THIRD HOUSE
The Forty-Third Congress returned to the traditional two-session 
format, with the First Session beginning on December 1, 1873• Represen­
tatives to the Forty-Third House were the first to he chosen under the 
reapportionment based on the 1870 census, which increased the number 
of Representatives from 2k3 to 293* As a reflection of the westward 
shift of the center of population, the Midwestern states gained the 
most new seats. The number of Southern seats increased from fifty to 
sixty-three, but the proportion of the seats belonging to the ten 
Southern states increased only slightly from 20.5 percent to 21.5 
percent. 1 The elections of 1872 also changed the political composition 
of the House in that the Liberal Republican-Democratic debacle enabled 
the Republicans to regain a two-thirds majority. 2 Southern Democrats
XFor the increase in representation by states, see Biographical 
Directory. k7. Alabama, Georgia, and Texas were each granted two 
additional seats. Each of the other seven Southern states gained one 
seat.
2At the beginning of the First Session, Republicans occupied 203 
seats and the Democrats held 88, with two vacancies; see George B. 
Galloway, History of the House of Representatives (New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell Company, 1961), 296. The Congressional Record indicates 
that the House seated 307 Representatives (208 Republicans and 99 
Democrats) during the Forty-Third Congress. Figured either way, the 
Republicans had slightly over a two-thirds majority, but that majority 
was not as cohesive as it once was. The Republicans had always been 
divided on economic questions and party unity on the issues of political 
reconstruction steadily declined during the period. See John Kent
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fared better than did Democrats frcsn other sections, hut proportionally 
Southern Republicans still gained seats. Over the course of the two 
sessions, the House seated twenty-nine Democrats and thirty-nine 
Republicans from the South.
The twenty-nine Democrats included same familiar and famous names. 
The solitary white district in Mississippi, for example, chose Lucius 
q. c . Lamar as its Representative— just as the former slave John Roy 
lynch, himself a member of the Forty-Third House, had planned when 
he redrew the state's congressional district lines. Lamar, a veteran 
of the antebellum House, a prominent secessionist, and a Confederate 
diplomat, was thus launched on a renewed political career culminating 
with his appointment to the U. S. Supreme Court.3 The seating of 
Alexander H. Stephens, the former vice-president or the Confederacy, 
received greater public attention. The election of Stephens, a frail 
symbol of traditional Southern leadership, was widely lauded in the 
conservative Southern press. The Atlanta Constitution, for example, 
proclaimed that the occasion marked "the return of Southern statesman­
ship to national activity." But the Constitution, a stronghold of
Folmar, "The Depletion of Republican Congressional Support for Enforce­
ment of Reconstruction Measures: A Roll Call Analysis, 1871-1877" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama, 1968), nassium.
3por Lamar's distinguished career, see James B. Murphy, L. C. 
Lamar: Pragmatic Patriot (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University “
Press, 19731, passium. Lamar won national acclaim almost immediately 
with an appeal for sectional reconciliation in his eulogy of Radical 
Republican Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. For the eulogy see Cong. 
Record. h2 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. h, 3^10-11, and for press reaction, see 
Edward Mayer, Lucius £. C. Lamar: His Life, Times, and Speeches (2 ed.,
Nashville: Publishing House of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South,
1896), 188-9U.
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conservatism, nevertheless entered a suggestive caveat:
Let Mr. Stephens not forget that the times have changed—  
sadly changed, perhaps—hut irrevocably changed, and that he 
must be practically progressive -while adhering to the grand 
old principles of constitutionalism.1*
The general amnesty and the continuing process of redemption 
facilitated the return to politics of men formerly prominent in Southern 
political leadership. The number of former slaveholders, secessionists, 
and Confederate veterans among Southern Democrats increased sharply in 
the Forty-Third House. Whether they were backward-looking 'bourbons" 
or forward-looking "redeemers" or a mixture of both is subject to 
debate, but the conservative Constitution1 s acknowledgement of irrevo­
cable change and its advice to Stephens indicated that newspaper's 
preference for "practically progressive" leadership.
Seventeen scalawags, fifteen carpetbaggers, and seven blacks 
represented those portions of the ten states that had, as yet, resisted 
redsnption. The Republicans made gains in Alabama and Virginia, and 
.retained their hold on Florida and South Carolina* But Louisiana and 
Mississippi each elected their first Democrat during Reconstruction, 
Democrats formed a majority in the delegations of Georgia and North 
Carolina, and Texas was represented by six Democrats. The states with 
large black populations tended to return carpetbaggers and blacks. 
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Mississippi sent ten of the fifteen 
carpetbaggers and five of the seven blacks. Scalawags remained strong 
in Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia— all states with
A^tlanta Constitution, November 30, March 8, 1873.
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sizable contingents of native unionists.^
The age profiles by party paralleled tbose for preceding delega­
tions. The median age was forty, over six years younger than that for 
the House as a whole, but nearly 60 percent of the Democrats and 50 per- 
cent of the scalawags were over 45 years of age. Carpetbaggers and 
blacks again provided the youth with thirteen of the fifteen carpet­
baggers and five of tne seven blacks under the age of thirty-five. The 
two youngest members, John Amber Smith (D-VA) and John Roy lynch (R-MS), 
were barely twenty-five years of age at the time of their election to 
the Forty-Third House. At the other end of the age spectrum were sixty- 
three year old Rees Tate Bowen (D-VA) and sixty-one year old Alexander 
H. Stephens (D-GA).
Education levels declined somewhat from the Forty-Second Congress, 
although only two Southerners, both blacks, had no formal education. 
Two-thirds of the carpetbaggers, 59 percent of the Democrats, and 53 per­
cent of the scalawags had attended college. In addition, three of the 
seven blacks had received same college training. Of the three, James 
T. Rapier (AL) was by far the best educated. Rapier's father, a free- 
black barber in Florence, had sent his son to Canada, where he received 
private tutoring and completed his secondary education. Rapier also did
^Six of ten states did not complete redlstrlcting in time for 
elections to the Forty-Third Congress. Those states elected at-large 
Representatives equal to their increase. Republicans won seven of the 
nine at-large seats.
^The median age for all members was 46.54 years and 45.06 for 
first termers. See Stuart A, Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 297.
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scane -work at Montreal College before taking a bachelor’s degree and 
doing graduate work at the University of Glasgow in Scotland. ^
Sixty-nine percent of the Representatives had been born in the 
South and 72 percent resided in the South prior to the war. At least 
seventeen (fourteen Democrats and three scalawags) were former slave­
holders. Of the fourteen identified as Democrats in the antebellum 
period, twelve remained in the party and two became scalawags. The 
dispersion of the fourteen former Whigs is more interesting in that 
eight joined the Democrats and only six became scalawags. Only three 
Representatives, all carpetbaggers, were positively identified as 
having been Republicans in the late 1850* s. The known secessionists 
numbered seven and those same seven men had supported Breckinridge in 
the presidential election of i860. Six of the Democrats had supported 
either Bell or Douglas, and three scalawags had favored Douglas. 
Seventy-six percent of the Democrats and 23 percent of the scalawags 
were Confederate veterans. The other Democrats and scalawags had sat
^Thomas J. Freeman, "The Life of James T. Rapier" (unpublished 
M.A. thesis, Alabama Polytechnic Institute, 1959), k~6; Norman W.
Walton, "James T. Rapier, Congressman from Alabama," Negro History 
Bulletin, XXX (November, 19^ 7), 6-8. In a much quoted passage, Horace 
Mann Bond charged that Negro leadership in Alabama during Reconstruction 
had no real connection "with the great masses of landless, utterly 
penniless Negro ex-slaves they purported to represent." Bond cited 
Rapier, who owned a "large plantation in North Alabama," as an example 
of this leadership, which was "bent on achieving, within the economic 
framework which favored them, the social and economic privileges which 
were the dower of the white Conservatives whom they publicly opposed."
See Bond, "Social and Economic Forces in Alabama Reconstruction,"
Journal of Negro History, XXIII (July, 1938), 296-97. Bond’s blanket 
condemnation of Alabama's black leadership deserves reconsideration.
The voting behavior of the blacks (particularly Rapier) in the House 
indicates that they did what they could, in the face of considerable 
opposition, for their black constituents.
out the war while twelve of the fifteen, carpetbaggers had served in 
the Union army.
Sixty-three percent of the Representatives were lawyers and only 
23 percent were planters or farmers. Over three-quarters of the Demo­
crats were lawyers, but the Republicans tended to be scattered among 
other vocations. Real and personal property evaluation for forty-four 
Representatives indicates that the Democrats were considerably wealthier 
tnan any of the Republicans. William S. Herndon (D-TX) and Effingham 
Lawrence (D-Lfl.) were worth over $100,000. Two other Democrats and three 
scalawags held property valued at more than $50,000, but the scalawags 
were again the poorest of any of the political factions, including the 
blacks. For those whose wealth has been determined, fifteen (of 
twenty-two) Democrats were worth over $10,000 while seven (of twelve) 
scalawags had less than $10,000 in real and personal estate. The 
information on the carpetbaggers is too incomplete to warrant compar­
ison, but the five blacks for whom information is available were all 
worth less than $10,000.
The general level of political experience continued to increase. 
All but two of the Southerners were found to have held political office 
at some level of government prior to their election. Twenty-one of the 
sixty-eight had held local offices, and forty-eight had served at the 
state level. Twenty-four had served in at least one previous Recon­
struction House, four were members of the House prior to the war, and 
three had served in the Confederate Congress.
The Southern elections to the Forty-Third House were the most
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closely contested of the. Reconstruction period. Twenty-six Represen­
tatives won by a margin of less than 5 percent of the vote, and the 
margin of victory for fifteen was under 2 percent. Thirteen of the 
seventeen scalawags, who were again caught in the narrowly white or 
black districts, won their seats by a margin of less than 5 percent.
By contrast, the carpetbaggers and blacks represented the safely 
Republican districts. Nine of the fifteen carpetbaggers and five of 
the seven blacks won with a margin of victory greater than 20 percent.
The Democrats also had relatively secure victories, for nearly 80 per­
cent won by a margin of 5 percent or better. The close elections 
spawned twelve formal contests of which four were successful. Two of 
the successful contestants, Effingham Lawrence (D-LA) and George A.
Sheridan (R-IA), had the dubious honor of being seated on the final 
day of the Forty-Third Congress.
Cross-tabulations of political affiliation with the congressional 
district data for the newly created districts yielded familiar patterns. 
Carpetbaggers continued to control four of six urban districts, and 
Republicans fared well in heavily agricultural districts. Over SO per­
cent of the Democrats came from districts that were over 55 percent 
white— obviously districts in which the process of redemption met the 
least resistance. All but two of the scalawags represented districts 
that were 40 to 60 percent white, and two-thirds of the carpetbaggers 
and aU but one black came from districts having black majorities.
Republicans still dominated the Southern congressional delegation, 
but evidence of a shift was apparent. It seems probable that the
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absence of a viable Democratic presidential candidate in I872 promoted 
Democratic disunity and placed Southern Democratic candidates for the 
House at a disadvantage. As a result of this situation and the fact 
that they controlled the process of reapportionment in several states, 
Southern Republicans gained seats in the House. But the elections of 
1872 were only a temporary setback, if even that, to the process of 
redemption at the state level. By 1874 all but four of the Southern 
states were safely under Democratic control, and certain sections of 
those four states had already been won by Democrats. The process of 
redemption caught up with the Republican Representatives in the 
congressional elections of 1874. The South sent forty-nine Democrats . 
and only seventeen Republicans to the Forty-Fourth Congress. In many 
ways, the Forty-Third Congress was a last hurrah for Southern Repub­
licans.
The Forty-Third Congress convened in the early months of what was 
to be the longest depression in American history. The depression, which 
would last until early 1879, was touched off by a banking panic which 
had its origins in the railroad boom of the early 1870s, a decline in 
the attractiveness of railroad securities, and an overextended economy.®
®0n the Panic of 1873 and the subsequent depression, see Rendigs 
Fels, American Business Cycles. 1869-1897 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1959}* ch. 6, especially 98-112; Irwin Unger,
The Greenback Era: A Social ana Political History of American Finance,
1865-1879 (PrincetonT Princeton University Press, 1964}, 213-33;
Samuel Rezneck, "Distress, Relief, and Discontent during the Depression 
of 1873-78," Journal of Political Economy, LVTII (December, 1950), 
494-513; and 0. V. Wells, "The Depression of 1873-79," Agricultural 
History, XI (July, 1937)* 237-49- Walter T. K. Nugent discusses the 
depression in its international context in Money and American Society, 
I865-I880 (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 175-84. Little is known 
about the actual effects of the panic in the South. E. Merton Coulter
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Congress spent most of the First Session seeking a solution to the 
economic orisis. Among the proposed solutions, a number of measures 
to expand the currency coupled with some form of free hanking and 
general retrenchment won the most favor. In the process, what little 
party unity had existed on economic measures largely disappeared. 9 
Several inflationist bills passed Congress during the session, but the 
most comprehensive measure received Grant's veto. That veto, along with 
the continuing depression and the scandals of the Grant administration, 
spelled disaster for the Republicans in the congressional elections of 
1874. The Democrats, standing on their own once again, secured a 
majority in the House for the first time since the antebellum period.
As a result, during the lame duck session, the Republican majority 
scrambled to secure several important pieces of economic legislation, 
including a revision of tax and tariff schedules and a bill providing 
for specie resumption. The deliberations on economic issues were 
punctuated by partisan controversy over the issues of political
suggests in passing that as the South had fewer institutions susceptible 
to panics, the section suffered less than did the North, but the falling 
prices for agricultural products did cause distress; see Coulter, The 
South During Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1947), 194-• For other references to the effect of 
the panic, see Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, 1865- 
1933 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), 4-I5-46.
9F0r an exposition of the thesis that during periods of economic 
distress, party lines give way to local and sectional interests, see 
Hannah Grace Roach, "Sectionalism in Congress (1870 to IB90)," American 
Political Science Review, XIX (August, 1925), 500-26. From her analysis 
of sixty-four roll-call votes, primarily on economic measures, Roach 
concluded that in the periods of depression the agricultural sections 
(the West and South) tended to unite in a bipartisan coalition in 
defense of their interests. In more prosperous times, party voting 
was the rule, although Roach notes, but does not emphasize, that the 
two parties seldom achieved internal unity on economic questions.
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reconstruction-most notably the proposal that eventually emerged as 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875.10
In a lengthy review of the currency debate during the First 
Session, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., no friend of irredeemable paper 
money, noted with satisfaction that President Grant had vetoed the 
so-called "Inflation Bill" which Congress had passed in April 1874.
The time and rhetoric spent constructing this "legislative curiosity" 
fascinated Adams: "the amount of groaning on the part of the mountain 
which proceded its still bom genius was truly portentous." He 
calculated that over 125 set speeches had been given on the currency 
issue and that the debate covered nearly 1700 columns in the Congres­
sional Record.^ - Congress did seem to do little else than try to 
expand the currency during the session, and the net result certainly 
was not commensurate with the effort expended.
Congressional proposals to cope with the currency question
numbered several score, but only three were of particular importance. 
The first was the least complicated of the three. Entitled "a bill to 
fix the amount of legal tender notes at $1*00,000,000," the measure
10For the controversy over the civil rights b i U  (H. R. 796), 
see Cong. Record, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 375-86, 405-30, 452-58, 
787-B7B7 9^3-&>7 977-92, 996-1012. Of the 485 roll-call votes, 
approximately 30 percent related to major economic issues. Nearly 
a quarter of the recorded roll calls were taken on procedural questions 
relating to a sundry appropriation bill (H. R. 4729), an election bill 
(H. R. 4745), and H. R. 796, the civil rights bill. The latter measure 
generated an incredible string of 74 roll-call votes on January 27,
1875— representing the delaying tactics of civil rights opponents.
See ibid., 787-828.
^Charles Francis Adams, Jr., "The Currency Debate of 1873-74," 
North American Review, C3QX (July, 1874), 112, 120.
Iproposed to resolve a dispute as to the authorized circulation of 
tender notes— which were also referred to as legal tenders, United 
States notes, or more popularly, greenbacks. The wartime acts estab­
lishing the greenbacks had authorized a circulation of $1*00 million.^ 
Starting in mid-1865, the Secretary of the Treasury, Hugh McCulloch, an 
avowed hard-money man, began to contract the volume of the greenbacks 
in circulation, and in March 1866 McCulloch received congressional 
sanction for his policy. When Congress finally cut off further con­
traction in early 1868, McCulloch had reduced the volume of circulating 
greenbacks to a little over $356 million. ^3 The greenbacks remained at 
that level until October 1873, when Secretary of the Treasury William 
A. Richardson began to reissue the retired greenbacks to help ease 
the effects of the depression. By mid-January 187*1- Richardson, with­
out congressional approval, had released $26 million to bring the 
greenback circulation to $382 million.-*-14-
•^Actually $U50 million had been authorized, but fifty millions 
were to be withheld from circulation to provide security for the tempo­
rary loan deposits with the Treasury. The $50 million was retired in 
1867 when the loans were repaid. On the origins and the amounts of the 
greenbacks, see Robert P. Sharkey, Money. Class, and Party; An Economic 
Study of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1959), 15-50; Unger, Greenback Era, l^-l£; and Robert T. Patter­
son, Federal Debt -Management Policies, lSo5-1879 (Durham: Duke Univer­
sity Press, 195*17, 179.
■*^ The ramifications of McCullochTs contraction are extensively 
treated in Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, chs. II-III.
■^AHan Nevins has charged that the restoration of the greenbacks 
to circulation was done to assist Republicans in the fall elections in 
the inflationist West rather than to meet a real need for more currency. 
See Nevins, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1937}, 696. Fish had no use for
paper money and liked Richardson even less. Nevins readily accepted 
the biases of his subject on the currency question.
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Whether the legal ceiling on greenback circulation was $356 
million to $400 million was therefore the subject of dispute during 
the First Session. James B. Beck (D-Kf), the bill's sponsor, explained 
that H. R. 1068 proposed to resolve the dispute by legally establishing 
the authorized greenback circulation at $400 million— thus sanctioning 
Richardson's issue of $26 million and providing for the release of an 
additional $18 million into circulation.*^ The proposed increase of 
$18 million incited opposition among most Northeastern Representatives. 
When the bill came up for final consideration on March 23, 1874, two 
attempts were made to reduce the authorized circulation. The first 
called for a ceiling of $382 million— thus giving congressional sanction 
to the $26 million issued by Secretary Richardson. While the first 
amendment was pending, Henry L. Dawes (R-MA) moved to amend the amend­
ment to reduce the total amount of U. S. notes in circulation to $356 
million which would entail calling in the $26 million issued by 
Richardson. The amendments failed by nearly identical margins. As 
Table 6-1: A indicates, the Dawes amendment received considerable sup­
port in the Northeast, particularly in New England. The Western and 
Southern Representatives voted overwhelmingly to defeat the amendment. 
The sides reversed positions on the motion to pass the bill (see 
Table 6-1: B). New England voted 1-22 against the bill, the Middle 
Atlantic states split on the issue, and the Western and Southern states 
provided most of the favorable votes.
Quite clearly, the House, led by the Western and Southern members, 
•^ Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 839.
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table: 6-1: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PASTY 
ON H. R. 1398
A. To amend an amendment H. R. 1398 by reducing the amount of U. S. 
notes in circulation to $396 million8.
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem, Hep
NE 2 20 • • 1
MA 11 16 3 29
MW 2 6 19 59
SS 3 1 18 20
BS 3 2 Ik 6
PS _2 _2 » ♦ k
Total 2k k7 5k 119
Grand Total 71 173
B. To pass H. R. 1398> a hill fixing the amount of legal tender notes
at $1*00 million^
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE • a 1 2 20
MA 3 26 10 18
MW 18 57 3 8
SS 20 20 3 1*
BS 13 6 3 2
PS _1 k _2 _2
Total 55 ilk 23 5k
Grand Total 169 77
aCong. Record, lf3 Cong., 1 Sess., Pfc. 3, 2376 (March 23, 187*0. 
^Ibid.
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favored an increase in the volume of circulating greenbacks as at least 
a partial solution to the economic crisis— much to the chagrin of most 
Northeasterners and hard money advocates. In reference to H. R, 1398, 
James A. Garfield (R-OH), for example, commented in his diary that 
’’the House by this backward step has lost nearly’ all we gained in the 
direction of specie payments in the last seven y e a r s . I n  a later 
letter Garfield lamented that "We might as well address the patients 
in the lunatic asylum on finance, as to hope to change the tone of the 
House at present."*^
The anti-inflationists' fears that Congress would authorize a 
substantial increase in the amount of paper currency in circulation 
were at least temporarily confirmed. The Senate did not consider 
H. R. 1398 because it was then considering its own bill that not only 
set the greenback level at $b00 million but also added $U6 million to 
the national bank note circulation. In the interim, the House turned 
its attention to a bill "to amend the several acts providing a national 
currency and to establish free banking, and for other purposes” (H. R. 
1572). As finally passed at the end of the session, H. R. 1572 bore 
no resemblance to the measure that was first introduced. Initially, 
the main section of the bill proposed to establish free banking by 
removing all restrictions on the amount of national bank notes in
l^Harry James Brown and Frederick D. Williams (eds.), The Piary of 
James A. Garfield: Volume II, 1872-187^ (East Lansing: Michigan State
University Press, 1967)> 30^ (March 23, 187^}.
"^Garfield to Burke Aaron Hinsdale, March 26, 187^ > in Mary L. 
Hinsdale (ed.), Garfield-Hinsdale Letters: Correspondence Between James 
Abram Garfield and Burke Aaron Hinsdale~TAnn Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 19 9^), 280.
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circulation and permitting national banks to increase their capital 
and circulation as much as they 'wished. Another important section 
proposed a gradual method of returning to specie payments by directing 
the Secretary of the Treasury, beginning in July 1874, to replace $2 
million in greenbacks every month with an equal amount of non-interest 
bearing notes which would be payable in gold two years after their 
issuance. Among the other provisions of the bill was one relieving 
national banks from keeping a reserve on their circulation which would 
have released the greenbacks then being so held.
H. E. 1572 was subjected to a lengthy debate on the House floor 
during which a host of amendments and alternative proposals were 
offered. The four Virginians and one Mississippian who were allowed to 
make major speeches on the bill presented divergent views but all 
favored an increase in the volume of currency for their section. James 
H. Platt (R-VA), for example, spoke in favor of free banking and specie 
payments if contraction could be avoided. John T. Harris (D-VA) 
criticized the Northeast for the maldistribution of national bank notes, 
but he emphasized his preference for greenback expansion to bank note 
expansion. Jason Niles (R-MS) proclaimed that money was "almost a 
stranger in the West and South" and indicated that he favored redistri­
bution or free banking, but he did not advocate an increase in currency 
volume.^
■^For the text of the bill see Cong. Record. 43 Cong., 1 Sess.,
Pt. 1, 1007. See also the remarks of Charles B. FarweU (R-IL), a 
member of the Committee on Banking and Currency, ibid., Pt. 3, 2508.
^Ibid., Pt. 3, 3871-7^ (Platt), 2739-^2 (Harris); Pt. 6, Appendix, 
180-82 (Niles).
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Debate on the hill opened on March 26, 187^, and continued almost 
unabated until the first votes were taken on pending amendments on 
April 10. The hill appeared to offer something to all interests, hut 
the amendments which were offered indicated that no one was fully 
satisfied with the measure. The first feature to he eliminated was 
the section proposing a gradual method of specie resumption. Primary 
opposition to the clause came from soft money advocates, especially 
the greenbackers, hut the immediate resumption!sts from the Northeast 
also opposed it— although they were willing to take what they could, 
get. Southerners were clearly split on the question (see Tahle 6-2: A). 
Most Southern Republicans and a large portion of the Democrats favored 
eliminating the resumption clause, hut nearly a third of the Southerners 
voted for it.
On the other hand, Southerners consistently voted against amend­
ments designed to counteract the inflationary effect of the hill and 
in favor of those Intended to expand the circulating medium. Anti- 
greenbackers, for example, attempted to amend the free hanking proposal 
in H. R. 1572 to provide that as national hank notes were issued in excess 
of the $35*J- million then authorized, an equal amount of greenbacks would 
he retired until the outstanding greenbacks were reduced to $300 million. 
Southerners opposed the amendment (6-lfO), as did Midwesterners (12-69), 
hut New England supported it (23-0) and the Middle Atlantic states 
split on the issue (30-29).^0
20por the text of the amendment and the division thereon, see 
ibid., Pt. 3, 3002. A similar amendment later proposed that as the 
hank note circulation exceeded $400 million, greenbacks would he retired 
at the same rate until the $300 million level was reached. This amend­
ment was also defeated. See ibid., Pt. h, 3073.
TABLE 6-2: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY 
ON H. R. 1572
To amend H. R. 1572 By eliminating the section providing for a 
gradual resumption of specie paymentsa
Region
Yea 
Don. Rep.
Nay 
Dem. Rep.
NE *. 1 2 22
MA 1 21 9 25
MW 19 53 2 10
SS 16 17 5 13
BS 13 6 3 3
PS -A _ 1
Total 50 103 2k 75
Grand Total 153 99
0 amend H. R. 1572 by providing for a limit of $*(00
U. S. notes and making the U. S. notes convertible 
percent "bonds®
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE 2 2 21
MA 1 20 11 25
MW 16 27 3 3**
SS 15 20 5 9
BS 9 5 7 *+
PS -2 J2 _2
Total *(3 79 30 $k
Grand Total 122 12k
aCong. Record, U3 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 
forbid., 3U07 (April 10, 187*0-
3, 3005 (Apri
3.65
A more interesting and controversial amendment proposed the 
creation of a new type of bonds which would be exchangeable or "inter­
convertible” with greenbacks. The idea had long been advocated by- 
soft money interests and by greeribaeker Benjamin Butler (R-MA). The 
essence of the proposition, as offered by William D. Kelly (R-PA), 
was that the greenback circulation be limited to $i*00 million and that 
greenbacks, at the discretion of the holder, be interconvertible with 
U. S. bonds bearing 3.65 percent interest. These bonds, principal and 
interest, would, in turn, be redeemable in greenbacks at any time. The 
bill instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to prepare the 3.65 per­
cent bonds and to provide greenbacks in the amount of $50 million to 
be used as a redemption fund for the bonds. The bill also allowed
national banks to hold the 3*65 bonds instead of greenbacks to meet
21their reserve requirement. The initial effect of the proposal would 
be to produce a significant expansion of greenback circulation, but 
advocates of the interconvertible bond claimed, with much justification, 
that the scheme would provide a needed elasticity to the circulating 
medium and that it would assist in controlling interest rates.^
Kelly's amendment came within two votes of passage (see Table 6-2: B).^ 
It received substantial support in all areas outside New England, but
^For the text of the proposal, see ibid., Pt. 3, 3005. The green 
backs exchanged for the bonds were to be applied to the purchase or 
redemption of any other outstanding U. S. bonds or to purchase gold to 
do the same.
no
For the origins and the sources of Northern support of the inter 
convertible bond idea, see Unger, Greenback Era, 99-119; and Sharkey, 
Money. Class, and Party. 187-206.
23jhe vote totals in Table 6-2: B include paired and announced 
votes. The recorded vote was 120-122 instead of 122-124 as indicated 
in the table.
the margin of support in the South was greater than that in any other 
region.
With the excerption of the elimination of specie resumption, H. R. 
1572 survived the amending process intact and was passed by the House. 
As adopted, the measure was essentially a free banking bill, although 
it did release most of the greenback reserves formerly held against 
the bank note circulation and it set the maximum, greenback circulation 
at $1*00 million.*^ The opposition to the bill in New England and the 
Middle Atlantic states stemmed from its inflationary character and the 
fact that the resumption clause had been eliminated. In the light of 
their behavior during the amending process, the Democrats' 15-63 vote 
against final passage is more difficult to explain, but it seems 
probable that most Democrats disliked enhancing the national banking 
system and its currency (see Table 6-3). Southern Democrats were 
obviously less particular than other Democrats about what kind of 
currency should be expanded. Nearly half of them joined Southern 
and Midwestern Republicans and a sizable group of Republicans from the 
Middle Atlantic states to pass the bill on April 11*, 1873.
On the same day, the House took up and passed a third currency 
measure— the so-called ’’Inflation Bill" (S. 617). This measure 
represented the work of inflationists in the upper house. like H. R. 
1398, which had earlier passed the House, S. 617 expanded the green­
back circulation from the $382 million then in circulation to $1*00
2lfFor the text of the bill as approved, see Cong. Record, 1*1 Cong. 
1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3022-23.
ZABLE 6-3
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY 
TO PASS H. R. 1572®
Yea
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep
NE • • 1 2 22
MA • * 23 15 25
MW 5 55 16 9
SS 9 29 11 3
BS 1 8 15 2
PS » <
— 1 Jt _2
Total 15 121 63 63
Grand. Total 136 126
®Cong. Record., 43 Cong., 1 Sesa., Pt. 4, 3073 (April 14, 1874),
TABLE 6-4
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO PASS 
THE INFLATION BILL (S. 6l7)a
Yea
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep
NE • • 1 2 23
MA • • 36 15 30
MW 13 56 8 9
SS 12 27 8 4
BS U 8 6 2
PS _1 - 1 _2 _2
Total 37 113 41 70
Grand Total 150 H I
aCong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3078 (April 14, 1874).
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million, but it also added $1(6 million to the volume of national bank 
notes, raising that circulation to $1(00 million. The additional $1(6 
million was to go to banks in states having less than their quota of 
such c u r r e n c y . The vote on S. 617 in the House was similar to that 
on H. B. 1572 with the exception that the Midwestern and Southern 
Republicans were now joined by a greater number of Democrats from the 
same sections to pass the bill over the strong objections of Repre­
sentatives from the Northeast (see Table 6-l().
As the first currency bill to be passed by both Houses, the 
"Inflation Bill," as it was dubbed by its opponents, quickly became the 
center of considerable controversy. Soft money advocates were con­
fident that Grant, who seemed aware of the powerful expansionist 
sentiment in his party, would sign the bill since he had earlier 
approved Richardson's release of the $26 million in greenbacks. Grant, 
however, was also tinder intense pressure from businessmen, bankers, 
reformers, resumptlonists, and hard money advocates who were opposed to 
the bill, and he surprised everyone by assenting to their wishes and 
vetoing it on April 22.^ In his veto message, the President reviewed 
his own statements and those made in the Public Credit Act of I869 
promising an early return to specie payments and declared that the 
$44 million in greenbacks should be held as a reserve. He added that
25fhe text of S. 617 is in ibid., 3077.
p/I
For Northern sentiment for and against the bill, see Unger, 
Greenback Era, 220-33* 235-45. See also Nevins, Hamilton Fish,
706-14.
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'when the additional bank note circulation created by the act of 1870 
was redistributed or taken up, and that "when specie payments are 
fully restored, or are in rapid process of restoration, [then] will 
be the time to consider the question of ’more currency’. "27 Soft- 
money men and inflationists denounced the veto, but a motion to over­
ride failed in the Senate and the bill died.2®
The final chance at passing currency legislation during the First 
Session lay in H. R. 1572, the free banking proposal, which the Senate 
next took under consideration. But with the threat of another veto 
hanging over their heads, inflationists in both houses were forced to 
compromise. The end result, after its consideration by two conference 
committees, was a bill bearing no resemblance to the original H. R.
1572.2^  Samuel S, Cox (D-NY) referred to the bill as "broth or 
froth" and declared that it was "poor, pitiful, impotent, unprincipled 
patch-work."30 cox, a hard-money Democrat, opposed the modest inflation 
provided by the bill and lamented the lack of a resumption clause.
House inflationists, on the other hand, felt that it did nothing to 
alter the currency volume significantly. The proposal set the level 
of greenbacks at $382 million, thus sanctioning Richardson's release
27James D. Richardson (comp.), A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, 1784-1897 (10 vols., Washington: Government 
Print Jug Office, 1897), VII, 265^ 1.
2®Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3271, 3436. For public 
and congressional reaction to Grant’s veto, see Unger, Greenback Era, 
243-45, 249-50.
2?For the evolution of the bill see Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., 
Pt. 5> 4347-49, 4958-61; Pt. 6, 5310-16; and George LaVerne Anderson, "Hie 
National Banking System, 1865-1875: A Sectional Institution" (unpublish­
ed Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1933), 321-24, 365-66).
3°Cong. Record. 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 6, 5315.
of $26 million; those greenbacks held as a reserve requirement for 
hank note circulation were to he released; and the West and the South 
were to receive an immediate redistribution of $55 million in national 
hank currency. H. R. 1572 clearly satisfied no one, and for differing 
and often opposing reasons, most Representatives agreed that it did 
not resolve the currency question.32 still the hill passed the House 
by a margin of 221-1*0. Of the fifty-four Southerners voting on the biH 
only four Democrats opposed its passage. 33
The reaction of Representatives to the currency issue in the 
First Session is summed up hy a scalngram (see Tables 6-5: A and 6-5: B) 
Southerners, Democrats and Republicans alike, scaled in the strongest 
inflationist positions (scale positions 5 and 6). 3^ Representatives 
from the Midwestern and border states also strongly supported inflation­
ary measures as did a sizable number of Republicans from the Middle
3XEtor the text of the bill, see ibid., 5310-11.
32por a sampling of House opinion on the hill, see the remarks of 
Horace Maynard (R-TN), Henry L. Dawes (R-ME), Joseph R. Hawley (R-CT), 
Eugene Hale (R-ME), William D. Kelly (R-PA), Samuel J. Randall (D-PA), 
William S. Holman (D-IN), Samuel S. Marshall (D-Ui), and Samuel S. Cox 
(D-NY), ibid., 5311-16. No Southerner spoke on the measure.
33®xe vote on the bill is in ibid., 5316.
3^Che five Southerners opposing the inflationary measures (scale
positions 0 and l) were Bromberg (D-AL), Herndon (D-TX), Hancock (D-TX), 
Niles (R-MS), and Platt (R-VA). Apparently all five were simply hard 
money men. Nothing in their backgrounds suggest any other reason for
their opposition to currency expansion— with the possible exception that
Herndon and Hancock were both extremely wealthy and established individ­
uals. Of the five only Niles and Platt participated in the debate.
Niles favored redistribution or free banking as long as expansion was 
limited and he favored specie resumption. Platt also favored specie 
payments and free banking and was not a contractionist, but he also 
disliked any further issue of irredeemable paper. See above, foot­
note 19.
TABLE 6-5: A
CURRENCY SCALOGRAM:
REGIONAL AND PARTY DISTRIBUTION OP SCALE POSITIONS
REGION AND PARTY
Scale
Position D
NE
R D
MA
R D
MW
R
ss
D R D
BS
R D
PS
R
Total 
D R
0 2
12
6
10
1
• •
2a
• •
2
• •
3
1
16
23
1 • *
8
k
5
1
6
lb
2C
1
2
• 9
1
7
2lt
2 • •
1
1
3
« •
3
• •
• 9
1
■ •
« *
• •
2
7
3 • *
• •
1
5
• •
3
2
2
• ■
* •
« •
• *
3
10
U • •
• •
* *
5
3
2
m m
2
It
1
• •
• •
7
10
5 • •
9 •
• 9
b
It
8
3
2
2
1
• *
9 9
9
15
6 * «
1
• «
15
11
¥t
lit
19
8
6
1
5
3*t
90
Total 2 22 12 *t7 20 66 22 27 18 10 It 7 78 179
Coefficient of Reproducibility = .961 
aBromberg (AL), Herndon (TX).
^^ Hancock (TX). 
cNiles (MS), Platt (VA)
Scale
Position
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
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TABLE 6-5: B 
ITEMS IN THE CURRENCY SCALOGRAM
Identification
To agree to the second conference report on H. R. 1572. 
221-40; + » YEA. Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 6, 
5316 (July 20, 187*0.
To amend H. R. 1398 "by reducing the amount of U. S. notes in 
circulation to $356 million. 70-171; + = MY. Ibid.,
Pt- 3, 2376 (March 23, 1874).
To amend H.* R. 1398 "by providing that the total amount of 
U. S. notes in circulation shall never exceed $382 
million. 74-173; + = KAY. Ibid.
To amend H. R. 1572 hy providing that after July 4, 1876 
only gold and silver U. S. coins shall he legal tender 
for the payment of debts thereafter contracted. 70-171;
+ = MY. Ibid., Pt. 4, 3072 (April 4, 1874).
To pass H. R. 1398j a bill fixing the amount of legal tender 
notes at $400 million. 169-77; + “ YEA. Ibid., Pt. 3> 
2377 (March 23, 1874).
To amend H. R. 1572 by providing that as national bank notes 
are issued in excess of the present limit of $354 million, 
a corresponding amount of legal tender notes shall be 
canceled until the outstanding legal tender notes are 
reduced to $300 million. 79-160; + = NAY. Ibid., 3002 
(April 10, 1874).
To suspend the rules and consider a resolution instructing 
the Banking and Currency committee to prepare and report 
a bill increasing the circulating medium of the country. 
135-98; + = YEA. Ibid., Pt. 1, 767 (January 19, 1874).
To pass S. 617, a bill fixing the amount of U. S. notes at 
$400 million and increasing the amount of national bank 
notes by $44 million. 140-102; + = YEA. Ibid., Pt. 4, 
3078 (April 14, 1874).
To amend H. R. 1572 by providing for a limit of $400 million 
in U. S. notes and making the U. S. notes interconvertible 
with 3.65 percent bonds. 120-122; + = YEA. Ibid., Pt. 3, 
3007 (April 10, 1874).
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Atlantic states. The "balance of Republicans from the Middle Atlantic 
states joined that region's Democrats and New Englanders in opposition 
to inflationary measures. Quite clearly, the Southerners were an 
Important element of the coalition favoring an increase in the volume 
of the currency during the First Session.35
Grant's veto of the inflation hill was one of the factors con­
tributing to the disastrous performance of his party in the congres­
sional elections of 1874. The evidence strongly indicates that most 
Republican congressional leaders were determined to avoid the divisive 
currency issue in the lame duck Second Session. But the issue refused 
to lie dormant, and Irwin Unger has argued convincingly that the party 
leadership decided to "hammer out" a compromise measure which would 
reunite the congressional Republicans in preparation for the elections 
of 1876. The result, referred to as the resumption bill, was quietly- 
conceived in the Senatorial caucus committee under the leadership of 
John Sherman. ^
3?ln what is probably the best secondary discussion of the currency 
issue in the First Session, Irwin Unger repeatedly attributes the strong­
est inflation sentiment to a coalition of Midwestern and Pennsylvania 
Republicans. The contributions of the Southern Democrats to the coali­
tion are rarely mentioned, and the Southern Republicans are ignored.
As the above discussion indicates, the Southern Republicans were a 
crucial part of the House coalition voting in favor of inflationary 
measures. They were not purist greenbackers as were many of the Mid­
western Republicans and Democrats in that they also supported redistri­
bution and increases in the bank note circulation, but they consistently 
contributed twenty to twenty-five votes in support of any inflationary 
measure. The thirty-five to forty Southern votes were far more critical 
to the passage of inflationary measures than were the fifteen to twenty 
votes offered by the Middle Atlantic states. See Unger, Greenback Era, 
ch. VII, particularly 219-20, 233-35.
36ibid., 249-56
2*4-3
As it passed the Senate in December l87*f-, the resumption bill 
(S. 10***0 contained several significant provisions. The first authorized 
the Secretary of the Treasury to have minted subsidiary silver coins 
of the denominations of ten, twenty-five, and fifty cents to replace 
the fractional paper currency then in circulation. The withdrawal 
from circulation of the fractional greenbacks would be a first step 
toward full resumption. The clause attracted little attention at the 
time, but a year later a congressional controversy over the release 
of the stockpiled silver coins triggered a twenty-year debate over the 
place of silver in the nation's monetary system.37
The resumption bill also established free banking by eliminating 
restrictions on bank note circulation, but at the same time provided for 
the contraction of greenback circulation. The measure provided for 
greenback redemption equal to 80 percent of the new bank notes issued 
until the volume of greenbacks in circulation was reduced to a maximum 
of $300 million. Free banking was coupled with a proposal for specie 
resumption which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to stockpile 
gold by direct purchase and bond sales as authorized by the Refunding 
Act of 1B70. This gold reserve would then be used to purchase green­
backs presented for redemption on or after January 1, 1879. On that
day, the irredeemable legal tenders would finally become redeemable 
38
in gold.
“"The origins and ramifications of the silver clause in the re­
sumption bill is the subject of intense analysis in Allen Weinstein, 
Prelude to Populism: Origins of the Silver Issue, 1B67"1878 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), ch. 2.
3^The bill also repealed the mint charge for converting gold 
bullion into coin. The text of the bill is in Cong. Record, Cong.,
241*
Diehard greeribackers and immediate resumptionists, the extremes 
of the currency spectrum, were not pleased with the measure for obvious 
reasons. But the Midwestern and Southern Republicans, the core of the 
inflationist movement in the First Session, were apparently satisfied 
with the free hanking provisions of the hill, even though the green­
back circulation would he contracted. The hill did restore Republican 
unity on the currency question— as it was designed to do. Republican 
managers of the bill in the House successfully prohibited debate, and 
the measure passed by a margin of 138-99 on January 7, 1875 (see Table 
6-6). A H  seventy-seven Democrats voting on the issue opposed it. 39 
They were joined by twenty-two Republicans, mostly immediate resump­
tionists, and a few dedicated greeribackers like Kelly of Pennsylvania.
The Resumption Act of 1675> as a consequence of its eventual 
success, has been viewed as a hard-money measure. But Unger1 s 
argument that its function was to restore Republican party unity is 
quite convincing. The act was actually more generous to soft-money
2 Sess., Ft. 1, 316. See also: Unger, Greenback Era. 25^; Weinstein, 
Prelude to Populism. 39-**0; Anderson, "The National Banking System," 
367-68; and Patterson, "Federal Debt-Management Policies," 189-90. 
Senator John Sherman details his role in drafting the resumption bill in 
Recollections of Forty Years in the House Senate and Cabinet: An Auto­
biography t2 vols.. Chicago: The Werner Company, 1895), I, ch. XXV.
39uhger records two House Democrats as voting for the measure, 
Walter T. K. Nugent found one, and Allen Weinstein concluded that the 
bill prompted a strict party vote. See Unger, Greenback Era, 259; 
Nugent, Money and American Society, 227; and Allen Weinstein, Prelude 
to Populism, lfl. The ICFR data, which used the Biographical Directory 
as the source for political affiliation, lists one Democrat for the 
measure, but one Southern Republican, Hynes (AR), is miscoded as a 
Democrat in the data set. Re-corrected figures including paired and 
announced votes in Table 6-6 indicate that the Democrats were solidly 
united against the bill.
TABLE 6-6
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO PASS 
THE RESUMPTION BILL (S. 10^)a
Yea Nay-
Region Bern. Rep. Bern. Rep.
NE 13 1 9
MA 1*2 11 5
MW 53 21 2
ss 20 26 2
BS 6 16 2
PS il. _Jt _2 _2
Total 138 77 22
Grand Total 138 99
aCong. Record, 1*3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 1, 319 (January 7, 1875)
21*6
interests than to resunrptlonists as it promised immediate free hanking
while the vague specie resumption clause was at best problematical.
Unger's interpretation is supported by the opposition of the immediate
resumptionists to the measure in both Houses and by the fact that it
won ready support among Southern and Western Republicans. He concludes
that "to most moderate Republicans, its long-run results were irrelevant;
it was sufficient that it promised momentary party peace.I,lf0 As Speaker
James G. Blaine noted, the Democrats had nothing to lose by opposing
the resumption bill in the House. If the resumption scheme failed, the
Democrats could blame the Republicans, if it suceeded, the Republicans
could be held responsible for not restoring specie payments sooner.
Blaine also found it significant that Democrats did not delay passage
1*1
of the resumption bill as they could have done. As it turned out, 
the proposal worked and specie payments were resumed without difficulty 
on January 1, 1879* In the interim, the Democrats picked at the 
Resumption Act, but inflationists were already turning their attention 
to a new cure-all for the nation's monetary problems--free~s±lver;f
Of all the economic questions considered by Congress during Recon­
struction, the currency problem was probably the most important to the 
South. Southern attitudes on the currency issue were a function of time 
and circumstances, as they were in other sections. The central problem 
for the South was a paucity of stable circulating medium, whether specie, 
national bank notes, or greenbacks. The currency shortage was particu-
*%nger, Greenback Era, 250-63.
1*1James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress; From Tdnnoin to 
Garfield (2 vols., Norwich, CT: The Henry Bill Publishing Company,
1886), II, 569.
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larly sharp in the immediate postwar period and during the depression
following the Panic of 1873* Very little specie circulated anywhere
in the South, with the occasional exception of New Orleans, and the
South had never received its quota of national hank currency. The
ten percent tax placed on the note issues of state banks contributed
further to the shortage. Certain sections of the South were therefore
forced to rely on unauthorized issues of state and local scrip— at
best an unstable and dangerous form of currency. The South did acquire
some currency by an influx of Northern greenbacks and bank notes in
return for Southern* agricultural products, but the flow was slowed
periodically by poor crops and the necessity of buying in Northern
markets. Still George La Verne Anderson has found evidence of a drain
of currency from the North and considerable hoarding in the South in
the immediate postwar period— a drain that may have helped awaken
42Northerners to the inadequacy of the currency supply.
The Panic of IB73 accentuated the South's currency problems in 
that it hit when a ready supply of cash was needed for crop movement.
The panic had forced Northern banks to call in their obligations thus 
forcing Southern banks in turn to pay their obligations to New York 
banks in currency. The influential New Orleans Price Current observed
^2Anderson, "The National Banking System," 159-69. See also: 
Anderson, "The South and the Problem of Post-Civil War Finance," Journal, 
of Southern History. IX (May, 1943), 183-216; Airoi stead C. Gordon, "The 
Effects of Currency Legislation," in The South in the of the
Nation (12 vols., Bichmond: The Southern Historical Society, I909), VI. 
415-18; Gordon, "Currency Problems in their Relation to Southern Economic 
Development," ibid., 418-20; and Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in 
the South (Los Angeles: University of California Press, I9S0), 9-13, 
'44-4?H
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that New Orleans had "been
victimized for the "benefit of the North and the West, especially 
of New York, and while our hanks were never in sounder condition, 
or had seldom, or perhaps never held, so little paper that was 
not unquestionably good, they were compelled to discontinue pay­
ments in currency and resort instead to certified checks. 3
The Price Current warned Northeastern bankers and financiers that they
would find it to their interest "to place no obstacle in the way of our
obtaining our legitimate supply of currency," but the newspaper was not
inflationist. The editor blamed the currency shortage on administrative
mismanagement and "speculators" and he regretted "to see indications that
a determined effort will be made in [the Forty-Third] Congress to inflate
the currency."1^  The conservative Price Current favored resumption
of specie payments as soon as possible: 'Ve pay all the rest of the
world in ^ old, or its equivalent. Why can't we settle accounts among
ourselves on the same basis?
Other Southern newspapers ranged from the position typified by 
the Price Current across the spectrum to soft-money inflationists.
Within the confines of New Orleans alone, the newspapers offered a
wide range of opinion. In 1369 the Daily Picayune sided with the
Price Current and indicated its willingness to contract the currency 
in order to achieve specie payments. The effects of the panic, however, 
cooled the Picayune's resumptionist ardor. By April 1874, it was
%^ew Orleans Price Current» September 27, 1373; October 4, 1373. 
^ Tbid., October 18, 1873; January 8, 2373; December 8, 1873.
^Ibid., February 1, 1873; January 23, 1873.
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declaring that Congress had wisely postponed specie payments.^ Still 
the Picayune was not expanionist on the money question and its editor 
constantly belittled parties seeking to inflate the currency. The New 
Orleans Bee and the city's Republican were more receptive to expanionist 
sentiment, and the two papers conducted a small war on the currency 
issue with the Picayune which the Bee referred to as the ’’Organ of 
the Bondholders."^
The Republican was particularly critical of the Picayune’s oppo­
sition to the inflation bill (S. 617) and charged that the paper was 
going against the interests of the South and West:
It is not a fair representation of the wishes or interests of 
Louisiana that the reasonable increase of circulating medium 
should be censured. We repeat that Wall Street and State Street 
have one interest, the planters and laborers in cotton and sugar 
another and an opposite Interest.^®
The Republican reminded the Picayune that among those voting for the
bill were Southern Democrats who "preferred the property of their
constituents, white and colored, to that of the bloated foreign bond
holders and [who] sympathized with the planter and wished to relieve
his dependence upon the factor and country note shaver. "^9 The
Republican's editor claimed that it was "well known that our planters,
laborers, merchants, and bankers deplore the insufficiency of
circulating capital," and he could not understand "how any journal in
^ e w  Orleans Daily Picayune, January 21, I869J April 2, I87U.
^New Orleans Bee as quoted in the New Orleans Republican, April 8,
187^ .
USNew Orleans Republican, April k, 187^ .
^Ibid., April 5, I87U.
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the Southwest should, take the Wall Street stand in this controversy. "5°
The editor felt that specie payments would ccme of their own accord:
As the government "becomes more and more able to collect its 
revenues in currency, the currency will approximate specie par.
This will satisfy our people who are hy no means clamorous for 
specie payments.^1
Other Southern newspapers shared the Republican* s views on
currency expansion. During the House debate on the inflation bill,
Christopher Y. Thomas (R-VA), under questioning by a Democratic
colleague, admitted that most, if not all, Virginia newspapers favored
an expanded currency supply.^2 But at least one Virginia journal
opposed the movement to inflate the currency. The Southern Workman
(Hampton) declared that Grant Ts veto of the inflation bill
has, for the time at least, averted the threatened national 
dishonor, and while it has alienated many who have been prom­
inent members of the republican party it has rallied to his 
support the ablest financiers and statesmen of all parties, and 
strengthened the credit of the government at home and abroad.53
The Richmond Whig had long cautioned against the immediate resump­
tion of specie payments, particularly if currency contraction was in­
volved. The Whig also confessed, long before the panic, that there might 
be same merit in the interconvertible bond scheme when it was proposed by 
Ben Butler in UB69* The newspaper disliked the idea of more irredeemable 
paper, but it noted that "the scheme is backed by a logic most potent
5°Xbid., April 10, lfl7^ *
53lbid., February k, 1B7^.
^^Cong. Record, 1+3 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 3> 39^ 1.
53rhe Southern Workman, May, 187*+.
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of all in a land of universal suffrage— numbers. "5^ When It was 
suggested that the interconvertible bond might help resolve the 
currency shortage during the fall of 1873, the New Orleans Price 
Current, as might be anticipated, declared that the 3.65 percent bonds 
were the "panacea of the charlatan. But other conservative news­
papers, particularly those in the interior, were surprisingly recep­
tive to the interconvertible bonds, whose chief promoters were the 
Radical Republican greeribackers, Butler and Kelly. The Atlanta Con­
stitution, for example, announced that the interconvertible bonds 
would offer a badly needed elastic currency supply. 56
That the Constitution, long a bastion of financial conservatism,
should endorse the interconvertible bond indicates the impact of the
Panic of 1873 in the South and the growing Importance of the Southern 
57Grange. By late 1873, the Constitution believed that the economic 
crisis could be remedied by "an increase in the currency from time to 
time to meet the wants of our rapidly growing country, taking care 
that the increase is not so great as to produce overtrading and
5t*RicIroona Whig, January 23, 1869. See also: ibid., January 15,
16; December 23, 31, 1369.
55?few Orleans Brice Current, November 11, 1873.
•^ Atlanta Constitution, November 2, 1873.
57'The Constitution had tried to remain optimistic during and after 
the September panic but by November, it was obvious that Atlanta was 
suffering from a lack of currency to move the cotton crop and that 
Georgians, like people elsewhere, were hoarding money. The editor was 
not sure who was to blame for the depression, but he soon turned on 
the most convenient scapegoat— the Radical Republican administration 
and the Northeastern financiers and speculators. See, for example, 
Atlanta Constitution, September 21, October 5, 26, November 2, 30,
1873.
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speculation.11 The Atlanta paper felt that such a policy would eventu­
ally bring the nation to the "greatly desired" objective of specie
rQ
payments. The Constitution was prepared to accept expansion in any
form; the newspaper even retreated from its sharp criticism of the
national banking system and indicated its willingness to accept bank
note expansion. The newspaper accordingly supported the free banking
bill and the inflation bill and traded sharp words with the New York
World on the issue:
We know very well that New England and New York are interested 
in preserving the national dependence on that locality as the 
money stronghold of the country. It is to break that dependence 
that the South and West are now striving, and to achieve which 
they have united. 59
The Constitution did not, however, go so far as to give credit to
Southern Republicans who were a crucial element in the Southern and
Western coalition against the Northeast.
Grant* s veto of the inflation bill gave Southern soft-money advo­
cates another reason to denounce the administration. Hie Constitution. 
which had earlier predicted defeat for the Republican majority if they 
failed to expand the currency, was now fully convinced that Grant had
fidbeen bought by Northeastern financial interests.0 The veto was 
particularly harmful to Republican newspapers which had actively- 
promoted the currency needs of the South. The New Orleans Republican. 
for example, had continually criticized Boston and New York bankers
58Ibid., October 26, 1B73.
59ibld., April 1, 1874.
8oIbid., June 11, December 1874.
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and financiers for fighting currency expansion and urging Grant to 
veto the inflation bill.^l The veto was hut another nail in the 
coffin of Southern Republicanism.
The views expressed by Southern newspapers indicate that little 
sectional unity existed on the currency issue. The newspapers surveyed 
generally agreed that the South suffered from a dearth of currency, 
and most favored expansion, hut at the same time they preferred the 
initiation of seme plan for specie resumption. Southern Representatives, 
particularly the Republicans, appear to have been responsive to the . 
section's needs. Southern Republicans were more inflationist than 
their Democratic colleagues during the First Session in that they were 
more willing to accept expansion in any form— including national 
bank notes. The Republicans also supported proposals for specie 
resumption (which should have pleased the hard-money elements in the 
South) and in voting for the Resumption Act of 1875* they secured the 
benefits of free hanking for their section. But despite the economic 
crisis, the creditable record of the Southern Republicans on the 
currency question was not as important to the section's conservative 
press as was their record on the political issues of Reconstruction. 
Economic issues remained secondary to the pending civil rights hill 
and other efforts to resolve the "Southern problem."^2
6lNew Orleans Republican, April U, 12, 18, 187^. See in partic­
ular the Republican'3 critique of the New York Herald's position on the 
issue, ibid., April 23, 187^ .
^2Xouisiana newspapers, for example, were more concerned about 
the turbulent state politics which were only temporarily quieted by the 
Wheeler Compromise; Arkansas was still tom by the so-called '^ Brooks- 
Baxter War;11 187^ was the year of redemption for Alabama and Arkansas;
25k
The currency controversy overshadowed all other economic issues 
during the Forty-Third Congress, but as the depression diminished 
government revenues, the subject of increasing taxes and tariff duties 
inevitably entered the discussion. Early in the First Session William 
S. Holman (D-IN), in his continuing role as the spokesman for the 
forces of retrenchment, offered a resolution calling for a reduction 
in appropriations and "severe economy in the public expenditures" to 
avoid an increase in taxation. The House readily approved the 
resolution by a margin of 222-3.^3 House Democrats, particularly 
Northern Democrats, continued to press retrenchment as a solution to 
the crisis. Republicans, on the other hand, preferred to adjust exist­
ing levels of taxation and tariff duties rather than to reduce 
appropriations drastically.
The determination of the Republican majority to augment govern­
ment revenues rather than to retrench precipitated a partisan struggle 
over internal tax rates and tariff duties. If any taxes were to be 
increased, Southerners and Westerners made it quite clear that they 
preferred to re-establish the income tax. In May lB7k, Greeriburg L.
and conservatives across the South were obsessed with the pending 
civil rights legislation.
6^Cong. Record. k3 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 591-92. Two of the 
three Representatives voting against the resolution were Southerners 
and twenty-one Southerners abstained. The large number of Southerners 
not voting on the issue suggests that some may have been unwilling 
to go on record as favoring the resolution as it was contrary to 
their campaign for federal aid to internal improvements in the 
South.
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Port (R-IL) offered a resolution providing
That if it should he found necessary to increase taxation for 
any purpose, such increase should commence by taxing persons 
and corporations upon their annual incomes, dividends, and
salaries.°4
Southerners favored the resolution 36-4, and the Midwesterners, 64-U. 
The Hew England and Middle Atlantic states opposed it 15-42. The 
resolution, which entailed suspension of the rules, passed 137-64, 
but with conservative Henry L. Dawes (R-MA) presiding over the 
Committee on Ways and Means, the chances of reinstituting the income 
tax were nil.^5
After lengthy deliberation, the Forty-Third Congress passed two 
measures to increase tax and tariff revenues. Southern Republicans 
generally favored both measures while their Democratic counterparts 
opposed them. But when specific Southern interests were involved in 
either bill, the Southerners united to vote for What they conceived 
to be good for their section. They voted 40-1, for example, to
amend the first revenue bill (H. R. 3572) to cut back duties on
66tobacco exports. During the Second Session, Southerners again 
united in an unsuccessful effort to suspend the rules and pass a bill 
(H. R. 4544) providing for retail sales of leaf tobacco. The vote on
64jbid., pt. 4, 3774.
6gIbid.
^Ibid., Pt. 5» 4434. For the text of H. R. 3572 as first passed 
by the House on the first of June 1874 and the vote thereon, see ibid., 
4432-33. Republicans favored the measure 149-6. The Democratic vote 
was 31-43. Southern Democrats split on the measure 11-11. After two 
conference committees, the House finally approved the measure on 
January 21, 1875 by a largely partisan vote. See ibid., 43 Cong.,
2 Sess., Pt. 1, 644.
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this particular measure again indicates the -willingness of Southern 
Republicans to desert their party on proposals directly affecting the 
Southern economy (see Table 6-7).^ This defection is even more 
notable given the fact that the vote came -when partisanship was running 
high over the civil rights bill.
Partisan feeling increased during the consideration and passage 
of the second tax and tariff bill (H. R. 4680) in February 1875. Anti­
protectionists were noticeably upset because the bill repealed the 10 
percent reduction in protective duties made in 1872, but the debate 
centered more on the bill's provisions elevating duties on sugar and 
revenue taxes on tobacco and whiskey. Republicans justified the 
increases as necessary to replenish declining revenues and labeled the 
measure "an act to further protect the sinking fund and to provide for 
the exigencies of government."^ Republican leaders produced figures 
documenting the continuing decline in revenue receipts, but Democrats 
charged that the bill was simply a means of reimposing protective 
duties and raising taxes.
Scholars have tended to agree with the Democrats. Professor 
F. W. Taussig, for example, concluded that "there can be little doubt 
that the need for providing for the sinking fund was used merely as an
^The text of the bill is in Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 2 Sess.,
Pt. 2, 885.
^See the text of the bill in ibid., Pt. 2, Ul4, and introductory 
remarks on the bill by Ways and Means Chairman Henry L. Dawes (R-MA), 
ibid., 1180-85.
TABLE 6-7
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO SUSPEND THE RULES AND 
PASS A BILE. PROVIDING FOR RETAIL SALES 
OP LEAP TOBACCO (H. R. 4544)a
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE 1 • • • « - 20
MA 10 1 • • 32
MW 16 9 4 47.
SS 23 18 • • lb
BS 15 6 • • 1
PS -3 _2 • •
Total 68 36 4 io4
Grand Total 104 108
aCong. Record, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 2, 886 (February 1, 1875). 
bIynch (MS).
TABLE 6-8
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO PASS THE 
TAX AND TARIFF BILL (H. R. 4680)a
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep
NE « • IB 2 3
MA 1 40 10 3
MW # * 40 23 24
SS 9 • 18 23 5
BS 9 * 6 18 2
PS 0 • 4 -2
Total 1 126 78 4o
Grand Total 127 118
aCon£. Record, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 3, 1666 (February 23, 1875)
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excuse for raising the duties."^ Taussig argued that the sinking fund 
had never been provided for in any rigid manner, and he echoed the 
argument of House Democrats that the reimposition of duties on tea and 
coffee -would have been a better means of increasing revenues. But 
during the debate Henry L. Dawes (R-MA) declared that tea importers 
had already stocked a full year’s supply and that tea would not yield 
any additional revenue for at least a year. Professor Edward Stanwood 
has noted that a lobby of tea importers was at the time urging the 
imposition of duties to enhance domestic prices on the tea already in 
stock. Whether or not the repeal of the 10 percent duties was neces­
sitated by financial conditions depends upon the observer’s attitude 
toward the protective tariff. As Stanwood has commented, the sincerity 
or insincerity of the Republicans in promoting repeal to increase 
revenues cannot be determined by debate on the issue, and therefore is 
perhaps best left unanswered,?0
W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (8th ed., 
Hew York: G. P. Putman’s Sons, 1931)» 190n. Taussig did not mention 
that the repeal of the 10 percent reduction was only part of the bill.
?°Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth 
Century (2 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1903), XI, 189* 
Stanwood’s discussion of the 1875 bill is fuller and more balanced than 
that of Taussig. For the major speeches on the bill and proposed amend­
ments thereto, see Cong. Record. b3 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1180-91* 
1208-19, 1385-1^ 16,'"lS30-39> 1^8-52, 15^3-60, 1655-6 ;^ Pt. 3, 1665-67. 
Reiraposition of the duties on tea and coffee was risky business for the 
Representatives because the items were widely used. A year later when 
Congress was considering duties on coffee and tea, one of Senator Matt 
W. Ransom’s North Carolina constituents remarked that he was "afraid of 
the duty on coffee" and he warned Ransom that "Every old woman will 
attribute it to the Democracy.” See Henry F. Bond (?) to Ransom, 
February 25, 1876, in Matt Whitaker Ransom Papers, Southern Historical 
Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, hereinafter 
cited as Ransom Papers.
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The second revenue hill split Southerners along party lines. Few 
roll-call divisions occurred during the amending process, hut South­
erners, particularly the Virginia Republicans and Democrats, tried 
unsuccessfully to strike the increase in tohacco taxes.71 Southern 
Republicans seemed to take their cue from Horace Maynard (R-TN) who 
favored the repeal of the 10 percent reduction because the "home, the 
great depository of iron and coal in the country lies south of what is 
known as Mason and Dixon's line," and such industry deserved "encour­
agement . "72 Jacob H. Cypher (R-IA) added that the West and South 
might "find some profit" in following the New England example by using 
the protective tariff to develop their manufacturing and industrial 
interests.73 whatever their motivation, Southern Republicans Joined 
their party colleagues from other regions and voted 18-5 to pass the 
bill, while Southern Democrats opposed it 0-23 (see Table 6-8).
While the Northern Republicans were willing to increase revenues, 
they tended to side with the Democrats on bills to limit appropriations. 
In his relentless efforts to curtail subsidies and appropriations, 
Holman introduced another cleverly worded resolution at the beginning
71see, for example, Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 
1398-99, 1406-407, 1438-3971858.
72Ibid., 1546.
73jbia., 1656, Cypher was obviously pleased that the bill raised 
duties on molasses and sugar of all kinds by 25 percent. During the 
First Session, Cypher, mindful of Louisiana sugar interests, had intro­
duced a resolution to restore duties on sugar which had been reduced by 
a third in 1870. Sypher claimed that the reduction of the sugar duties 
had decreased revenue by $12 million annually without reducing the price 
of sugar to the consumer. See ibid., Pt. 1, 592.
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of the Second Session:
Resolved, That in the judgment of this House, in the present 
condition of the financial affairs of the Government no subsidies 
in money, bonds, public lands, or by pledge of the public credit 
should be granted by Congress to associations or corporations 
engaged or proposing to engage in public or private enterprises, 
and that all appropriations from the public Treasury ought to be 
limited at this time to such amounts only as shall be imperatively 
required by public service.?^
Southerners opposed the resolution.13-36, but they received little sup­
port from either Northern Democrats or Republicans (see Table 6-9).
New England supported the resolution, l£-2, the Middle Atlantic states, 
3^ -13, and the Midwest, 66-10. The House failed by one vote to suspend 
the rules and pass the resolution, but the division clearly indicated 
that the body was not favorably inclined to grant further subsidies for 
internal improvements.
The Holman resolution was aimed primarily at the Texas-Pacific 
Railroad and its president, Thomas A. Scott. The Credit Mobiler 
scandal, the Panic of 18739 and the general clamor for railroad 
regulation in the West had nearly ruined Scott and his railroad, and 
he had turned to Congress to secure additional aid for the line.^ At 
issue in the Second -Session was a bill (H. at^ively promoted
by the Texas-Pacific, requesting that the government guarantee the 
interest on the railroad's forty-year five percent bonds. In return,
*^ Cong. Record, lj-3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 173.
^Scott's difficulties and his campaign to win congressional 
approval for additional subsidies are detailed in C. Van Woodward, 
Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Recon­
struction (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), (3j-82. See 
also, Lewis H. Haney, A Congressional History of Railroads in the 
United States (2 vols., Madison: Democratic Printing Co., 1910),
II, 125-27.
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TABLE 6-9
VOTE BY REGION AMD PARTY TO SUSPEND THE BUIES AND PASS 
THE HOIMAN RESOLUTION TO CURTAIL SUBSIDIES 
AND LIMIT APPROPRIATIONS®
Yea Nay-
Region Dem. Rep. Dem, Rep.
NE 1 16 *  * 2
MA 10 2l+ 2 11
MW 19 1*7 2 8
SS 8 5 15 21
BS 15 2 2 7
PS _1 _2 J+
Total 5b 97 23 53
Grand Totalb 151 76
aCong. Record, 1+3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 1, I7I+ (December 21, 187!+).
bGrand total Includes parted and announced votes. The recorded 
vote on the question was 11+9-75*
TABLE 6-10
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO SUSPEND THE RULES 
AND CONSIDER. THE. SUPPLEMENTAL TEXAS-PACIFIC 
BILL (H. R. l+5l+7)a
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Don. Rep
NE * « 1 2 17
MA 3 20 11 22
MW 13 9 9 50
SS 21 22 2 5
BS 15 9 1+ 1
PS _2 JL
Total 5b 61+ 29 98
Grand Total 118 127
aCong. Record, 1+3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 2, l601 (February 22, 1875).
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the company offered the government a first mortgage on the line, a 
return of public lands, and the right to retain $5,000 of the maximum 
of $35,000 per mile of bonds issued to finance construction."^ in a 
letter to Senator Matt Ransom (D-RC), Scott emphasized that the pro­
posal asked only that the government guarantee the interest on the 
bonds. The Holman resolution, which was pending at the time, was, in 
Scott's opinion, "directed especially at the southern interests," and 
he pleaded for support from the Southern congressional delegation.77
Southerners were willing to consider aiding the Texas-Pacific, 
but the measure was never allowed to reach the House floor. A motion 
on February 22, 1875, to suspend the rules to consider H. R. k'jk'I and 
to set a date for a vote on its passagw was greeted by Vermont Repub­
lican Charles Willard's derisive query, "Is this not what is generally 
known as the Tom Scott subsidy bill? "7® The House refused by a margin 
of 118-127 to hear the favorable committee report on the bill (see 
Table 6-10). The Southerners, who voted if3-7 for the motion, received
solid support from the border and Pacific states which were also inter-
79ested in the Texas-Pacific project. Republicans from the Mid-Atlantic
7^House Reports, i*3 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 267, 1-^ -
77Scott to Ransom, December 15, 187^, Ransom Papers. Ransom was 
a member of the Senate Committee on Railroads and his papers are one of 
a handful of Southern collections containing material relating to 
economic issues during Reconstruction.
76Cong. Record, lf3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, l£00.
7^For Southern support for H. R. 1*5 ^7, see New Orleans Republican, 
March 6, December 17, 187^, January 30, 1875; Augusta Constitutional as 
quoted in the Atlanta Constitution, January 6, 1874,''and The Vicksburg 
(MS) Herald, March 3, 1&75. The line was widely supported in all areas 
of the South, see above, ch. IV, and Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, 
78-79.
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states split on the issue as did Midwestern Democrats; otherwise,
80Northern support for the motion was negligible.
The South fared scmewhat better on regular appropriations for 
rivers and harbors. The recorded roll calls on the subject indicate 
that the Southerners, almost without exception, united behind appro­
priations for their section— often in the face of substantial Northern 
opposition.^  Most importantly for the South, Congress finally 
adopted a plan to remove the mud bars at the mouth of the Mississippi 
river which blocked the passage or large ships into the river. The 
movement to open the river had the unanimous endorsement of Southerners 
and general support in both Houses, but the Southerners were split 
over the best means of clearing the pass. One group, including most 
Southern Republicans and the New Orleans press, backed a scheme to 
construct a canal beginning somewhere below Fort St. Philip on the
O peastern bank and running southeast to the vicinity of Brenton Pass.
®®Very few roll-call divisions occurred on the numerous railroad, 
bills, and those involved time extensions for the completion of lines 
outside the South. See, for example, Cong. Record. 1*3 Cong., 1 Sess.,
Pt. 3, 2845; Pt. 5, 4241; Pt. 6, 5332. Southern Republicans consis­
tently supported the time extensions— more so than did Republicans from 
any other regions. Southern Democrats were less inclined than Repub­
licans to extend time limits, but they too were much more receptive 
than were Democrats frcm other regions.
On
OJ-See, for example, the votes on a bill to improve the Ostanaula 
River in Georgia, Cong. Record. 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3370; to pass 
a resolution calling for a bill to promote cheap water transportation, 
ibid., 3207; to pass a bill providing for construction of a public build­
ing in Atlanta, ibid.. Pt. 6, 5199; and to amend the rivers and harbors 
appropriation bill by making an appropriation for Mississippi River 
levees, ibid., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, IO69.
^New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 28, 1869, April 8, 1874; 
Republican. February 15, 22, 24, 26, 28, 1874; March 1, 13, 17, 1874.
The Picayune, in a rare display of bipartisanship, wholeheartedly
In 1874, however, Captain James B. Eads, whom one Repres entat ive 
referred to as "a successful carrier-out of great works," submitted a 
controversial and more radical plan to construct jetties to narrow 
and extend the mouth of the river Into the deep water of the gulf.
The confined force of the river current, Eads explained to a host of 
doubters, would then clear the mud bar.^3 Given a choice between the 
two proposals, the House passed the Fort St. Philip canal proposal on 
June 5, 1874,^  but the Senate preferred the Eads scheme, and in 1875, 
the House agreed to let Eads try his experiment. By 1879 Eads had 
opened up a channel thirty feet in depth. ^
endorsed the Fort St. Philip canal, which was pushed by two Louisiana 
carpetbaggers, Lionel A. Sheldon and Jacob H. Sypher. Judging from the 
comments and endorsements collected by the two papers, the canal was 
strongly favored by most of the shippers along the lower Mississippi 
and the mercantile and shipping community in New Orleans. For the 
speeches of Sheldon and Sypher on the canal, see Cong. Record. 43 Cong., 
1 Sess., Pfc. 5, ^569-73 (Sheldon); and ibid., Pt. 6, Appendix, 407-10 
(Sypher).
^^Both plans are thoroughly debated in ibid., Pt. 5, 4518-34, 
4566-73, 4624-26. See also: Florence Dorsey, Road to the Sea: The 
Story of James B. Eads and the Mississippi River (New York: Holt, Rine­
hart, and Winston, 1947"chs. XI-XIII; and James B. Eads, Mouth of the 
Mississippi. Jetty System Explained (St. Louis: Times Print, 187£)»
1-38.
ou
Cong. Record. 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 5, 4626. Southern Repub­
licans supported the canal proposal by a margin of 23-8; Southern Demo­
crats opposed it, 5-16. This particular vote was considered by Hannah 
Roach and she found "the entire Atlantic coast voting against the im­
provement of the Mississippi River and all sections west of the Alleghe­
nies voting for it. . . . shewing clearly that section interest was the 
chief determining factor in the vote." Roach* s discussion and map of 
the vote are misleading as the question was not one of whether the 
river should or should not be improved, but rather one of how the bars 
could best be removed. See Roach, "Sectionalism in Congress," Map I, 
507-10.
^ C^ong. Record, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1440, 1448; Dorsey, Road 
to the Sea, 215. No roll calls were recorded in the House on the final 
passage of the Eads proposal, but one of its most attractive features to
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A final economic issue, that of railroad regulation, opened up 
questions of congressional powers and the relationship and responsi­
bilities of private corporations to the public. That this matter 
should appear in 1873 was primarily because of the growing influence 
of the Patrons of Husbandry in the Midwest and elsewhere. The 
Grange, faced with discriminatory and excessive freight rates fostered 
by railroad consolidation, had passed rate regulations in several 
Midwestern states, but most of the lines, as interstate carriers, were 
subject only to congressional regulation.®®
In response to Granger pleas for congressional action, George W. 
McCrary (R-IA) introduced a bill to regulate interstate railroad 
commerce early in the First Session. The McCrary bill forbade excessive 
and discriminatory rates on every railroad line extending into or 
through two or more states. The bill set up a nine member board of 
"disinterested" railroad commissioners to be appointed by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, which after investigating
retrenchment-minded Democrats was that Eads agreed to accept no pay until 
he had achieved at least 20 feet of water. Congress agreed to pay him 
$500,000 for the first twenty feet and $500,000 for every additional two 
feet thereafter until the channel reached a depth of 30 feet. In addi­
tion, Eads was to receive another $500,000 for every two feet maintained 
for one year and an additional $2 million for maintaining the 30 foot 
depth. Total cost of the project, if successfully completed, was $8 
million. The Hew Orleans newspapers and the Louisiana delegation upheld 
the canal proposal until the very end, because they doubted that the 
Eads jetties would hold up under gulf currents and storms, and they were 
convinced that it would take too long to complete. See Mew Orleans 
Republican, February 25, 1875*
®^See Solon J. Buck, The Granger Movements; A Study of Agricul­
tural Organization and its Political Economic and Social Manifestations, 
1870-1660 CCambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913), passium;
Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, ch. II; and Haney, A Congres­
sional History of Railways, II, ch. XIX. “
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existing rates, was to create and enforce a schedule of reasonable 
maximum rates on passenger and freight carriers. The commission was 
granted the power to bring suits against offending parties for damages 
of not less than $500 nor more than $5,000 for each offense.®7 in the 
opinion of one authority, the McCrary bill was "one of the most notable 
attempts to regulate railroad rates prior to the passage of the Inter­
state Commerce Act."®®
The House had already adopted, by a margin of 176-64, a resolution 
affirming the power of Congress to regulate rates on all common carriers 
and calling for "prompt and wise execution" of that power (see Table 
6-11: A). The vote on the resolution was highly partisan with Repub­
licans voting 156- H  in favor and Democrats 16-53 against. The 
resolution had not been debated, but the McCrary bill generated a full- 
dress debate. The Republicans tended to believe that the commerce 
clause of the Constitution conferred the power to regulate rates on 
interstate carriers, and most of the party favored McCrary*s proposal.
The Democrats were less willing to admit the regulatory power of Congress, 
and most opposed the bill on constitutional grounds.®9 Midwestern and 
Southern Republicans, however, mustered sufficient support from Repub-
®7ihe text of the McCrary bill is in Cong. Record, 43 Cong.,
1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1946-47-
^^ Haney, A Congressional. History of Railways, II, 255, 283-85.
89'Tor the extensive House debate on bill, see Cong. Record, 43 
Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1941-48, 1963-68; Pt. 3, 2044-50, 2144-60, 2171- 
80, 2206-209, 2230-51, 2414-37. 2459-71. Of the two Southerners who 
spoke on the bill, Thomas Whitehead (D-VA) opposed it and John Amber 
Smith (R-VA) favored it. See ibid., 2427-31 (Whitehead); ibid., Pt. 6, 
Appendix, 189-90 (Smith).
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TABLE 6-11: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AMD PARTY 
ON THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ISSUE
A. To suspend the rules and pass a resolution favoring the regulation 
of interstate commerce0.
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep
NE 1 18 1 k
MA 35 9 5
MW 8 65 11 * *
SS k 23 18 1
BS 1 8 13 1
PS _ 2 _ Z _1 m a
Total 16 156 53 11
Grand Total 172 6k
B. To pass the McCrary hill (H, R. 1358) to regulate interstate
Yea Nay
commerce'3
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep.
NE 0 w 7 2 12
MA m • 16 13 21
MW 3 59 19 7,
SS lc 2k 20 2d
BS - • « 5 17 3
PS _2 6 _2 _1
Total 6 117 73 k6
Grand Total 123 119
^ong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 13^2 (February
*Ibid., Pt. 3, 2U93 (March 25, I87U). 
cRohbins (NC).
‘'Niles (MS), Sener (VA).
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licans in other regions to pass the measure over Democratic opposition 
(see Table 6-11: B).
Southern Republicans approved the McCrary hill by a margin of 
24-2; Southern Democrats opposed it 1-20. Ironically, the conservative 
Southern press, particularly those newspapers connected wish the 
Southern Grange, supported the measure. As early as 1870, Debow*s 
Review had expressed concern about the growing power of the railroads 
and had called for freight rate regulation. In the same year the 
Atlanta Constitution published an appeal to railroads to lower passenger 
rates, and by 1873 the Constitution was promoting the Grange. The New 
Orleans Picayune declared that the McCrary bill was one of the most 
important measures considered by the Forty-Third Congress.9° Only the 
Picayune noted that the "carpetbaggers" had voted to pass the bill, but 
the conservative newspapers neglected to mention that the region* s 
Democrats had voted solidly against it. In any event, railroad rate 
regulation was postponed as the Senate took no action on the McCrary 
bill.
The South had no. grounds for complaint about the voting record of 
the section*s Representatives on economic issues during the Forty-Third 
Congress. If the South generally desired both currency expansion and a
"Railroad Legislative Policy," Debow* s Review (After the War 
Series), VIII (March-April, I87O), 237-53; Atlanta Constitution, July 3, 
1870, December 21, 1874. See also: Mew Orleans Republican, April 4,
1874, and The Southern Workman, February 1873> November 1873, February 
1874• Saloutos comments on the attitudes of Southern Grangers on rate 
regulation in Farmer Movements in the South, 38-39.
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plan for specie resumption, Southern Republicans compiled a more credit­
able record than did Democrats. The section's Democrats, because of 
constitutional scruples, refused to vote for railroad rate regulation. 
The Southern delegation waged a now familiar losing battle for subsidies 
for internal improvements— with the exception of the bill to open the 
mouth of the Mississippi Elver. Most Southern Republicans voted with 
their party in favor of the 10 percent reduction in tariff duties—  
which may or may not have been justified by tne need for revenues— but 
Southern Republicans readily abandoned their party when specific 
sectional, interests were involved.
Thus, with the exception of revenue bills, Southern and New 
England Republicans stood on opposite sides of the economic issues 
which were considered by the Forty-Third House. On currency questions, 
the most evident coalition was that between Southerners, Midwesterners, 
and Pennsylvania Republicans. Southerners mustered little support in 
other sections for appropriations and internal improvements other than 
that for the Mississippi River. Southern Republicans, however, were 
not judged by their constituents on their voting record on economic 
issues, and so the tide of redemption rolled on. Of the thirty-nine 
Republicans who served in the Forty-Third House, only nine survived 
the elections of 107^, and two of those would lose their seats by 
contest.
CHAPTER VII
THE PORTiT-FOURTH HOUSE
The two-thirds majority enjoyed by Republicans in the Forty- 
Third House evaporated during the congressional elections of 187^ .
Of the 309 men seated by the Forty-Fourth House, 189 were Democrats 
giving the party a majority of over 60 percent— their first since the 
antebellum period.^ * The scandals of the second Grant administration 
and the continuing depression contributed to the Democratic victory, 
but the party fared particularly well in the Southern states, where 
it directed and benefited from the natural process of redemption.
The House seated forty-nine Southern Democrats and only seventeen 
Republicans during the course of the Congress.
Republicans lost ground in every Southern state except South 
Carolina. After the contests had been settled, a Republican and a 
Democrat occupied Florida's two seats, but Democrats had a majority 
in every other state, and the delegations of Arkansas, Georgia, and 
Texas were solidly Democratic. Redemption had been hastened in 
several ways. Louisiana remained in Republican hands at the
1At the beginning of the First Session in December 1875, the House 
membership consisted of 181 Democrats, 107 Republicans, and 3 Independ­
ents with two vacancies; see George B. Galloway, History of the House of 
Representatives (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 19S1), 296.
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state level by virtue of the so-called Wheeler Compromise, hut the 
White League, for example, had been particularly effective in New 
Orleans during the congressional elections of l87h. Mississippi did 
not hold elections to the House until November 1875, and it was in 
that campaign that the conservatives developed the classic method of 
redemption. The "Mississippi Plan,1' a simple matter of intimidation, 
would become the model for other states.^
The forty-nine Southern Democrats formed a far more variegated 
group than is usually depicted. Southern conservatives, in fact, appear 
to have suffered from stereotyping nearly as much as have the 
various elements in the Republican party. Southern Democrats in the 
Forty-Fourth House were a particularly diverse lot. Among those 
returned were such familiar names as L. Q. C. Lamar and Alexander H. 
Stephens. Lamar, an avid advocate of hard money and federal subsidies 
for internal improvements, had established himself as a spokesman for 
reconciliation in the previous House, and he chaired the important 
Committee on Pacific Railroads in the Forty-Fourth House. If Lamar 
represented the rising Southern leadership, Stephens in his own eccentric 
way, symbolized a dying breed. Although he would serve in the House 
until 1882, Stephens lacked the ability and vigor to adjust to the new 
conditions. He was in such poor physical condition that he was bedridden
2For the White League, see H. Oscar Lestage, Jr., "The White 
League in Louisiana and its Participation in Reconstruction Riots," 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XVIII (July, 1935), 617-95; and Allie 
Bayne Windham, ’^Methods and Mechanisms Used to Restore White Supremacy 
in Louisiana, 1872-1876" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State 
University, 19^9). The workings of the Mississippi Plan are detailed 
in Vernon L. Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi. 1865-1890 (Chapel Hill: 
of North Carolina Press, 19^ 7), ch. XIII.
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for most of the First Session.
Lamar and Stephens were joined by others who had been prominent 
in antebellum and wartime Southern politics. John H. Reagan of Texas, 
for example, a lifelong Democrat, had been a member of the antebellum 
House and a somewhat reluctant secessionist, but he had served in the 
Confederate Congress and Cabinet. In the Forty-Fourth House, Reagan 
reflected his connections with the strong Texas Grange by promoting an 
expanded currency, bimetallism, and regulation of railroad rates. 
Mother Texan, James W. Throckmorton also favored railroad regulation, 
but Throckmorton and Lamar were the leading proponents of further 
subsidies for the Texas and Pacific. Throckmorton, a former unionist 
Whig, had been heavily involved in Texas state politics since 1851 and 
had served as Andrew Johnson's provisional governor of the state until 
1867.3
To this select group, Georgia added Benjamin H. Hill, a wealthy 
former slaveholder, whose Identification with the Whig, American, and 
Constitutional Union parties forecast his stance as a cooperationist
3
For the careers of the two Texans, see Reagan to Andrew Johnson, 
May 28, 1865, July 18, 1865, June 20, 1865, Amnesty Papers, Texas; Ben 
H. Procter, Not Without Honor: The Idfe of John H^nn^wger Reagan
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 196217 Reagan, Memoirs With Special 
Reference to Secession and the Civil War (New York: Neale Publishing
Company, 1906); Walter Prescott Webb and H. Bailey Carroll (eds.), The 
Handbook of Texas (2 vols., Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 
1952}, n T M a - W  (Reagan), 776 (Throckmorton); Ralph A. Wooster, 
"Analysis of the Membership of the Texas Secession Convention," South­
western Historical Quarterly, IXII (January, 1959), 328-29; John 
Pressley Carrier, "A Political History of Texas During Reconstruction" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1971), 288-H89, 
502; and Alwyn Barr, Reconstruction to Reform: Texas Politics, 1876-
1906 (Austin: University Press, 19?l7» chs. I-II.
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in i860. When Georgia seceded, Hill went to the Confederate Senate for 
the duration of the war, hut he never really became a Democratic 
"regular.” During the 1870s he announced his acceptance of the "fact" 
of Reconstruction and become an outspoken advocate of the Hew South. 
Another newcomer was John Randolph Tucker, member of a distinguished 
Virginia family and a professor of law at the University of Virginia. 
Tucker, an old line, hard-money Calhoun Democrat, was well-known for 
his closely reasoned defense of the doctrine of strict construction.
Less well-known Democrats were nevertheless familiar names in 
their own particular areas, and some, like Randall Gibson of Louisiana 
and Roger Q. Mills of Texas, would achieve prominence in the national 
councils. Gibson, a former Whig and secessionist and a member of 
Louisiana's "sugar aristocracy," would serve in the House and Senate 
until his death in 1892. Mills, who entered political life as a 
Know-Nothing, had been a fire eater in i860 and would serve in the House 
and Senate until 1899* Mills, a low-tariff, hard-money retrenchment- 
minded Democrat, became the first Southerner in the postwar period to
^For Hill's career, see Hill to Andrew Johnson, June lk, 1865,
May 3j 1867, Amnesty Papers, Georgia; Haywood J. Pearce, Jr., Benjamin 
H. Hill: Secession and Restoration (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1926); Ralph A. Wooster, !,The Georgia Secession Convention," 
Georgia Historical Quarterly, XL (March, 1956), 51; and E. Merton Coulter, 
"The Hew South: Benjamin H. Hill* s Speech Before the Alumni Society of 
the University of Georgia, 1871," Georgia Historical Quarterly. LVII 
(Summer, 1973), 179-99* For Tucker, see Tucker to Andrew Johnson,
June 19, 1B65, Amnesty Papers, Virginia; and the Introductory Polder, 
and especially "Political notebook" Humber 9, in Tucker Family Papers, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of Horth Carolina, Chapel 
Hill, hereinafter cited as Tucker Papers. The Tucker Papers are rich 
in family correspondence— much of which relates to politics during 
John Randolph Tucker's six terras in the House.
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chair the powerful Committee on Ways and Means.?
At a lower rank were long time Democratic regulars as well as 
a number of men who plainly disliked the party into which Recon­
struction had forced them. E. John Ellis of Louisiana, for example, 
came from a Whig background and had been a Constitutional Unionist 
in i860. He had joined the Confederate army with great reluctance:
I am in, am willing to enlist and fight till the foul 
monster Democracy shall cease to exist. If the sanctity 
of home and friends were left out of this quarrel, like 
the immortal Cass I would break my sword over a stump 
and retire to Private To me abolitionism is not
more odious than Democracy.
Twenty years later Ellis assured his brother, "Only let me say that I
am not a devout believer in the infallibility of the Democratic
Party either National or State." But the Democratic Party was the
only vehicle available to men like Ellis, and he joined the White
League to drive the Republicans from power in Louisiana.?
The party also harbored other mavericks like William H. Felton 
of Georgia. Felton, a former Whig, had favored secession and joined 
the Democrats, but during the 1870s he became an agrarian insurgent,
S^ee Donald Eugene Dixon, "Randall Lee Gibson of Louisiana, 1832- 
1892" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1971); and 
Russell A. Purifoy, Jr., "Statesman from Texas, Roger Q. Mills" (unpub­
lished M.A. thesis, North Texas State College, 195*0 •
Ellis to his father (Ezekiel Park Ellis), Jaauaxy 9, 1862, in 
Ellis (E. John, Thomas C. W., and Family) Papers, Department of 
Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
^EUis to Thomas C. W. Ellis August 9, 1882; ibid; Robert Cinnsmond 
Tucker, "The Life and Public Services of E. John (unpublished
M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 19*4-1), 55-65.
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and he von his seat by defeating the candidate of the regular Demo-
O
cratlc party. Still another type, this one unique, was represented 
by William W. Wilshire. Wilshire, an Arkansas carpetbagger, had been 
elected to the Forty-Third House, had been seated, and was then ousted 
by his Democratic opponent. In the interim, Arkansas was reapportioned 
and the opportunistic Wilshire ran and was elected as a Conservative to 
the Forty-Fourth House where he joined the Democratic caucus. Wilshire 
was the only Southerner to serve both parties in the House during Recon­
struction. 9
If its Representatives in the Forty-Fourth Congress are a 
valid sample, the Southern Democratic party possessed little unity on 
economic issues. The party contained states righters and New South 
advocates, free traders and moderate protectionists, soft money and 
hard money advocates, resumption!sts and antiresumptionists, and 
monometallists and bimetallists in a bewildering array of combinations. 
Nor were the Democrats solidly united behind the notion of federal 
subsidies for internal improvements. They appear to have been united 
only by their opposition to the forces behind Reconstruction. While 
they differed on methods of redeeming their section, the common bond 
against "carpetbaggers” and "Negro domination” was more than sufficient
®D.A.B., VI, 319i Felton to Andrew Johnson, July 25, 1865, Amnesty 
Papers,“Georgia; Justin C. Ward, Jr., "The Republican Party in Bourbon 
Georgia, I872-I890," Journal of Southern History, IX (May, 1<&3), 197- 
201; Mrs. William H. Felton, Mjr Memoirs of Georgia Politics (Atlanta:
The Index Printing Company, 1911),' lMt-59; and John E. Talmadge,
Rebecca Latimer Felton: Nine Stormy Decades (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, i960), 32-45. Felton*s second wife later became the 
first woman to be appointed to the U. S. Senate.
^Biographical Directory, 1935.
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to guarantee their success.
As a group, the seventeen Republicans were even more obscure 
than those who served in the Fortieth Congress. Of the nine incum­
bents who survived, only carpetbaggers Frank Moray and Chester B.
Par mil of Louisiana and Charles Hays, an Alabama scalawag, had 
left much of a mark. Even less is known about the eight newcomers.
Their weight in the Southern delegation was further diminished as 
four of the Republicans served only partial terns. During the 
First Session, Democrats unseated Morey and Josiah Walls of Florida. 
Carpetbagger Charles W. Buttz of South Carolina contested the election 
of his fellow carpetbagger Edmund W. M. Mackey, and succeeded in getting 
the seat declared vacant and was subsequently elected to fill it. At 
the beginning of the Second Session the party numbers had stabilized 
at forty-nine Democrats, six blacks, five carpetbaggers, and three 
scalawags.
A profile of the delegation is obviously biased toward the 
Democrats because of their numbers and the deficiency of biographical 
data for the Republicans. Still, a profile is useful for what it 
reveals about the Democrats. The median age of the Southerners was 
forty-four, the highest of any of the Reconstruction delegations, 
but still two years younger than that for the House as a whole. 10 
The Republicans again pulled the median age down as all but four 
were under the age of forty. Forty-one of the forty-nine Democrats
10Stuart A. Rice calculated the median age for all members of the 
Forty-Fourth House at H6.69 years; see Rice, Quantitative Methods in 
Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 297.
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were over forty. The Southerners ranged in age from twenty-seven 
year old John Boy lynch (K-MS) to sixty-four year old Alexander S. 
Wallace, a South Carolina scalawag*
In terms of formal training, the seven blacks and two of the 
three scalawags had no more than an elementary education. Four of 
the seven carpetbaggers had been to college, but the carpetbaggers 
were no longer the best educated of the Southerners. FOrly of the 
forty-nine Democrats had attended college and thirty-five had taken 
one or more degrees.
Eighty-four percent of the Representatives had been bom in 
the slave states, and proportionally the number of former slave­
holders, Breckinridge supporters, secessionists, and Confederate 
veterans increased sharply. At least twenty-two Democrats and one 
scalawag were former slaveholders. Eighteen of the thirty-one 
Democrats for whom antebellum political affiliations were discovered 
had been Democrats, but another thirteen had belonged to the Whig 
party. Nineteen of the Democrats had voted for Breckinridge in 
i860 and ten had favored either Douglas or Bell. Most of the 
latter were Unionists Whigs still in search of a political heme. 
Twenty-one Democrats had been either unionists or cooperatlonists 
during the secession crisis, and sixteen had favored secession 
(twelve unknown). When the war broke out, forty of the forty- 
nine Democrats served the Confederacy. Only ten, including six 
carpetbaggers, three blacks, and Wilshire, the carpetbagger-turned- 
conservative, were veterans of the Union army.
While most Democrats had substantial land holdings, 84 percent 
claimed the practice of law as their primary vocation. Only four­
teen (seven Democrats and seven Republicans) of the sixty-six Repre­
sentatives were farmers or planters. Real and personal estate 
holdings were found for thirty-four Democrats and nine Republicans.
Six of the Republicans held property valued at less than $10,000, and 
only one, scalawag Charles Hays of Alabama, was worth over $50,000.
By comparison, most of the Democrats were men of substantial wealth.
The property holdings of twenty-four of the thirty-four Democrats were 
valued at more than $10,000, and fourteen held property worth more 
than $20,000. It should he noted, however, that same Democrats, 
like many of their Republican counterparts, were in difficult economic
circumstances. E, John Ellis of Louisiana, for example, was contin-
11ually in debt and had to borrow money to get to Washington.
Only five of the sixty-six Southerners had not previously held 
an elective office. Fifty-five had served in some capacity at the 
state level and twenty-six were veterans of at least one term in the 
postwar House. Six Democrats had served one or more terms in the 
antebellum House, and eight Democrats had been members of the Confed­
erate Congress.
The large number of Democrats renders cross-tabulations between 
political affiliations and congressional district data meaningless 
with one exception: all but one of the seventeen Republicans came
frcm districts with black majorities. The methods of redemption
■^ T^ucker, "life and Public Services of E. John Ellis,1* 55, 73, 83.
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enabled the Democrats to -win nearly half of the thirty districts with 
populations under 50 percent white. The closest elections occurred 
in these black districts, but only ten Democrats won with a margin 
of victory under 5 percent. Twenty-seven Democrats won by a margin 
greater than 20 percent and six had only token opposition. The 
"Solid South" was emerging; in most future elections the real con­
tests would take place in the confines of state Democratic nominating 
conventions rather than at the polls.
After having played the role of a loyal opposition for so long,
House Democrats had difficulty adjusting to their newly-acquired 
status as the majority party. Part of their problem stemmed from the 
absence of decisive leadership. When the House Democrats caucused 
in December 1875 to choose a Speaker, Michael C. Kerr of Indiana and 
Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania were the leading candidates. It 
was a difficult choice for Southern Democrats. Kerr, a free trader 
and hard money advocate, had stubbornly opposed federal subsidies 
for internal improvements. Randall was a moderate protectionist 
and had frequently been found on the side of hard money, but he also 
had a record of opposition to subsidies. Southern Democrats generally 
favored a low tariff and subsidies for internal improvements, but they 
were split on the money question. At stake for the Southerners was the 
issue of further aid for the struggling Texas-Pacific railroad. The 
line's president, Thomas A. Scott, threw his support to Randall but 
Kerr emerged as the choice of the caucus. Once he was formally 
installed, Kerr was ineffective due to poor health and he died in 
August 1876. Randall became Speaker at the beginning of the Second
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Session) but neither of the two Democrats exercised the power of the 
office as effectively as had James G. Blaine (R-ME), the Speaker in
TP
the three preceding Houses.
The disorganization of the majority party was evident through­
out both sessions. In terms of legislation passed) the Forty-Fourth 
Congress was the least productive of any of the Reconstruction Con­
gresses. During the lengthy First Session which lasted until 
August 15, I8T6, the House, led by the Democratic majority, seemed 
obsessed with investigations. Among those attracting special attention 
were the Louisiana election frauds, irregularities in the Navy Depart­
ment, and the Whiskey Ring scandal. The House also spent considerable 
time impeaching Grant*s Secretary of War, W. W. Belknap, for accepting 
bribes.^ During the lame duck session, the disputed election of I876 
overshadowed all other business before the House.^
Economic issues were of secondary concern to the Forty-Fourth
TO
See Albert V. House, "The Speakership Contest of 1875: Demo­
cratic Response to Power, 11 Journal of American History* LII (September, 
1965), 252-7lt; and C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Com­
promise of 1877 and the End of Reconst auction* ^Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 195l), 97.
^The Congress passed 278 public and 302 private acts and resolu­
tions. The total of 580 was about half that of the Forty-Second Con­
gress and about two-thirds that of other Reconstruction Congresses.
See Galloway, History of the House of Representatives * 30**.
ll*For the Belknap impeachment proceedings and trial, see Cong. 
Record, ¥* Cong., 1 Sess, Pt. 7*
^See Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, passium; and Keith Ian 
Polakoff, The Politics of Inertia: The Election of 1876 and the End
of Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1973), passim.
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House and no major piece of economic legislation emerged from the 
Congress. Of the 338 roll call divisions in the Forty-Fourth House, 
fewer than 20 percent related to economic issues. House Democrats 
assailed the Resumption Act passed by the Republicans in the previous 
Congress and finally succeeded in repealing the resunrption-day clause, 
but the Senate took no action on the matter. More important was the 
opening battle on the silver question which climaxed with House passage 
of a bill to remonetize silver in December 1876. The tariff and taxes 
generated no roll call divisions, and the South came away with very 
little to show for its efforts to secure aid for internal improvements*
The Resumption Act of 1875 had split the Forty-Third Congress 
along party lines and when the Forty-Fourth Congress convened in 
December 1875> the act came under attack almost immediately. During 
the First Session, several efforts were made to repeal parts or 
of the act. The sentiment for repeal was strongest among Midwestern, 
Southern, and border state Democrats— most of whom, as soft money men, 
disliked the contraction of greenbacks. Hard money Democrats from the 
Northeast and elsewhere, including several prominent House leaders, 
joined the Republican minority, who viewed the act as a party measure, 
and opposed its repeal.^ late in the session, the Democrats finally 
mustered sufficient support to pass a bill (H. R. 4o64) which repealed 
that part of the Resumption Act setting January 1, 1879,) as the date
•^For the forces behind congressional efforts to repeal the 
Resumption Act, see Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era; A Social and 
Political History of American Finance , 1865-1879 (Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1964), 286-312.
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when greenbacks would become redeemable in gold. ^7
The scalogram in Tables 7-1: A and 7-1: B indicates the partisan 
' nature of the resumption issue. With the exception of a handful of 
Midwesterners, the Republicans opposed «.n attempts to alter or 
repeal the Resumption Act (scale position 0).1® The Democrats were 
slightly less united, but a large majority scaled in the higher 
positions favoring repeal. The hard money Democrats from the South 
reacted to the question in several different ways with most favoring 
repeal. John Randolph Tucker of Virginia, for example, voted to 
repeal while reaffirming his hard money b e l i e f s . ^  a  few, like 
L. Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi, openly favored the act, and Lamar 
even preferred an earlier date for resumption. ^  Randall Gibson
-^ Cong. Record, Ml Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 6, 5232. All ten Southern 
Republicans voting on the issue opposed repeal; the section's Democrats 
favored repeal 3 -^5*
3j3Of the Southern Republicans voting often enough to scale, only 
John A. Hyman of North Carolina approved repeal of the Resumption 
Act. The only other Republican to favor repeal was Charles Hays of 
Alabama who does not scale because of excessive absences. The two 
had little in common other than similar black, agricultural constit­
uencies— not unlike those of other Republicans opposing repeal.
Hyman, a former slave, ran a small grocery and liquor store in 
Warrenton and farmed, but he reportedly had to mortgage the farm to 
run for office. Hays, on the other hand, was a wealthy planter.
■^See Tucker to Edmund Wilcox Hubard, July 30, IB78, in Edmund 
Wilcox Hubard Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill; R. Taylor to Tucker, October lU, 1875; 
and W. Allan to Tucker, January 21, 1676, Tucker Papers.
pA
cwJames B. Murphey, L. £. C. Lamar: Fragmtic Patriot (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 10737, 137- «l«o=
The Weekly Clarion (Jackson, MS), March 29, 1876, which applauded 
the Mississippi Democrats for voting against repeal. The Clarion 
neglected to mention that Republican John Roy lynch had also voted 
against repeal.
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TABLE 7-1: B 
ITEMS IN RESUMPTION SCALOGRAM
Scale
Position Identification
To suspend the rules and pas’s a resolution granting the 
Secretary of the Treasury necessary powers to render 
effective the policy of resumption of specie payments. 
85-139} + = HAY. Cong. Record, ¥+ Cong,, 1 Sess., Pt. 2,.
107*1-75 (February l4,1876).
To suspend the rules and pass a resolution providing that 
the right of Congress to coin and regulate money does 
not include the authority to issue the paper of the 
Government as money. 97-11*6; + - NAY. Ibid., Pt. 1, 
920 (February 7, 1876).
To pass a bill (H. R. 1*06k) to repeal the resumption-day 
clause in the Resumption Act of 1875. 106-86; + = YEA. 
Ibid., Pt. 6, 5231-32 (August 5, 1876).
To amend H. R. 406U by substituting therefore H. R. **065, 
a bill providing for a commission to consider measures 
to bring about resumption of specie payments. 92-10**;
+ = NAY. Ibid.. 5230-31 (August 5, IB76).
To suspend the rules and pass a bill repealing so much of 
the Resumption Act of 1875 that authorized Secretary 
of the Treasury to redeem and cancel U. S. notes. 
115-111; + = YEA. Ibid., Pt. 3, 2862 (May 1, 1876).
To suspend the rules and pass a bill repealing the 
Resumption Act of 1875* 110-108; + = YEA. Ibid.,
Pt. 2, 1815-16 (March 20, 1876).
To suspend the rules and pass a resolution providing that 
it is unwise and inexpedient at this time to set a 
specific period prescribed by law at which legal-tender 
notes of the U. S. should be paid by the Secretary of 
the Treasury in coin. 112-158; + = YEA. Ibid., Pt. 1,
. ****** (January 17, 3876).
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of Louisiana privately remarked that hard money men were "embarrassed 
by the demands of our Western friends for the repeal of the resump­
tion clause."21 Gibson resolved the conflict between his hard money 
principles and the party position by simply not voting on most of 
the repeal proposals.
The partisan nature of the resumption question clouded Southern
opinion, and, as discussed earlier, it is difficult to determine
where the South stood on the question at any given time.22 It is
apparent that resumption had substantial support in the South provided
the process was gradual and involved little or no contraction. Part
of the Southern Democrats* opposition to resumption probably stemmed
from the fact that Secretary of the Treasury Benjamin Bristow, a
hard money man, had interpreted the act in such a way as to contract
the amount of currency in circulation. Bristow* s contraction, albeit
small, nevertheless accentuated the depression.2^ Still, the blanket
opposition of most Southern Democrats to resumption baffled some
observers. One of Senator Matt Ransom's correspondents, for example,
exclaimed that
cotton commands gold, every where in the world, and the 
south is not in favor of specie payments, your politicians 
are speculative philosophers, not statesmen.2^
21Quoted from Unger, Greenback Era, 310* See also: Dixon,
"Randall Lee Gibson," 135-37.
22See above ch. VI. See also: Unger, Greenback Era, 304; and
Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, 1865-1933 (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, I960), lf8-^ 9*
23unger, Greenback Era. 263-65.
Janies Mant (?) to Matt W. Ransom, February 13, I876, in Matt 
Whitaker Ransom Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of
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The congressional dehate over the remonetization of silver 
during 1876 was largely ignored by historians until Allen Weinstein* s 
recent investigation revealed its significance* Weinstein concluded 
that the debate served as an opening round during which Souse lines 
first formed in the renonetization struggle that would climax with 
the passage of the Bland-AlHson Act over President Rutherford B. 
Hayes* veto in 1B78.25
The Resumption Act of 1875 had directed the Secretary of the 
Treasury to mint subsidiary silver coins to replace fractional green­
backs as a first step toward the resumption of specie payments. The 
silver debate began in January 1876, when Congress endeavored to 
force Secretary Bristow to release some $10 million in subsidiary 
silver coinage already stockpiled in the Treasury. Bristow had 
refused to issue the silver coins because he feared they would 
disappear from, circulation as their value was greater than the 
fractional greenbacks they were to replace.2^ Most members of Con­
gress disagreed with the Secretary and in April Congress passed a 
"silver resumption bill" ordering Bristow to begin immediately to 
exchange the silver coins for fractional paper notes.2? But in the
North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
25Weinstein discusses the 1876 silver debate in great detail in 
Prelude to Populism: Origins of the Silver Issue* 1867-1878 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), especially chs. 5 and 7 .
^Ibid., 3h, 83-8U.
^The House vote on the initial passage of the silver resumption 
bill (H. R. 2h50) is in Cong. Record, Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2130. 
Southern Republicans favored the issue 9-° and Southern Democrats 
split 17-20. Their response paralleled that of their respective
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interim, the congressional debate strayed from a discussion of sub­
sidiary coinage to proposals to issue additional silver without pro­
viding for greenback contraction and to increase the legal tender 
qualities of subsidiary silver. The direction of the debate led 
almost inevitably to proposals to overturn the "Crime of '731' and
pO
restore bimetallism by remonetizing the silver dollar.
The debate came to a climax early In the Second Session with
House passage of a bill remonetizing the standard silver dollar. The
bill (H. R. Ul89) j a substitute measure offered by silverite Bichard
P. Bland (D-MO), provided
That there shall be, from time to time, coined at the mints 
of the United States, silver dollars of the weight of kl2^ 
grains standard silver to the dollar, . . . and that said 
dollar shall be legal tender for all debts, public and 
private, except where payment of gold is required by law.^9
House lines on remonetization had hardened and Bland* s proposal passed
by a margin of 169-53 (see Table 7-2).80
At least four of the six Southerners voting against passage were 
monometallists who were opposed to any further issue of silver with or 
without legal tender qualities. Bandall Gibson of Louisiana, for
parties. For an analysis of the Democratic opposition to the bill as 
it passed the House for the first time and the Senate debate thereon, 
see Weinstein, Prelude to Populism. 85-91*
28Ibid., 86-123.
29cong. Record, Ml- Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 172.
30rhe grand totals in Table 7-2 include two announced votes for 
the proposal. The recorded vote on the measure was 167-53. For the 
debate on the bill, see ibid., 149-51* 163-72; and Weinstein, Prelude 
to Populism, 188-93*
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TABLE 7-2
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO PASS H. R. Ul89 
AUTHORIZING COINAGE OP THE STANDARD 
SILVER DOLLAR AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
H. R. 3635*
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep, Dem. Rep,
NE 1 • • k
MA 19 6 6 26
MW 37 35 3 3b
SS 39 3 3 3
BS 23 2 1 • 0
PS 3 0 0
Total 122 h7 17 36
Grand Total 169 53
a£2££* Record, M* Cong,, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 172 (December 13, 1876) 
^Includes one Independent.
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example, was an immediate re sumption! st opposed to currency expansion 
in any form.^ Gibson was supported by two fellow Louisianians, 
Democrat William M. Levy and Republican Charles Nash, the former a 
wealthy Natchitoches parish cotton planter, the latter a black about 
whom almost nothing is known.32 John Roy lynch (R-MS) indicated his 
attitude on the measure by trying to strike the section in the original 
bill (H. R. 3635) granting legal tender powers to silver, 33 and. Milton 
Candler (D-GA), a wealthy Atlanta lawyer, was simply anti-silver.3^
The sixth Southern vote against the Bland bill came from Jeremiah 
Haralson, an ex-slave from Alabama. Haralson* s reasons for opposing 
remonetization remain unknown. The forty-two Southerners voting for 
the Bland bill probably reflected the wishes of most of their constit­
uents, but remonetization never excited much public response in the
33-Dixon, "Randall Lee Gibson," 135-37.
32Por Levy, see Biographical Directory. 1286; Alc6e Fortier 
(ed.), Louisiana; Compromising Sketches of Parishes. Towns, Events, 
Institutions, and Persons Arranged in Cyclopedia Form {3 vols.,
Madison, WI: Century Historical Association, 19^i)VII, 65; Man­
uscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules, Agricultural Schedules, 
Louisiana, Natchitoches Parish; and ibid., 1880, Agricultural 
Schedules, Louisiana, Natchitoches Parish. Levy admitted to a personal 
worth of $37,000 in 1870 and his real estate holdings increased sub­
stantially over the following decade. For the sketchy biographical 
information on Nash, see Biographical Directory, 1460-61; Fortier (ed.), 
Compromising Sketches, II, 191; and Maurine Cristopher, America's 
Black Congressmen (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1971), 64',' 104-107.
Nash's life is a virtual blank from the end of the war to the time of 
his election to the Forty-Fourth Congress.
33cong. Record, Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 1, 149-5°*
3tfBiographlcal Directory, 1701; Memoirs of Georgia . . . .  (2 
vols., Atlanta: Southern Historical Association, 1905), I, 739; and
Manuscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules, Georgia, Dekalb County.
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South until the congressional debate on silver reached its climax in 
the winter of 1877-1878.35
Southern Democrats assumed control of their section's drive for 
internal improvements with less success and less support from other 
regions than Southern Republicans had previously had. Chief among the 
obstacles were the Northern Democrats, now in increased numbers, led 
as ever by William S. Hainan (d-IN).3^ On December 15, 1875, Holman 
offered one of his familiar retrenchment resolutions proposing that 
Congress grant no subsidies of any kind to public or private corpora­
tions and that all appropriations ought to be limited "to such amounts 
only as shall be imperatively required by public service."37 . The 
House approved the resolution by an overwhelming margin of 223-31 
(see Table 7-3). Southern and border state Representatives provided 
twenty-five votes against the resolution but it was quite clear that
35por Southern attitudes on the silver question, see Salnutos, 
Farmer Movements in the South, 49-52; Weinstein, Prelude to Populism, 
270-72, 292-93; Woodward, Reunion and Reaction. 237-42; Woodward,
Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1951), 47-48; and Walter T. K. Nugent, Money and American 
Society, 1865-1880 (New York: The Free Press, i960), 217-18.
3%he South's desire for internal improvements and their Repre­
sentatives' efforts to secure such, were, according to Woodward, the 
"quid pro quo" for the Southerners. In the electoral crisis of
1876-77> the Southern Democrats appeared willing to support Rutherford 
B. Hayes in return for Republican guarantees of federal aid for Southern 
projects— particularly the Texas and Pacific railroad. See Woodward, 
Reunion and Reaction, pas slum. Woodward* s account, however, leaves 
the erroneous impression that Southern Republican delegations in 
previous Congresses had been negligent in making every possible effort 
to secure aid for internal improvements in the South. See ibid.,
12-13, 45 ch. III.
3^ cong. Record, 44 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 227. The resolution 
was identical to the one Holman offered a year earlier in the Second 
Session of the Forty-Third Congress. See above ch. VI, Table 6-9.
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TABLE 7-3
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY ON THE HO MAN 
RESOLUTION CURTAILING SUBSIDIES®
Yea Nay
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep,
NE 8b 16 » # 0 0
MA 35 20 1 k
MW kQC kO 2 2
SS 28 6 15 5
BS 17 1 k 1
PS _1 0 0 0 0
Total 139 8k 22 12
Grand Total 223 3k
aCong. Record, Vf Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 227 (December 15, 1875). 
^Includes one Independent. 
cIncludes two Independents.
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the House was more opposed than ever to the continuance of federal
subsidies.38
As a consequence of the Northern attitudes toward public expend­
itures for internal improvements Southerners received little aid for 
their projects. Northern Democrats effectively cut off consideration 
of a new Texas and Pacific measure despite an intensive Southern effort 
to call it up led by L. Q. C. Lamar (D-MS).39 Ko roll-call divisions 
occurred on the Texas and Pacific measure, but the division on an 
equally important proposal, a Mississippi river levee appropriations 
bill, gives an indication of what the South was up against. On the 
last day of the Second Session, E. John Ellis (D-LA) moved to suspend 
the rules and pass a bill (H. R. 3^30) appropriating $^ ,202,000 
"to repair and rebuild the levees of the Mississippi River, and to 
reclaim the alluvial lands thereof, to improve its navigation, and 
promote and protect its commerce. 11**0 Six states were to benefit 
from the appropriation, but $3*527,000 was to go to Arkansas,
^Woodward discusses the vote in Reunion and Reaction, 62, but 
he neglects to note that the margin of the handful of Southern Repub­
licans for the measure was far less than that of the Southern Demo­
crats. The 28-15 margin of the Southern Democrats in favor of the 
resolution was hardly an emphatic statement for continuing federal 
subsidies. Ironically, John Randolph Tucker of Vriginia voted 
against the resolution as he felt it prohibited aid for various 
Virginia projects and the Texas and Pacific railroad. He confided 
to his son that he "was surprised and dismayed with the heavy attack 
on me" for voting against the resolution. See Tucker to Henry St. 
George Tucker, December 21, 1875* January 9* I876, Tucker Papers.
39®ie Texas and Pacific issue, which was intimately connected 
with the resolution of the electoral dispute, is the subject of intense 
analysis in Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, especially chs. V-VI.
^Cong. Record, Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 3, 2232.
293
Mississippi, and Louisiana. The measure was of tremendous importance 
to the South; Woodward haB concluded that in terms of public interest, 
immediate practical need, and popular demand, "there was much more 
to be said for government aid to Mississippi levee construction than 
for subsidies to a new Pacific railroad."^ If the South could 
unite behind the Texas and Pacific proposal, it certainly should have 
viewed the levee proposal as vital to Southern interests.
The House defeated the proposal 73-11 >^ but the Southerners' 
reaction to the measure was revealing (see Tables 7-4 and 7-5)• Of 
the fourteen Southern Republicans thirteen voted for the levee bill.
Their response was particularly notable given the partisan atmosphere 
at that time and the fact that all but three were lame ducks. The 
response of the Southern Democrats, on the other hand, was less 
decisive. The ten Democrats opposing the measure were from the South­
eastern states, but the proposal should have commanded support through­
out the region. In addition, sixteen Democrats, including one from 
Mississippi and one from Louisiana, did not vote on the question.
Some of the Democrats may have been necessarily absent, but they failed 
to avail themselves of the opportunity to pair or announce their votes. 
Their response to the levee bill suggests that the unanimity long 
attributed to Southern Democrats in favor of federal aid for internal
kp
improvements merits reconsideration.
^IWoodward, Reunion and Reaction, 1 5^-
^2For Woodward* s discussion of the levee issue, see ibid., Xk6-k7- 
Woodward did not note that the Southern Republicans were nearly unanimous 
in support of the measure— nor did he mention the twenty-six Southern 
Democrats who either opposed or did not vote on the measure.
TABLE 7-k
TOTE BY REGION AND PARTY ON H. R. 3^30 TO REBUILD 
THE LEVEES OP THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER8-
Yea Nay-
Region Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep,
NE 1 * • &> 12
MA 3 k a£ 15
MW 10 9 2^ 22
SS 23 13 10 1
BS 10 • • k • *
PS e • _l JL _1
Total k6 27 63 51
Grand Total 73 Ilif
aCong. Record, 1|4 Cong,, 2 Sess., Pt. 3, 2232 (March 3, 1877). 
^Total includes one Independent.
TABLE 7-5
DISTRIBUTION OP THE VOTE ON THE MISSISSIPPI 
LEVEE BILL BY SOUTHERN STATE AND PARTY*
Yea Nay
Den. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem.
AL 3 2 1 • * 2
AR k • • • * • * • *
PL 1 1 • » • ♦ m •
GA 2 « • « « 3
LA 3 2 * • « * 1
MS 3 2 • • • * 1
NC 1 1 If « « 2
SC • • 5 * * # * « •
TX k • « • * • « 2
VA _2 JL JL JL
a 23 13 10 1 16
Not Voting 
Rep.
aCong. Record, ¥f Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 3» 2232
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With the exception of the scattered subsidy measures, the Forty- 
Fourth Congress did not consider economic issues of major import to 
the South* The South was of a divided mind on the resumption question, 
and as yet the section showed little concern about the remonetization 
of silver. The partisan climate, the paucity of economic issues, and 
the small number of Southern Republicans prohibit any conclusions on 
how well they served their section's economic interests. But it was 
altogether fitting that the surviving handful of Southern Republicans 
should break with their Northeastern party colleagues and vote for 
the appropriation for Mississippi levees on what was, symbolically at 
least, the last day of Reconstruction.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
This study has attempted to determine how well Southern Repub­
licans represented the interests of their section on economic questions 
in the House of Representatives during Reconstruction. When judged by 
their response on recorded roll-call votes in the five Reconstruction 
Houses, it must be concluded that Southern Republicans, often under 
difficult circumstances, served the economic interests of their 
section in a creditable manner. They were particularly responsive 
to their section's need for federal aid for internal improvements, for 
reduction of internal taxes, and for the expansion of the currency 
supply and banking facilities.
The assumption that Southern Republicans ignored their constit­
uents' interests and voted with Northeastern party colleagues on 
economic questions is not supported by the evidence. Even during 
times when the partisan feeling generated by the issues of political 
reconstruction was running high; Southern Republicans remained 
conscious of their section's economic interests and they did not 
hesitate to differ with Northern Republicans. In the interests of 
maintaining internal unity, the two political parties wisely avoided 
taking a stand on divisive economic questions and, during Reconstruction
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at least, only a few economic questions (e.g., the public credit Issue) 
provoked a partisan response. House Republicans tended to vote 
together on the tariff issue, but there is no evidence that those 
Southern Republicans who favored a moderately protective tariff were 
acting as "agents" of Northeastern protectionists. Many Southern 
Republicans openly promoted the development of Southern manufacturing 
and industry and they were aware of the benefits of a protective 
tariff for emerging industries.
Southern Representatives usually voted as a bipartisan unit on 
economic questions of major importance to their section and they 
willingly accepted support from any region or party. The most evident 
coalition on questions relating to banking and currency was that 
between the South and Midwest against the Northeast, but on other 
questions, such as that of federal subsidies for internal improvements, 
Southerners often found more support in the Northeast than in the 
Midwest. But outside the South, support for the granting of federal 
subsidies steadily waned during the period— particularly after the 
last big grant to the Texas-Pacific Railroad in I87I.
Only minor relationships were found between an individual's 
response to specific economic Issues and his personal and constituent 
characteristics because Southerners tended to vote along sectional or 
party lines. In either case, personal and constituent characteristics 
are virtually meaningless as determinants of voting behavior. Regional 
interests, in fact, appear to have been the primary factor in determining 
voting behavior on most economic measures in the House during the period.
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It is quite dear, however, that the issues of race and political 
reconstruction were more important to conservative Southerners than 
were economic questions. Their constituencies did not judge Southern 
Republicans on their responsible voting record on economic issues, 
and only a handful of Southern Republicans survived the congressional 
elections of 337^ to the Forty-Fourth House. Eight Republicans 
represented the South in the Forty-Fifth House and half that many 
served in the Forty-Sixth House. The Republican survivors more often 
than not represented districts which the Democrats had gerrymandered 
to contain heavy black majorities. Until such time that these 
districts could be redeemed by intimidation or black disfranchisement, 
they were conceded to the Republicans.
The subsequent careers of the ninety-seven Republicans who had 
represented the South during Reconstruction were generally undis­
tinguished. The scalawags tended to remain in the South where most 
had economic roots. A few remained active in the Republican party 
and accepted patronage positions, bub most simply retired from public 
life as their tainted record blocked effective participation in 
Southern politics. Only 25 percent of the carpetbaggers, on the 
other hand, stayed in the South for the remainder of their lives. The 
others moved, sometimes involuntarily, to new locations and new 
pursuits. A few returned North and resumed political activity in 
their home states, but a large number successfully petitioned Repub­
lican administrations for patronage positions. Most of the blacks 
stayed in the South, almost all remained active in the Republican 
party, and a few were granted minor patronage jobs. But of all the
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Republicans, the blades suffered most from redemption; their eventual 
disfranchisement eliminated them from all involvement in the political 
process.
Former Speaker of the House James G. Blaine's observations on
the Southern Republicans in the Forty-First House seem to be equally
applicable to other Republican Representatives 'who served the section
during the period. Blaine came to the defense of the much maligned
carpetbaggers and scalawags, but he noted that "their misfortune was
that they had assumed a responsibility that could be successfully
discharged only by men of extraordinary endowments." Blaine speculated
that had they been brilliant orators or extremely wealthy, they might
have been able to cope with their situation, but after surveying the
list, he found that
there was not one who was regarded as exceptionally eloquent 
or exceptionally rich; and hence they were compelled to enter 
the contest without personal prestige, without adventitious 
aid of any kind. They were doomed to a hopeless struggle 
against the influences, the traditions, [and] the hatred of a1 
large majority of the white men of the South.
Southern Republicans were obviously caught in a very difficult 
situation. They were under continual harassment and they seldom had 
any real political security. Their responsible voting record on 
economic questions mattered little to conservatives, but to have 
adandoned their support of political reconstruction meant betrayal 
of principle and party. And in their effort to survive in Southern 
politics, Republicans received little material aid from their
James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to
Garfield (2 vols., Norwich, CT: The Henry Bill Publishing Company,
1855), II, kkQ.
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Norfcnem party colleagues. The relationship between Northern and 
Southern Republicans during Reconstruction merits farther consideration. 
In the eyes of Northern Republicans, the Southerners appear to have 
been the "ugly sisters" of the party. Northern Republicans welcomed 
Southern support for the party's reconstruction policy, but the 
Southern Republicans received little in return. The survival of the 
Southern Republicans depended upon continued Northern backing for 
Reconstruction, and as that support declined and the process of 
redemption increased, the Southern Republicans were slowly but surely 
eliminated from Southern politics.
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APPENDIX I
CODEBOOK FOR BIOGRAPHICAL AND CONSTITUENT DATA
Variable
Number
(Held)
1
IBM
Card
Column
1
Identification 
State Number
Code
0 - VA
1 - AL
2 - AR
3 - FL
4 - GA
5 - LA
6 - MS
7 - NC
8 - SC
9 - TX.
2 2-3 Individual
Number
Numerical: alphabetical 
sequence within each 
state
3 4-13 Last Name First 10 characters
4 14-15 Age (at beginning of 
tern)
5 16 Age Group 1 - 25-29
2 - 30-34
3 - 35-39
4 - 40-44
5 - 45-49
6 - 50-54
7 - 55-59
8 - 60-64 
9 - 6 5  and over
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328
Variable IEM
Number Card
(Field) Column
6 17-35
Identification Code
Birth State ICPR Code:
01 - Connecticut 51 Kentucky
02 . Maine 52 Maryland
03 - Massachusetts 53 - Oklahoma
oh - New Hampshire 5*v **Tennessee
05 •* Rhode Island 55 - Washington, D. C
06 “ Vermont 56 West Virginia
11 - Delaware 6l _ Arizona
12 - New Jersey 62 - Colorado
13 - New York 63 - Idaho
lh - Pennsylvania 6h - Montana
65 - Nevada
21 - Illinois 66 - New Mexico
22 - Indiana 67 - Utah
23 - Michigan 68 - Wyoming
2h - Ohio
25 - Wisconsin 71 - California
72 - Oregon
31 - Iowa 73 Washington
32 - Kansas
33 - Minnesota Foreign
3h - Missouri
35 - Nebraska 91 - Scotland
36 - North Dakota 92 England
37 - South Dakota 93 Germany
9U - France
hi - Alabama 95 - Ireland
h2 - Arkansas 96 a*Canada
h3 - Florida
hh - Georgia
h5 - Louisiana
h6 - Mississippi
h7 - North Carolina
h8 - South Carolina
h9 - Texas
ho - Virginia
19 Birfch State:
Slave/Free
1 - Slave
2 - Free
8 20 Ethnicity 1 - White
2 - Negro
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Variable IBM
Number Card
(Field) Column Identification Code
9 21 Level of formal 1 - Self
education. Informal 2 - Common: Public and
preparation for the bar Private
(self or reading) codes 3 - College or Lav School: 
at any level; evidence No degree indicated
of formal training 4 - College graduate
coded 3+- 5 - Graduate/Professional/
2d degree
10 22 Military Service 0 - Unknown
1 - Union
2 - Confederate
3 - None
11 23-24 Occupation
Legal:
10 - Lawyer 
U  - lawyer/ Judge
12 - Lawyer/Agriculture
13 - Lawyer/Mercantile
14 - Lawyer/Editor
15 - Lawyer/Railroads
16 - Lawyer/Banker
17 - Lawyer/iron and
Coal
IB - Lawyer/Educator 
19 - Lawyer/Federal 
Official
Agriculture:
Semi- and Professional:
bO - Physician
41 - Minister/Preacher
42 - Banker
43 - Educator
44 - Editor
45 - Railroads 
b6 - Insurance
47 - Architect/Builder
48 - Army
49 - Civil Engineering
Public Official:
50 - Federal Official
51 -
52 -
53 - State Official
20 - Agriculture
21 - Planter
22 - Farmer
23 - Rancher
24 - Agriculture/Banking 54 -
25 - Agriculture/ 55 -
Railroad 56 -
26 - Agriculture/Editor 57 - Local Official
27 - Agriculture/ 58 -
Insurance 59 -
28 - Agriculture/Lawyer
29 - Agriculture/
Mercantile
!
1
I<
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Variable H M  
Number Card
(Field) Column Identification Code
Business: Trades:
30 - Mercantile 60 - Photographer
31 - Mercantle/Lavyer 61 - Livery Stable
32 - Mercantile/ 62 - Carpenter
Agriculture 63 - Bricklayer
33 - Mercantile/ 6b - Barber
Shipping 63 - Shipping Clerk
3** - Express Company 66 - Pilot
35 - Wholesale Grocer 67 - Millwright
36 - Lumber Business 68 - Printer
37 - Iron Business/Mfr 69 - Tailor
38 - Mercantile/Editor
39 - Mercantile/Banking
12 25 Primary Occupation 1 - Legal
2 - Agricultural
3 - Business
b - Semi- and Professional
5 - Public Official
6 - Trades
13 26 Former Slaveboldlng 
Status
0 - Unknown
1 - No slaveholding
2 - Former slaveholder
ll* 27 Wealth: Value of 
Estate (1870)
0 - Unknown
1 - Below $500
2 - $500 - $900
3 - $1,000 - $i*,900  
1* - $5,000 - $9,900
5 - $10,000 - $1^,900
6 - $15,000 - J >19,900
7 - $20,000 - i;i*9,900
8 - $50,000 - $99,900 
9 - $100,000+
15 28-29 Length of Residency 10 - Native
11 - 11+ years before 1861
12 - 10- years before 1861
20 - 1861-1861*
21 - 1865+
1331
Variable
Number
(Field) Column Identification Code
16 30 Residency 2361 1 - South
2 - North
17 31-32 Congressional District 
(ICFR)
01 - 1st Congressional 
District
•
98, 97, 96 - At large: 
Alpha 
assigned
18 33 Political Affiliation 
Prior to i860
0 - Unknown
1 - Democrat
2 - Republican
3 - Whig
4 - American
19 3* Secessionist/Unionist 0 - Unknown
1 - Secessionist
2 - Unionist
20 35 Vote for President, 
i860
0 - Unknown
1 - Breckenridge
2 - Lincoln
3 - Douglas
4 - Bell
21 36 Southern Party Faction 1 - Native Democrat
2 - Outside Democrat
3 - Native Republican
(Scalawag)
If - Outside Republican 
(Carpetbagger)
5 - Native Black Republican
6 - Outside Black
Republican
22 37 Congressional Party: 
Democrat/Republican
1 - Democrat
2 - Republican
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Variable
Number
(Field) Column
23 38
Identification
Prior Political 
Experience
0 - None, Party
1 - Local
2 - State
3 - Federal
4 - Local, State
5 - State, Federal
6 - Local, State, Federal
2l* 39 Margin of Victory: 0 - Unknown
Present Congress 1 *
2 - 3-5$
3 - 6-10$
1* - 11-20$
5 - Over 20$
6 - Unopposed or Token
Opposition (Less
than 10$)
25 UO Contested/Not Contested 0 - Not contested
1 - Contested unsuccess­
fully
2 - Contested successfully
3 - Won by contest
26 1*1 Congressional District:
Percent White
1 - Under 1*0$
2 - 1*0-1*!*$
3 - 45-l*9fc
4 _ 50-54$
5 ** 55-5936
6 - 60-69$
7 - 70-79$
8 - 80$ and over
27 1*2 Congressional District:
Per Capita Wealth
1
2
3
l*
5
6
7
8
9
feloo-$ll*9 
pl50-$l99 
fe200-i2l*9 
B250-S299 
ROO-43l*9 
teo-4399 
$i*oo-si*i*9 
$i*50-|l*99 
Over $500
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Variable
Number
(Field) Column Identification Code
28 43 Congressional District: 
Percent Agriculture
1 - Under 5036
2 - 50-599&
3 - 60-69%
4 - 70-79%
5 - 80-89%
6 - 90-9956
29 44 Congressional District: 
Land Value Per Acre
1 - $l-$3
2 - ;;4-;;6
3 - J!7-?9
4 - $10 and over
30 45 Number of Houses Range: 1-5
31 Current House 0 - 40th
1 - 4lst
2 - 42nd
3 - 43rd
4 - 44th
47-68 BLANK
32 69-73 ICPR Identification 
Number
33 74-77 Congressional Party 
(ICER Code)
0100 - Democrat 
0105 - Conservative
Democrat 
0112 - Conservative 
0120 - Liberal Democrat
0200 - Republican
0208 - Liberal Republican
0209 - Liberal Republican
and Democrat
0328 - Independent 
0331 - Independent 
Republican
0402 - liberal
33^
Variable
Number
(ileld) Column 
78-80
Identification
BLANK
Code
APPENDIX II 
BIOGRAHtECAL DIRECTORY
The following directory lists each of the 185 Southern Representatives and gives his birth date and 
state, state served in Congress, party (D = Democrat, R-S = scalawag, R-C = carpetbagger, R-B = black), 
former political party, secession stand (S = secessionist, U = unionist or coqperationist), military 
service (C = Confederate, U = Union, HP *= nonparticipant), occupation (coded according to scheme in code­
book, Appendix I, variable 11), real and personal property valuation in 1870 (coded according to scheme 
in codebook, Appendix I, variable 14), and Houses served in (0 = 40th Cong. . . , 4 = 44th Cong.).
Seces-
Name
Birth 
Date State
State
Served Party
Former
Party
sion
Stand
Mil.
Ser. Occ.
Property
(I870) Houses
Ashe, I. S. 1812 NC NC D Whig U 12 6 34
Ayer, R. S. 1829 ME VA R-C U U 22 5 1
Barry, H. W. 1840 NY MS R-C U U 10 123
Beck, E. W. 1833 GA GA D c 10 3 2
Bell, H. P. 1827 GA GA D Dea. U c 10 3 3
Sethune, M. 1816 GA GA R-S 13 4 1
Bigby, J. S. 1832 GA GA R-S c 11 7 2
Blackburn, W. J. 1820 AR LA R-S U 44 6 0
Blount, J. H. 1837 GA GA D c 12 7 34
Boannan, A. 1839 MS LA R-S
Boles, T. 1837 AR AR R-S
Booker, G. W. 1821 VA VA D
Bowen, C. C. 1832 RI SC R-S
Bowen, R. T. 1809 VA VA D
Boyden, N. 1796 MA NC R-S
Bradford, T. 2B35
%
AL AL D
Braxton, E. M. 1B23 VA VA D
Bromberg, F. G. 1837 My AL D
Buck, A. E. 1832 ME AL R-C
Buckley, C. W. 1835 NY AL R-C
Buttz, C. W. 1837 PA SC R-C
Cabell, G. C* 1836 VA VA D
Cain, R. H. 1825 VA SC R-B
Caldwell, J. H. 1826 AL AL D
Callis, J. B. 1828 NC AL R-C
Candler, M. A. 1837 GA GA D
Carpenter, L. C. 1836 CT SC R-C
c 10 1+ 2
U u 10 012
Whig U NP 10 3 1
c 10 3 01
NP 22 7 3
Whig U 12 7 0
C 10 5 1+
C 10 2
u NP ^3 k 3
u U 37 1
u U 1+2 k 012
Rep. u 15 1+
C Ik 1+
NP kl 3
Dan. s C 10 3 3k
u u 1+8 0
Bern. u C 10 7 3
u NP 10 3
Clark, W. T. 1B31 CT IX R-C
Clift, J. w. 1837 MA GA R-C
Cobb, C. L 181+2 NC NC R-S
Connor, J. C. 181+2 IN IX D
Cook, P. 1817 GA GA D
Corker, S. A. 1830 GA GA D
Corley, M. S. 1823 SC SC R-S
Critcher, J. 1820 VA VA D
Culberson, D. B. 1830 GA IX D
Darrall, C. B. 181+2 PA LA R-S
Davis, At M, 1833 VA VA D
Davis, J. J. 1828 NC NC D
Begener, E. 1809 Ger. IX R-S
De Large, B. C. 181+2 SC SC R-B
Deweese, J. T. 1835 AR NC R-C
Dixon, J. 1828 NC NC R-S
Dockery, 0. H. 1830 NC NC R-S
Douglas, B. B. 1822 VA VA D
U u 1+2 12
u u 1+0 5 0
u NP 13 3 123
u u 10 12
u c 10 1+ 3^
c 12 6 1
u c 69 1+ 0
u c 10 7 2
Whig u c 10 1+
u u 29 6 123!+
c 10 3
c 10 l+
u NP 35 1+ 1
NP 29 2
u u 10 01
Whig u NP 29 1
Whig u c 21 l+ 01
Dam s c 10 1+
Dox, P. M. 1813 NY AL D
mi Bose, D. M. 183^ TN GA D
Duke, R. T. W. 1822 VA VA D
Edwards, J. 1805 KY AR R-C
Edwards, W. P. 1835 GA GA R-S
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